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This thesis deals with the Uability of automobile and motorcycle manufacturers,
as well as their suppliers, in situations where a defective product causes a harmfiil event.
Specifically, it compares the product liability laws of the Federal Republic of Germany'
to those of the United States of America.^
Before entering into the details of legal doctrine, the introductory note provides
background information on the social and economic aspects of automobile use in those
two countries. Next, Chapter I describes the liability regime governing claims against
German motor vehicle manufacturers and their suppliers. Chapter II focuses on the
comparable law in the United States and contains the conclusion that both laws are very
similar, in part even identical, and only differ in a few aspects. It recommends that the
German legislature should introduce capped punitive damages to its product liability
law, and, with regard to American product liability law, it argues for the adoption of a
clearer determination of the preemption doctrine by the United States Supreme Court. It
further pleads against federalization of United States product liability law which, as a
part of tort law, traditionally belongs to the states.
' [hereinafter Germany].
2 [hereinafter United States or U.S.].
2
- Social aspects demonstrating the practical relevance of the
TOPIC
Motor vehicle travel is the primary means of transportation in the United States^
and Germany. It provides a high degree of personal mobility for each individual,
making it possible to establish social and business contacts and organize one's leisure
time. Due to the geographical dimensions and underdeveloped public transportation
systems, most importantly in the United States, the automobile has become a practical
necessity of everyday life. This observation is reflected in statistics pertaining to the
degree of motorization in the two countries. In 1996 the population in the United States
was approximately 265.28 million,'* in Germany 82.01 million^ people. The number of
registered vehicles in the United States was 201.63 million^, in Germany 49 million'', so
that the degree of motorization in the United States is 76 %, whereas in Germany it is
only about 57 %. However, it must be kept in mind that children under the age of 16 in
the United States and under the age of 1 8 in Germany* are generally not legally entitled
to drive automobiles. Moreover, elderly people will often not be able to drive cars due
to their physical condition. Thus, because these groups of people may not be taken into
account when measuring the degree of motorization, the factual degree of motorization
is even higher than the one mentioned above. In addition, the number of new
registrations for motor vehicles, especially for passenger cars, increases every year. In
^ U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Overview Traffic
Safety Facts 1996, Introduction, p. 1, <http://www.nhtsa.dot.gOv/people/ncsa/overvu96.html#Motorcy>.
^ U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic Safety
Facts 1996, Chapter 5, States, Table 103, <http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/ncsa/TSF96Contents.html>.
^ Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland (Federal Statistical Office of Germany) [hereinafter Statistisches
Bundesamt], <http://www.statistik-bund.de/basis/e/be02_t02.htm>.
^ See supra, note 4.
"^
Statistisches Bundesamt, Verkehr (Traffic), <http://v^^ww.statistik-bund.de/basis/d^dl9.htm>.
* See, § 7 sec. I, Nr. 3 Strassenverkehrs-Zulassungs-Ordnung (StVZO) in der Fassung der
Bekanntmachung vom 28.09.1988, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [hereinafter BGBi. I], S. 1793 [hereinafter
StVZO].
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1996 about 4.8 million motor vehicles were newly registered in the United States,^
compared to 3.8 million in 1995'^ while in Germany the number of registrations for
passenger cars amounted to almost 3.5 million" in 1996 compared to 3.2 million in
1995.^2 Thus, the degree of motorization increases continuously in both nations.
Although motorization brings numerous advantages, its biggest disadvantage is
that the use of motor vehicles can lead to accidents in which a large number of people
are killed every year. In 1996, there were an estimated 6,842,000 police-reported traffic
crashes, in which 41,907 people were killed and 3,51 1,000 people were injured.'^ Thus,
an average of 115 persons died each day in motor vehicle crashes, one every 13
minutes. •'* In the same year 8,758 people were killed in motor vehicle accidents in
Germany, an average of 24 people per day, one every hour .'^ In the majority of these
accidents alcohol and / or speeding was at least a contributing factor. '^ However, in a
small number of accidents, the malfunction of a part of the motor vehicle, its design or
^ Which comes to the average of 3,55 million new registrations of motor vehicles since 1988, see: U.S.
Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Overview Traffic Safety
Facts 1996, Summary, Table 2, p. 3, <http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov./people/ncsa/overvu96.html#Motorcy>.
'^ In 1994, the total number of registered vehicles was 188.43 million. In 1995, this number increased to
192.21 million, thus an increase of about 3.8 million compared to 1994 can be noticed. This number
increased again in 1996, where 197.1 million vehicles were registered, thus a total of approximately 4.8
million new registrations compared to 1995 can be noticed, see, U.S. Department of Transportation,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Overview Traffic Safety Facts 1996, Summary, Table
2, p. 3, <http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov./ people/ncsa/overvu96.html#Motorcy>.
" Statistisches Bundesamt, Verkehr (Traffic), <http://www.statistik-bund.de/bsis/d/bdl9_t01.htm>.
'^ U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Overview
Traffic Safety Facts 1996, Introduction, p. 1,
<http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov./people/ncsa/overvu96.html#Motorcy>.
'^ Statistisches Bundesamt Verkehr (Traffic), <http://www.statitik-bund.de/basis/d^dl9_t03.htm>.
'^ In 1996, 17,126 fatalities were alcohol-related (40.9 % of total traffic fatalities for the year) and 12,998
lives were lost in speeding-related crashes (speeding was a contributing factor in 30 % of all fatal
crashes), see, U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
Overview Traffic Safety Facts 1996, Summary, p. 4-5,
<http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov./people/ncsa/overvu96.html #Motorcy>.
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the lack of necessary information will have played a role in the occurrence of the
accident.
'"^
- Economic aspect showing the practical importance of the topic
The mentioned statistical data already gives a hint to the economic importance
of the motor vehicle industry the United States and Germany. In fact, it is one of the top
industries in the respective national economies, providing many jobs and constituting a
significant percentage of the gross national product. In 1996, Germany, for example,
was the third largest producer and the second largest exporter of motorcars in the
world. '^ Thus, it is not surprising that one often hears the term "automobile-lobby"
which might, from case to case, be connected with the exertion of influence on political,
economic and legal decisions.
- Effects of product liability on automobile and motorcycle
manufacturers (and their suppliers)
Product liability laws can affect the business and business-related decisions of
motor vehicle manufacturers and their suppliers. First, the liability for defective
products often is one factor which is taken into consideration before determining the
location of a production center,i^ because the strictness of product liability laws may
vary from country to country and in the United States from state to state. However,
'^ E.g., see, BGHZ 99,167 ff. - Honda: Here, a steering gear cover led to the death of the driver of a
motorcycle; in this case, the defect consisted of the manufacturer's (Honda's) failure to observe
accessories (steering gear cover) that could be used for its products (motorcycles).
^^ International Facts and Statistics for 1996, p. 3, <http://mightymall.com/sevenseas/facts.html>.
^9 Henry J. Steiner et al., Transnational Legal Problems 50 (4'^ ed. 1994); as an example one
can refer to BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996): The Alabama Supreme Court
held that the Trial Court erred in its decision to allow an action against the German manufacturer (BMW)
as long-arm-jurisdiction did not exist because of a lack of contacts to the forum in the United States; see,
Joachim Zekoll, Umkehr im U.S.-amerikanischen Produkthaftpflichtrecht und internationaler
Schadensersatzprozess, Praxis des Intemationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts [hereinafter IPRax]
1997,198(201).
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economic factors like the market, wages, social security contributions, taxes, antitrust
and labor legislation,^^ will often be more important and even decisive for the
determination in question. For example, the production center of the Mercedes-Benz
cross-country vehicle (M-Class, ML-320) is in Tuscaloosa, Alabama,^' despite
Alabama's strict product liability laws.
Secondly, the involvement of a manufacturer or supplier in a product liability
suit and the related potential risk of economic loss can have severe consequences for its
business. Due to higher medical costs, the existence of a jury, and the availability of
punitive damages in the United States, which is unknown to German law, this risk is
even higher for U.S. manufacturers, or those who can be sued in the United States,
compared to others who are not subject to U.S. jurisdiction. This can be illustrated by a
recent case in which a South Carolina jury returned a $ 262.5 million verdict against
Chrysler in a product liability suit brought by a family whose 6-year-old child was
killed in an automobile accident. The award consisted of $ 12.5 million in compensatory
and $ 250 million in punitive damages. ^2
Thirdly, in addition to the potential monetary liability a motor vehicle
manufacturer has to face, the loss of reputation caused by the involvement in a product
liability action can lead to a sales crisis. The same is true for a manufacturer or supplier
who has to start a recall campaign for a product that is defective. Here, the manufacturer
has to remedy the defect which may cost a lot of money and damage its image. In
Germany, Mercedes Benz recently had to face this situation. Beginning in October
1 997, Mercedes-Benz recalled its A-Class, the so-called "Baby-Benz," because it tended
20m
2' Deutsche Autos in den USA begehrt (German cars desired in the U.S.), Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger,
Wirtschaft, October 6, 1997, <http://ksta.de/text/wirtschaft/wirtschaft01.html>.
22 The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, October 9, 1997, at section G 1.
6
to roll over in extreme driving situations simulated in road tests. ^3 About 100,000 cars
of this type were affected. Delivery to customers was delayed for 12 weeks,^'* and the
2,600 cars which had already been delivered were recalled. ^^ j\iq whole A-Class-series
got a new chassis-tuning with different stabilizers, broader tires, a lowered body-work
and was equipped with an Electronic Stability Program (ESP) guaranteeing a
computerized stabilization of the car in a split second. All these improvements were
added without additional charge to the customer, and those customers who had already
ordered an A-Class model for a delivery date prior to February 1998 received a
substitute car from Mercedes-Benz.^^ It is estimated that the profit of the company in
the years 1997 and 1998 will be diminished by 300 million Deutsche Mark [hereinafter
DM], and combine boss Juergen Schrempp admitted that the prestige of the combine,
known as a model in traffic safety until that date, has been scratched.^'' Other examples
of recall campaigns carried out by automobile manufacturers can be gathered from the
table in the appendix.^*
Rapidly developing technology contributes to the manufacturer's increased
exposure to product liability suits or being forced to recall products. In former times a
car consisted of only a few mechanical parts. Today it consists of thousands of
mechanical and electronic elements some of which are highly sophisticated, like driver
and passenger airbags, side-bags, Anti-Slip-Regulation (ASR), Anti-lock Braking
System (ABS), brake assistant, Electronic Stability Program (ESP), power windows etc.
Although most of these innovations contribute to safety and comfort, they may also
23 Autobild, Nr. 44, 10/97, October 30, 1997, <http://www.autobild.de.>; Koeber Stadt-Anzeiger,
October 30, 1997, at 29.
2'* Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger, November 12, 1997, at 33.
26 Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger, October 30, 1997, at 29; Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger, November 12, 1997, at 33.
2"^ Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger, November 12, 1997, at 33.
^^ See infra, at 186.
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malfunction in a way that can cause an accident for which the manufacturer or supplier
could be held liable. ^^
On the subject of liability, we now have to consider the liability situation for
defective products in both countries. The potential defendant in Germany has to be
aware of the increasing shaping of the idea of consumer protection,^^ which is
noticeable not only in legislation and jurisprudence but also in the attitude of the
consumers who become more and more demanding. In the field of legislation, the EC-
Directive^' on product liability must first be mentioned. It was enacted on July 25, 1985,
and Germany, in performing its duty to transform this directive in accordance with art.
1 89 of the European Treaty, enacted on January 1 , 1 990 the national statute concerning
the liability for defective products (Produkthaftungsgesetz, ProdHaftG)^^ which is
obligatory for all states. The most important innovation that has been brought by this
law is the introduction of strict liability for all three kinds of product liability claims
(manufacturing, design, and instructions or warnings-defects). Thus, since 1990 a
product liability claim can either be based on traditional tort law (§§ 823 - 853 BGB)33
requiring fault, or on strict liability.
2^ For example, since 1990, 89 people have been killed in the Unites States by airbags inflating in low
severity crashes, see, Airbag Statistics, <http://www.hwysafety.org/airbags/airstat.htm>. From October
1993 to September 1994 it is estimated that 499 persons have been injured in connection with motor
vehicle power windows; 9 % of them (43 persons) were injured as a result of a "faulty" power window,
see, U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Research Note,
May 1997, Injuries associated with Hazards involving Motor Vehicle Power Windows,
<http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov./people/ncsa>.
30 Friedrich Graf von Westphalen-Littbarski, Produkthaftungshandbuch, Band 1,
Vertragliche und deliktische Haftung, Strafrecht und Produkthaftpflichtversicherung § 48, Rn. 1
[hereinafter von Westphalen-editor, Band 1]; Littbarski is talking about a "[T]riumphal march of the idea
of consumer protection...".
3J EG-Richtlinie 85/374 EWG, Abl. L 210/29-33 v. 07.08.1985.
32 Gesetz ueber die Haftung fuer fehlerhafte Produkte (Produkthaftungsgesetz, ProdHaftG) v. 15.12.1989
BGBl. I S. 2198 [hereinafter Product Liability Act, Produkthaftungsgesetz or ProdHaftG].
33 Buergerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code) v. 18.08.1896, Reichsgesetzblatt [hereinafter RGBl.j S. 195,
entered into force 01.01.1900.
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Another law which has recently been enacted on the basis of an EC-Directive^"*
is the statute concerning the regulation of safety requirements for products and the
protection of CE-labeling (Produktsicherheitsgesetz, ProdSG)^^. This statute was
enacted on August 1, 1997 and requires manufacturers to put safe products on the
market. In case of violation of this requirement, administrative agencies, like the
Federal Office for Motor Traffic (Kraftfahrtbundesamt,) have the power either to forbid
the marketing of the product or to issue orders to the manufacturer requiring it to
provide a warning about the product or recall it. Secondly, these agencies can issue
warnings or recalls themselves; and, finally, they can impose an administrative fine up
to 50.000, DM to the disobeying manufacturer. With this law, the power of
administrative agencies to intervene in situations involving defective products was
expressly established for the first time.
In addition, an EC-Directive establishing a higher standard for crash tests is in
preparation. New cars wall have to meet the requirements of this directive from October
1, 1998 on, whereas it becomes mandatory for all cars, including those introduced
before 1998, on October 1, 2003.36
With regard to the German courts, it can be said that since the leading case, the
so called "Fowl pest case,"^'' decided by the Federal Supreme Court of Germany, a
continuous tightening of the defendant's duties under product liability law can be
noticed.38
^'^ EG-Richtlinie 92/59 EWG des Rates v. 29.06.1992 ueber die allgemeine Produktsicherheit "Produkt-
sicherheitsrichtlinie", ABIEG Nr. L 228 v. 1 1.08.1992, S. 24.
^^ Gesetz zur Regelung der Sicherheitsanforderungen an Produkte und zum Schutz der CE-
Kennzeichung, Produktsicherheitsgesetz, ProdSG v. 30.04.1997 BGBl. I S. 934 [hereinafter Product
Safety Act, Produktsicherheitsgesetz, or ProdSG].
36 See <http://www.fia.com/tourisme/safety/coagnstd.htm>.
37 BGHZ 51,91 - Huehnerpest (Fowl pest).
38 See, in particular: BGHZ 80,186 - Apfelschorf I (Derosal) (Apple scab 1); BGHZ 80,199 - Apfelschorf
II (Benomyl) (Apple scab II); BGHZ 99,167 - Honda; BGHZ 104,323 - Mehrwegflasche I (Returnable
bottle I); BGHZ 1 16,60 - Kindertee I (Child tea I); BGHZ 1 16,104 - Salmonellen (Salmonellae).
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In the United States, however, product liability law and the role of consumer
protection are more complex. Of course, this is to a high extent due to the fact that, in
contrast to Germany, a federal law on products liability is non-existent.^^ As in most
areas of substantive law (e.g. criminal law, family law) , product liability law is not
subject to federal but to state regulation, either with regard to legislation or with respect
to common law.''^ As a result of this division of competence one can notice
fragmentation and a lack of clarity in the field of product liability. Although several
attempts have been made to introduce a federal law on products liability, each has
failed.'*' In 1996, the latest legislative initiative'*^ to enact such a federal law, through
which restrictions of liability would have been introduced, failed. The draft law passed
both the House of Representatives and the Senate and was the most successfiil initiative
that has ever been introduced. However, President Clinton considered it to be too
detrimental to the consumer and vetoed the proposal.''^ Thus, the liability for defective
products is still subject to a different treatment in each of the 50 states. In the majority
of these states, however, efforts for reform of product liability law have taken place
^^ Tort law, including product liability law, belongs to the historic province of the states and it is
estimated that 95 % of tort litigation is decided by state courts, see, Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M.
Talarico, A Profile of Tori Litigation in Georgia and Reflections on Tort Reform, 30 Ga. L. Rev. 627,632
and note 9 (1996).
'*0 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938): "[TJhere is no federal common law...".
'*' Robert A. Goodman, Proposed Federal Standardsfor Product Liability, 30 Harv. J. on Legis. 296,299
(1993); Cynthia R. Mabry, Warning ! The Manufacturer ofthis Product may have engaged in Cover-Ups,
Lies, and Concealment: Making the Case for limitless Punitive Awards in Product Liability Lawsuits, 73
Ind. L.J. 187,251 (1997); Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales of Justice through National
Punitive Damage, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 1573,1613-1614 (1997).
^^ The 1996 legislation focused on capping punitive damage awards and intended to establish uniform
state laws regarding punitive damages, see. The Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of
1996, H.R. 956,104* Cong. § 102 (a) (1) (1996), see, Mabry, supra note 41, at 251. For criticism on this
bill, see, Eaton & Talarico, supra note 39, at 685,686 (arguing that the proposed 1996 legislation did
address secondary issues (e.g. punitive damages, joint and several liability) instead of imposing a uniform
standard to determine design or warning defects).
^^ President Clinton vetoed because he feared that limits on punitive remedies in tort law would
"[pjrevent many persons from receiving fiill compensation for their injury.", see, Amy A. Kirby, Punitive
Damages in Contract Actions: The Tensions between the United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the
International Sale ofGoods and U.S. Law, 16 J.L. & Com. 215, note 83 and accompanying text (1997).
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since the 1 980s, pursuing the common goal of reducing the number of claims brought
against enterprises.'*'' '^ jn particular, this "quiet revolution"'*^ comprises the
introduction of caps on damages,'*'^ the modification or abolition of the collateral source
rule,'*^ joint and several liability,'*^ and a change in awarding punitive damages^o.^i
^'* James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An
Empirical Study ofLegal Change, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 479 (1990); Pace, supra note 41, at 1613 (stating
that the recently proposed national tort reform legislation intends to protect manufacturers from excessive
punitive damage awards; see also, S. Rep. No. 104-69, at 1-1 (1995)); Product liability actions have
increased from 2 % of all federal cases in 1975 to 5.74 % in 1989, see, Goodman, supra note 41, at 307.
'*^ In 1986 and 1987 laws concerning the restrictions of damage claims entered into force in 41 states,
see, Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off the Races": The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process,
27 Hou. L. Rev. 207 (1990); see also, WILLIAM LLOYD Prosser ET AL., TORTS 808 (5™ ed. 1994).
'*^ See, James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An
Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 479,480 (1990); James A. Henderson, Jr. &
Aaron D. Twerski, Stargazing: The Future of American Products Liability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1332,1342 (1991); Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in
Products Liability, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 731 (1992).
'*^ Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, Testing two Assumptions about Federalism and Tort Reform,
14 Yale J. on Reg. 371,389 (1996) (stating that 35 states have enacted legislation placing caps on
compensatory damages and providing statistical data on damage-cap legislation).
'*^ According to the collateral source rule a damage claim against the defendant remains entirely although
the plaintiff has other claims resulting out of the same harmflil event against a third party - typically an
insurance company -; the same is true even if the plaintiff has abeady received the payment of damages
from the third party. Usually, these claims or payments had to be disregarded in a products liability
action; meanwhile, in most of the jurisdictions either the jury or the judge can decide whether they have
to be subtracted from the amount of damages that is going to be awarded to the plaintiff, see, Kathleen E.
Pyne, Linking Tort Reform to Fairness and Moral Values, 1995 Det. CiL. Mich St. U. L. Rev. 1207, note
70 (1995) (stating that the only states retaining the collateral source rule are Colorado, Florida, Iowa,
Missouri, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, and Oregon).
^^ Under the common law rule of joint and several liability each of several defendants is responsible for
the entire loss, see, Eaton & Talarico, supra note 39, at 682-683. This rule is comparable to the rules
applicable in German tort law (§§ 840, 421 ff, 426 BGB).
^^ One restriction concerning the granting of punitive damages is the introduction of an upper limit
("caps") for punitive damages. In Connecticut, for example, the amount of punitive damages may not be
higher than the double of the actual damage claim, see, CONN. GEN. Stat. Ann. § 52-240B (West 1991).
Another kind of restriction is that the plaintiff can only recover a certain percentage of the amount of
granted punitive damages; the other part - which can be up to 75 %, see, Ga. CODE ANN., § 51-12-
5.1(e)(2) - will flow towards the state; e.g., in Oregon the plaintiff gets 40 % of the awarded amount of
punitive damages, see, OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540 (1) (a). Some of the reasons for the introduction of
statutory capped punitive damages is that they increase predictability of punitive damage awards and
avoid the effect of over-deterrence, see, Amelia J. Toy, Statutory Punitive Damage Caps and the Profit
Motive: An Economic Perspective, 40 Emory L.J. 303,323-328 (1991). In addition, the requirement
concerning the provision of evidence for circumstances justifying the granting of punitive damages is
higher than the one for other facts: Whereas usually facts have to be proven by the "preponderance of
11
Furthermore, an important source of tort law in the United States to which courts
often refer to as an authority, the Restatement, has been subject to change and high
criticism. In reflecting current common law, the Restatement (Second) of Torts from
1965 established in its § 402A a strict liability standard for all kinds of product defects.
From 1965 until today, however, courts have interpreted § 402 A in various ways.
Today's common law majority upholds a strict liability standard solely for
manufacturing defects. For design and instruction or warning defects, on the other hand,
a "kind of negligence" standard is applied under which the plaintiff has to prove the
availability of an alternative design or information. ^^ xhese changes are reflected in the
rules set forth in the Third Restatement. However, critics argue that the new
Restatement incorrectly restates the common law and that it is, to the detriment of the
consumer, too manufacturer-friendly. ^^ This controversy fiirther enhances the difficulty
and complexity of U.S. product liability law.
The above mentioned aspects give an impression of the close linking of social,
economic, and legal issues and demonstrate the practical importance of product liability
in the motor vehicle area. The purpose of this thesis is to present the product liability
law in this field in Germany and the United States by taking a comparative view, to
discover and debate the legal issues, and to attempt to provide solutions for them.
evidence", facts supporting the award of punitive damages have to be proven with "clear and convincing
evidence", see. Pace, supra note 41, at 1589-1590 and note 65.
5' Prosser, supra note 45, at 808.
52 See, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, Proposed Final Draft [hereinafter
P.F.D.], April 1, 1997, §2.
^^ See, e.g., Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2 (B): The
Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1407,1424 (1994); David G. Owen, Risk-
Utility Balancing in Design Defct Cases, 30. U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 239 (1997); Frank J. Vandali,
Constructing a Roof Before the Foundation is prepared: The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability Section 2 (b) Design Defect, 30 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 261,277-279 (1997).
Chapter I
Product liability in the motor vehicle area in Germany
A. Sources of law and system of product liability law
1. Three statutory sources based on tort law - generally
excluding contract law
In German law three statutory sources of product liability law are found. The
first source is the German Civil Code (Buergerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB)^'* from 1900,
which contains in its §§ 823 - 853 BGB the traditional tort law. The second source is the
Product Liability Act (Produkthaftungsgesetz)^^ from 1990. The third and most recent
source, the Product Safety Act (Produktsicherheitsgesetz),^^ was enacted on August 1^',
1997.
As we can see, contract law does not appear as a source of product liability. The
reason for this is that, with regard to an action brought against the manufacturer or
supplier of a defective product, a contract does generally not exist because the consumer
usually buys a product {e.g. car) from a dealer, trader, or marketing company, not
directly from the manufacturer. Due to the lack of contractual links between the
consumer and the latter, the consumer's claim can, according to the German Supreme
Civil Court [Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen], generally not arise out of contract law
^^ See supra, note 33.
^^ See supra, note 32.
^^ See supra, note 35.
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but can only be based on tort law.^^ 58 Even if, in exceptional cases, contractual relations
between the consumer and the manufacturer exist, a contract-based claim for harm
caused by a defective product would be subject to more, or at least more severe,
potential defenses than a products liability claim based on tort law. Although in an
action for breach of warranty of a sales contract (§§ 433, 459 ff. BGB) the defendant is
liable without fault,^^ such a claim is barred by the statute of limitations six months after
the item has been handed over (§ 477 sec. I BGB.) The same statute of limitations is
applicable to an action for breach of a sales contract [positive Vertragsverletzimg,
p.V.V.],60 where, to compound matters, the defendant is only liable for culpable
behavior for which the plaintiff bears the burden of proofs* Moreover, a contractual
claim could be contracted away either by individual agreement between the parties^^ or
by the use of general terms and conditions of trade [Allgemeine
Geschaeftsbedingungen],^3 limited only by the statute concerning the regulation of
general terms and conditions of trade (AGB-Gesetz)^. From the plaintiffs point of
view, these disadvantages are fiirther enhanced by the fact that, according to § 253
BGB,^5 the plaintiff cannot get damages for pain and suffering under contract law,
" BGHZ 51,91(93 ff.) - Huehnerpest (Fowl pest).
^^ In this context, a parallel can be drawn to United States product liability law: Since MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 1 1 1 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) the privity requirement for actions against a manufacturer
has been abolished, see infra, Chapter II, at 96-97.
59 Hans Putzo, in Palandt BuergerlicHES Gesetzbuch § 459 BGB, Rn. 4 (57* ed. 1998).
^0 Helmut Heinrichs, in Palandt Buergerliches Gesetzbuch § 276 BGB, Rn. 1 10 (57* ed. 1998).
61
Id. at Vorbem v § 249 BGB, Rn. 162.
62 Hans Putzo, in Palandt Buergerliches Gesetzbuch Vorbem v § 459 BGB, Rn. 1 ; § 463 BGB,
Rn. 3(57*ed. 1998).
63 Helmut Heinrichs, in Palandt Buergerliches Gesetzbuch § 276 BGB, Rn. 62: § 9 AGBG, Rn.
36ff. (57*ed. 1998).
6^ Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschaeftsbedingungen (AGB-Gesetz), v.
09.12.1976(BGB1. IS. 3317).
65 § 253 BGB provides: "For damage which is not pecuniary damage, compensation in money can only
be requested in cases determined by the law."
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because a provision allowing him to recover for this kind of damage does not exist in
this area of law.
A claim based on tort law, on the other hand, is subject to a three-year limitation
period that begins from the time the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have
discovered the act or omission of the tortfeasor (§ 852 sec. I BGB - traditional tort law)
(§ 12 sec. I ProdhaftG). The liability of the defendant for defective products under tort
law can generally be contracted away neither through individual agreement nor through
the use of general terms and conditions of trade.^^ Furthermore, the plaintiff is not
excluded from recovery for pain and suffering as the result of a provision allowing him
to recover for this kind of damage § 847 BGB. Thus, tort law has been and still is the
fundamental pillar of product liability law.
2. The role of judicial decisions: Updating of the law of product
liability
Although the legislature of the Civil Code from 1900 included a section dealing
with tort law, it did not specifically take care of the manufacturer's liability for defective
products.^^ Thus, it was the task of the courts to interpret traditional tort law under this
aspect of liability so that product liability was, in fact, not subject to statutory but to
judicial regulation.^* Today, this kind of liability is partly regulated in special statutes
(e.g., Produkthaftungsgesetz and Produktsicherheitsgesetz). However, compared to
other fields of law, courts still play a very important role in interpretation,
66 Heinz Thomas, in Palandt Buergerliches Gesetzbuch § 823 BGB, Rn. 218 (57* ed. 1998); the
reason for that in tort law the liability (for defective products) can generally not be "contracted" away is
that in contrast to contracts which create obligations based on agreements [vertragliche
Schuldverhaeltnisse], tort law consists of obligations which are created by law [gesetzliche
Schuldverhaeltnisse]
.
67 ReINHART MERTENS, in MUENCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BUERGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, § 823 sec. I
BGB, Rn. 269 (3^" ed. 1997).
6* See, e.g., BGHZ 51,91 ff. - Huehnerpest (Fowl pest): In this landmark decision the Supreme Court
introduced the shift of burden of proof to the defendant with regard to breach of duty and fault.
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determination, and updating of this law,^^ as legislators are not able to regulate every
single issue that might arise.^o One may conclude that in this area German judicial
decisions almost have the same importance as common law in the United States.
3. Differences between the three sources and the impact on
criminal law
Liability for a claim under traditional torts (§§ 823 - 853 BGB) is based on fault.
In order for a plaintiffs claim to be successful, he must generally prove that the act or
omission of the defendant was negligent or intentional.^' From the plaintiffs point of
view this is a relatively high standard compared to the statute concerning the liability for
defective products (Produkthaftungsgesetz), but the traditional tort law does generally
not place any limitations on the plaintiffs potential recovery. "^^
On the other hand, the statute concerning the liability for defective products
(Produkthaftungsgesetz) does establish a strict liability standard so that the defendant
can be held liable for damages caused by his defective product regardless of fault.''^
Thus, the plaintiff who bases his claim on this statute does not have to prove any form
of culpable behavior on the part of the defendant.^"* However, the Produkthaftungsgesetz
provides several limitations with respect to the damages that the plaintiff can recover.
Most importantly, it does not contain a provision according to which the plaintiff could
recover for pain and suffering. This kind of recovery is exclusively reserved to
69 Mertens, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 271.
"^^ See, e.g., BGHZ 104,323 ff - Mehrwegflasche 1 (Returnable bottle I): The Supreme Court introduced
the manufacturer's duty to secure the status of products that have a specific risk of danger; consequence
of a violation of this duty is the presumption that a (manufacturing) defect ab^eady existed before the
product has been marketed.
71 Thomas, supra note 66, § 823 BGB, Rn. 54 - 57.
72m at §823 BGB, Rn. 159.
" Id at Vorbem v § 1 ProdHaftG, Rn. 5.
74
See, § 1 sec. IV ProdHaftG.
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traditional tort law (§ 847 BGB). In case of property damage, the plaintiff has to pay a
deductible of 1.125,- DM (§ 1 1 ProdHaftG), and in case of personal harm the amount of
money the plaintiff can recover is limited to 160 million DM (§ 10 sec. I ProdHaftG)
(capped damages).^^
Thus, under traditional tort law we have a liability standard based on negligence
without any limitations, whereas under the statute concerning the liability for defective
products, the liability standard is strict liability with several limitations. Therefore, it
can be concluded that a disadvantage for the plaintiff in the burden of proof is
compensated by allowing him non-limited recovery and vice versa.
In contrast to traditional tort law, which basically^^ attempts to provide
compensation for harm that has already occurred, and the Produkthaftungsgesetz, which
fullyP'^ follows the same purpose, the statute concerning the regulation of safety
requirements for products (Produktsicherheitsgesetz, ProdSG) takes a different
approach. By empowering the Federal Office for Motor Traffic of Germany
[Kraftfahrtbundesamt] to prohibit a product from being put on the market (§ 7 ProdSG),
to warn of dangerous products (§ 8 ProdSG) and / or to recall unsafe products (§ 9
^5 Further important limitations which are foreseen in the Produkthaftungsgesetz are:
- In case of property damage the plaintiff cannot recover for the defective product itself but only for
damage caused to other things, see § 1 sec. 1, cl. 2 ProdHaftG;
- In case of property damage the plaintiff can only recover if the other thing was meant to be and was in
fact used by the plaintiff for private purposes (in contrast to commercial activities), see § I sec. I, cl. 2
ProdhaftG;
- The Produktafhaftungsgesetz contains a provision of repose according to which the plaintiffs claim is
excluded ten years after the defective product that caused the harm has been put on the market by the
manufacturer, see § 13 sec. I ProdHaftG.
^^ The term "^basically''' is used because of the following reason: Although traditional tort law provides in
the majority of cases compensation only, it also comprises the aspect of preventing the occurrence of
harm in the area of products liability since the manufacturer's post-salt duties to warn, instruct and recall
defective products is recognized under § 823 sec. I BGB, see, THOMAS, supra note 66, § 823 BGB, Rn.
208-209.
^^ The term '''fully''' is used because the Produkthaftungsgestz exclusively serves the purpose of providing
compensation but does not comprise any aspect of prevention of harm.
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ProdSG), the legislature's purpose is not to compensate for harmful events but to
prevent their occurrence (prevention instead of compensation)^^ Moreover, by vesting a
governmental agency with power concerning the regulation of private business matters,
it belongs to the field of public law,''^ in particular administrative law, with influence
on private law (tort law), whereas traditional tort law and the Produkthaftungsgesetz
belong to the area of private law only. This means that under the
Produktsicherheitsgesetz the manufacturer, trader or a third person^^ can be subject to
administrative regulation (e.g. administrative fines, substitute performance). However, a
violation of traditional tort law, the Produkthaftungsgesetz or even the
Produktsicherheitsgesetz by a car manufacturer or its supplier might also be sanctioned
by the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB)^^^^ One might, for example,
think of a case in which personal injury occurred as a result of the negligent, or even
intentional behavior, of an automobile manufacturer who knew or could have known
that the gas tanks of a certain car he produces are likely to explode when filling the tank
under warm weather conditions. ^^ Then, the manufacturer or its responsible organs (e.g.
^* <http://www.ra-clr-d-wendel.de/parts/downloacl/wrpsg.txt>.
^^ German law makes the general difference between three different fields of law: Private Law - which
comprises, among others, tort law and in particular products liability law -, involving private parties only,
Public Law and Criminal Law (which is in fact only a special area of public law), both generally
involving a governmental party on the one hand and a private party on the other hand; this distinction is
reflected in the existence of three general jurisdictions and has effect on the distribution of competences:
For private law matters. Civil Courts (Zivilgerichte) have jurisdiction, for Public Law either the
administrative Courts or the Constitutional Courts of the Laender (states) or the Bund have competence
and for Criminal Law only Criminal Courts can be called on.
80 See, § 7 sec. Ill ProdSG.
81 Strafgesetzbuch (StGB), v. 15.05.1871 RGBl. S. 127 [hereinafter StGB].
82 BGH NJW 1990,2560 (Lederspray-Leatherspray); Christoph Kremer, Traeger der haftungsrecthlichen
Produktverantwortung im KfZ-Bereich, Deutsches Autorecht [hereinafter DAR] 4 / 96,134,139 (1996).
8^ In fact, several accidents caused by fire and explosions occurred in 1995 due to gases escaping out of
the filler pipes of OPEL ASTRA models when refueled; because of that the German car manufacturer
OPEL had to recall worldwide 2.3 million affected cars of this model, see, Report: Rueckrufe am
laufenden Band, Autobild Nr. 49 v. 05.12.1997, at 76.
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board)^"* or employees {e.g. product designer, product manager)^^ will not only be
subject to a product liability action brought by the plaintiff, but he will also be subject to
criminal prosecution, which could be based on § 230 StGB (negligent physical injury),
§ 222 StGB (negligent homicide), § 223 StGB (intentional physical injury), § 226 StGB
(intentional physical injury which negligently caused death) or § 303 StGB (intentional
damage to property). In such a situation, the responsible organs or persons who acted or
omitted necessary measures could be convicted to pay a criminal fine, or they could
even be imprisoned.
Thus, although German product liability law has its roots in private law (tort
law), it also affects administrative law as part of the public law and can even raise issues
under criminal law. As a resulting consequence, the motor vehicle manufacturer or its
supplier will be well advised to examine product liability issues not only under the
aspects of tort law but also with regard to effects on the other two fields of law.
Therefore he should make use of lawyers who are specialized in these areas.
B. Product liability under traditional tort law (§§ 823 - 853 bgb)
1. Structure and most important sections of traditional tort law
Before entering in detail into the exposition of product liability issues under
traditional tort law, it is necessary to explain briefly its structure and to present its most
important provisions. German traditional tort law is regulated in the last title of the last
section of the second of five^^ books of the Civil Code from 1900, the law of
^'^ Kremer, supra note 82 at 139.
85 /J.
*^ The German Civil Code (Buergerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB) comprises five books: T' book, General
Part (§§ 1 - 240); 2"" book, Law of obligations (§§ 241 - 853); 3^"^ book. Law of things (§§ 854 - 1296);
4*^ book, Family law (§§ 1297 - 1921); 5"^ book, Law of succession (§§ 1922 - 2385).
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obligations. It comprises §§ 823 - 853 BGB which are not only still applicable^'' beside
the modem statute concerning the liability for defective products
(Produkthaftungsgesetz) from 1990, but which still provide the foundation for product
liability law. This is due to the fact that the Produkthaftungsgesetz and the
Produktsicherheitsgesetz from 1 997 are disadvantageous for the plaintiff and / or leave
gaps in the regulation of issues such as the duty to warn or to recall defective products
or accessories. Thus a recourse to traditional tort law is often necessary in order to
sustain the plaintiffs claim in its entire extent.
Although under the heading of "Tortious acts" the Civil Code only lists §§ 823 -
853 BGB, traditional tort law comprises in fact more provisions. This is due to the
system of the Civil Code which contains general rules at the beginning of the Code, or
at the beginning of its books, that are usually applicable to the sections which follow, as
long as they do not modify the general rules. Like this, the latter only had to be cited
once instead of being cited in every section to which they also apply. The first book of
the Civil Code is named "General Part" and provides with its §§ 1 - 240 BGB general
rules which are in principle applicable to each of the four following books. With respect
to tort law, the regulation of limitation in §§ 194 - 225 BGB and the provisions of
grounds of justification for an unlawful behavior in §§ 226 - 231 BGB are of particular
importance. The second book, the law of obligations, contains in its §§241 - 432 BGB
general rules most of which can be applied to traditional tort law. Of high importance
are §§ 249 - 253 BGB^^ which regulate the kind and the extent of damages the plaintiff
can recover
, § 254 BGB which contains the rule on contributory negligence and §§ 421
- 432 BGB which are designed for situations in which more than one debtor or creditor
exists (joint-debtors, joint-creditors). ^^
8''
See, § 15 sec. II ProdHaftG.
88 §§ 249 - 253 BGB are modified or specified by §§ 842 - 845, 847 BGB.
89 §§ 412 . 426 BGB are specified or modified by § 840 sec. I - III BGB.
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Traditional tort law itself provides the main provisions in the area of product
liability with § 823 sec. I BGB^o and § 823 sec. II BGB^'. These sections represent the
basis of the claim, containing its prerequisites and the compensation for damages as
legal consequence. Still less important is § 831 sec. I BGB^^ which establishes the
liability of the principal for a vicarious agent who causes harm. In such a situation it is
not the vicarious agent but the principal who will have to pay damages to the third
person, if he is unable to provide exculpatory evidence.
Concerning the determination of the kind and extent of damages for which the
plaintiff can recover under §§ 823 sec. I, § 823 sec. II and § 831 sec. I BOB, the general
rules of §§ 249 253 BOB are completed by §§ 842 - 845 BGB and § 847 BOB. Of
particular importance in this context is § 253 BGB,^^ which states that compensation for
non-material damage can only be requested in cases determined by the law. Such a
determination is contained in § 847 sec. I BGB,^"* which establishes that a plaintiff can
get compensation for pain and suffering when harm has occurred to his body, his health,
or his personal liberty .^^
90 § 823 sec. I BGB provides: "A person who, intentionally or negligently, causes unlawfully harm to
life, body, health, freedom, property, or other rights of another person is obliged to compensate the
resulting damage to this person."
9^ § 823 sec. II BGB provides: "Subject to the same obligation is the one who violates a law which
intends to provide protection for another person. If, according to this law, its violation is possible without
fauh, the duty to provide compensation for damages only exists in case of fault."
9^ § 83 1 sec. I BGB states: "The one who nominates another person to performing is obliged to provide
compensation for the damage which the other person causes unlawfully to a third person in execution of
the performing. The duty to provide compensation for damages does not exist if the principal followed
the necessary standard of care in trade and business with regard to the choice... and the supervision of the
nominated person or if the damage had also occurred would the principal have followed this standard of
care."
9^ See supra, note 65.
^^ § 847 sec. I BGB provides: "In case of injury to body or health as well as in case of deprivation of
freedom, the injured person can also get a just compensation in money for damage that is not pecuniary
damage."
9^ The assessment of the amount of money which the plaintiff can recover as pain and suffering lies in
the discretion of the court (judge(s)), see, § 287 ZPO (Code of Civil Procedure), Zivilprozessordnung v.
30.01.1877 (RGBl. S. 83), [hereinafter ZPO].
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§ 840 BGB contains a rule on the liability of joint tortfeasors that are, according
to § 840 sec. 1 BGB, generally liable as joint-debtors under §§421 - 426 BGB. Finally,
§ 852 BGB completes the general regulations of limitation of §§ 194 - 225 BGB in
establishing a period of limitation of three years for a claim based on traditional tort
law, beginning from the time in which the plaintiff obtained knowledge of the tortious
act or omission of the tortfeasor.
2. Liability under § 823 sec. I BGB
A) Link and constituent facts
In order to bring a successfiji claim under § 823 sec. I BGB, the following seven
requirements must be met. The defendant must have (i.) violated a duty of care by an act
or omission^^ which (ii.) must have caused a (iii.) violation of a right protected under §
823 sec. I BGB. The latter violation must have been (iv.) unlawful, and the defendant
must have acted with (v.) fault (negligent or intentional), and a (vi.) harm must have
occurred to the plaintiff, and finally (vii.) a causal connection between the violation of
the protected right and the occurrence of the harm must exist.^''
(I.) Violation of a duty of care by an act or omission
For a violation of a duty of care in the area of product liability, the decisive fact
is not whether a product is defective, but rather whether the manufacturer or supplier
observed the necessary standard of care in trade and business (reasonable manufacturer
standard) with respect to the manufacture and design of his product, and whether he
furnished appropriate warnings and instructions for the product.^^
96 See, Thomas, supra note 66, § 823 BGB, Rn. 2.
97M at § 823 BGB, Rn. 1.
98 Hein KOETZ, DELIKTSRECHT, Rn. 106 ff., 445 (6* ed. 1994).
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(II.) Causal connection between violation of duty of care and
VIOLATION OF RIGHT
This violation must have led to a violation of a right that is protected under §
823 sec. I BGB. Such a causal connection exists when three elements are completed.
First, according to the theory of equivalence,^^ also called the "but for" test,'^^ which
treats every circumstance equal, '°' a causal link exists when a circumstance cannot be
disregarded without the success (harm) being dropped. In other words, if one can give a
negative answer to the question, "if one disregards the circumstance would the harm
then still have occurred?", then a causal connection exists. Although this theory is a
necessary factor in determining whether a causal link exists, it extends liability beyond
all bounds, because almost every fact would have to be considered as causal. '^^
Therefore, the so-called theory of adequate causation has to be considered as second
element. Its goal is to eliminate completely unlikely causal developments by raising the
question of whether these developments can still be attributed to the tortfeasor. '^^ The
third element that must be checked with regard to the issue of causal connection is
whether it is the purpose of the violated statute or section to protect from the kind of
harm which occurred. 'O"*
(III.) Violation of a right protected under § 823 sec. I BGB
If a causal connection can be established as mentioned above, one must see if a
right that is protected under § 823 sec. I BGB has been violated. This section expressly




102 Heinrichs, supra note 60, Vorbem v § 249 BGB, Rn. 58; even the fact that the parents gave birth to
the tortfeasor would be a causal factor because without his birth the harm would not have occurred.
103 Heinrichs, supra note 60, Vorbem v § 249 BGB, Rn. 58.
104
Id. at Vorbem v § 249 BGB, Rn. 62.
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enumerates life, body, health and personal liberty as protected rights. Moreover, § 823
sec. I BGB speaks of "...other rights..." that are subject to its protection. This other right
is the undisputed right of possession of something, '^-^ which comes into play in cases
where damage occurred to property only, and where the plaintiff is not the owner of the
vehicle. 1^^ Then, he cannot assert a violation of his property right, but he can base his
claim on violation of his right of possession of the automobile. Thus, he will still be
able to get compensation, if he is unable to use the vehicle involved in the accident.
In any case, however, in order to file a product liability suit, a right protected
under § 823 sec. I BGB must have been violated by putting a defective product on the
market. 10^ The situations in which a product is considered as "defective" will be
discussed in connection with the different categories of product defects. ^"^^
(IV.) Unjustified violation
The violation of a right protected under § 823 sec. I BGB must not be legally
justified by a ground of justification which can either be written (§§ 227 - 231, 904
BGB) or unwritten (approval or consent). '^^ However, in the area of product liability
neither written nor unwritten grounds of justification will be pertinent, because,
obviously, a manufacturer will not have acted in self-defense (§ 227 BGB) or self-help
(§ 229 BGB), nor will the consumer have consented to the violation of the right.
105 Thomas, supra note 66, § 823 BGB, Rn. 13.
106 One might for example think of a situation in which the plaintiff leased a car or in which he bought a
car under reservation of title.
lO'^ Mertens, supra note 67, § 823 sec. I BGB, Rn. 276.
^^^ See infra, at 43.
109 THOMAS, supra note 66, § 823 BGB, Rn. 36-44.
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(V.) Fault
Moreover, the defendant is only liable if he acted with intent or at least with
negligence with regard to the violation of the right protected under § 823 sec. I BGB."^
Intent is thereby defined as knowledge and will to violate the right,'" and negligence is
defined as disregard of the diligence that is necessary in trade. "^ Regarding the field of
products liability, a manufacturer or supplier will most often have acted negligently
when a product defect occurred. On the other hand, with respect to design and warnings
or instructions defects, intentional behavior is conceivable, because here a company
might initiate a cost-benefit-analysis in cases where the financial expenditure of
additional safety features might affect the practical use of the product"^ or where costs
for additional warnings or recalls of the product might exceed the amount of damages
that could be awarded to the plaintiff in a potential law suit."''
(VI. / VII.) Harm and its causal connection to the violation of
PROTECTED RIGHT
Through the intentional or negligent violation of a right protected under § 823
sec. I BOB a harm must have occurred. Harm is naturally defined as every loss that one
suffers to his goods like life, health, property, honor, etc. and comprises pecuniary loss
as well as non-material damage. "^ For our topic especially relevant are the
"0 Thomas, supra note 66, § 823 BGB, Rn. 54, 55-57; Heinrichs, supra note 60, § 276 BGB, Rn. 10-
12.
' '
' Heinrichs, supra note 60,§ 276 BGB, Rn. 10.
"2 /^. at § 276 BGB, Rn. 12.
"^ An automobile manufacturer could for example produce a car that is designed as safe as a tank;
however, this would affect the practical usefulness of the vehicle due to its weight, size, use of fuel etc.
""* Andreas Birkmann, Produktbeobachtungspflicht bei Kraftfahrzeugen - Entwicklung und
Weiterentwicklung der Produktbeobachtungspflicht durch die Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofs,
DAR 4/90, 124 (127) (1990); see also. Wolf Wegener, Produktbeobachtungspflicht bei Kraftfahrzeugen,
DAR4/90, 130 (131) (1990).
"5 Heinrichs, supra note 60, Vorbem v § 249 BGB, Rn. 7.
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compensation for medical expenses, pain and suffering, loss of earnings, inability to use
the product (vehicle) and property damage.
If each of the above mentioned requirements is fulfilled, the plaintiff has the
right to get compensation under § 823 sec. I BGB for the loss he suffered.
b) Potential plaintiffs and potential defendants
After having presented the general prerequisites of § 823 sec. I BGB, we now
turn to the question of who can sue and who can be sued under this section.
(I.) Potential plaintiffs
§ 823 sec. I BGB^'^ provides that everyone who is subject to a violation of a
right protected by this section has a right to request compensation. Thus, in a product
liability case not only the consumer of the product (buyer, lessee, user), but also any
third person that suffers injury because of the defectiveness of the product (automobile
or motorcycle) has a claim against the liable person or company.
(II.) Potential defendants
The wording of § 823 sec. I BGB also provides the starting point for
determining who can be a potential defendant in a product liability action. It states that
"[t]he one who... causes unlawfully harm... is obliged to compensate... ".^'^
Accordingly, "everybody" who is responsible for the occurrence of the harm can be held
liable. 1 '8 In cases where the harm has been partially caused by a defective product,
however, only those who were in fact involved or who seemed to be involved in its
production or its placement on the market could be held responsible, if they had violated
' '^ See supra, note 90.
' '^ See supra, note 90.
' '^ See, Kremer, supra note 82, at 136.
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a legal duty to maintain safety."^ Thus, in a product liability action the circle of
potential defendants can be reduced to three basic categories: (a) the manufacturer and
its supplier, (b) the quasi-manufacturer and (c) others.
(a) Motor vehicle manufacturers and their suppliers as potential
defendants
When discussing product manufacturers, we must differentiate between three
types of manufacturers. First, there is the manufacturer who produces the product
entirely in his own enterprise ("entire manufacturer.") Next, we have the manufacturer
of individual supply parts ("supplier,") and finally, there is the manufacturer who puts
the parts produced by himself together with the supplied ones so that the final product is
created ("assembler"). • 20 in the motor vehicle industry, however, neither cars nor
motorcycles are entirely produced by one manufacturer. Rather, motor vehicle
companies such as Mercedes-Benz, Bayerische Motorenwerke (BMW), Audi, Porsche,
etc. work together with suppliers that furnish electronic parts, brakes or tires. Therefore,
they have to be considered as assemblers.
With regard to liability, the supplier is first of all generally responsible for the
defectiveness of the individual supply parts. ^^^ In addition, he is also liable for defects
of the final product that are the result of a violation of his duty to instruct the assembler
with respect to the use and assimilation of the supply parts. 122 Moreover, the supplier
has a duty to notify the assembler if he recognizes that the construction of a spare part is
defective in the way it is intended by the assembler, and when he has a reason to assume
' 19 Mertens, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 276.
'20Mat§823BGB, Rn. 278.
121 BGH Versicherungsrecht [hereinafter VersR] 1959,104 (105); BGH Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
[hereinafter NJW] 1968,247 (248); MERTENS, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 278 and note 724.
122 BGH NJW 1996,2224 (2225); MERTENS, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 278 and note 726.
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that the danger has not been recognized by the latter. '23 In case of violation of this duty
the supplier will be held liable if harm occurs because of the omission of the
notification.
The assembler, on the other hand, is responsible for defects resulting out of the
assembly of the motor vehicle. '^4 Furthermore, he can also be held liable for defective
supply parts, although in the majority of cases the supplier itself will have to assume
this responsibility. One could for example think of a case in which the defect finds its
origin in the defective design-plan or design-instruction of the assembler according to
which the supplier has produced the part.'^s Then, the assembler will be held solely
liable. The same responsibility hits the assembler in situations where he violated his
own duties, like his duty to carefully choose and observe the supplier, '^6 his duty to
carry out quality checks '^^ concerning the supply parts, and his duty to observe their
faultless working'28.
Another important area in which car and motorcycle manufacturers might be
subject to liability is the one of motor-vehicle accessories. In 1986, the Supreme Court
held in its famous "Honda-decision"'29 that a worldwide operating motorcycle-
manufacturer has the duty to observe the world-market of accessories that are
compatible to its own products in order to discover and prevent dangers resulting fi-om
the combination of its motorcycle, here, a "Honda GL 1000 Goldwing", with
accessories, here, a cover for the steering gear. Facts, issues, and the potential impact of
'23 BGH NJW 1996,2224 (2225 f); BGH Zeitschrift ftier Wirtschaftsrecht [hereinafter ZIP] 1990,514
(515); Mertens, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 278.
'24 BGH VersR 1956,259 (259); MERTENS, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 278.
'25 BGHZ 67,359 (362); MERTENS, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 278.
'26 BGH VersR 1972,559 (560); MERTENS, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 278; Kremer, supra note 82
at 137.
'27 BGH NJW 1968,247 (248); MERTENS, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 278.
'28 BGHZ 104,323 (327); BGHZ 67,359 (362).
'29 BGHZ 99,167 ff
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this case on the motor vehicle manufacturing world will be discussed in connection with
the duty to observe products once they have been put on the market. '^o
(III.) The quasi-manufacturer as potential defendant under § 823
SEC. I BGB
Another category of potential defendants is the so called quasi-manufacturers. In
contrast to the real manufacturer, they are not involved in the production process of the
product but label someone else's product either with their names or trademarks. '3' Such
a quasi-manufacturer is subject to liability when two prerequisites are fulfilled. First,
through the mentioned behavior he must have at least impliedly indicated that he took a
personal duty to check the product safety so that it appears as if he were the real
manufacturer. 132 Second, in contrast to § 4 ProdHaftG,i33 the consumer must have
evinced a special confidence to the quasi-manufacturer with the result that the first-
mentioned omitted precautionary measures which he otherwise would have taken. '^4
This requirement is based on the finding of the Supreme Court that consumers generally
evince their confidence to the professionalism of the real manufacturer, while only
130 See infra, at 54.
'31 One could, for example, think of a car manufacturer which receives engine filters (oil, air-filter) from
another manufacturer specialized in the manufacture of these filters. In order ot make it seem that each
single part of the car was produced by the car-manufacturer he puts his label on the filters before
integrating them into the engine. If a harmful event occurs due to a defect in these products, the car
manufacturer will be liable as quasi-manufacturer since he did not manufacture the filters himself but put
his label on them.
•32 BGH NJW Rechtsprechungs-Report [hereinafter NJW-RR] 1995,342 (343) (concerning the duty to
observe products); Mertens, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 279.
133 See infra, at 83, and note 362; under § 4 ProdHaftG the only requirement to establish liability for a
quasi-manufacturer is that he sells a product under his name, trademark or other distinctive sign.
134 BGH NJW 1980,1219 (1219); BGH VersR 1977,839 (839); Hein KOETZ, Deliktsrecht, Rn. 468
(e'^ed. 1994).
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under particular circumstances '^^ do they give their confidence to the one that provided
the name. '^6
Although in recent cases dealing with defective food products for babies'^'' the
Supreme Court has established a duty for the quasi-manufacturer to observe its
"products," in the motor vehicle area, however, the existence of quasi-manufacturers as
potential defendants is not as likely as it might be in other fields. This can be concluded
by taking a look at the occurrences within the chain of distribution from the
manufacturer of the supply parts (supplier), to the manufacturer of the motor vehicle
(assembler), to the retailer (dealer), and finally to the consumer. The assembler who gets
individual parts from the supplier will integrate them into the car or motorcycle he
produces. With respect to the appearance of his name (e.g. "BMW"), the assembler will
only be interested in selling the motor vehicle as a whole under his name; he will not
have an interest in labeling any single part of it, because it would make additional
negotiations with the supplier necessary dealing with the permission of changing names
or trademarks in order not to get in conflict with law. Secondly, it would increase the
purchase price of the supply part as the supplier will not "sell" his name free of charge.
Thirdly, it would lead to an increase of the assembler's production costs, as he would
have to build up a special department for the labeling. Finally, it would not necessarily
cause an increase of its profit or reputation. Thus, concerning the relationship between
the supplier and the assembler, the latter will almost never be a quasi-manufacturer. The
same is true for the retailer (authorized dealer) who buys the motor vehicle from the
assembler. Although he might put his business name on the frame of the license plates
'^^ Particular circumstances can be: Unusual knowledge / fame of the quasi-manufacturer or unusual
influence of the latter on the real manufacturer, see, G. SCHIEMANN, in Erman Handkommentar ZUM
BUERGERLICHEN Gesetzbuch, [hereinafter Erman] § 823 BGB, Rn. 123 (9*^ ed. 1994).
'36 BGH NJW 1980,1219 (1219); BGH VersR 1977,839 (839); see also, SCHIEMANN, supra note 135, §
823 BGB, Rn. 123.
137 BGHZ 1 16,60 - Kindertee 1 (Child tea 1); BGH NJW 1995,1286 - Kindertee III (Child tea III).
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of the cars he sells for advertisement purposes, he will not label these automobiles with
his name or trademark
(IV.) Other potential defendants
- Liability of marketing company and importer
The liability of the marketing company and that of the importer of motor
vehicles is basically identical, because the importer is the marketing company of a
foreign manufacturer. ^^^ Thus, both groups of potential defendants can be discussed
together.
As neither the marketing company nor the importer of motor vehicles is a
manufacturer, neither is generally liable under traditional tort law for harm caused by
defective products. '39 Nevertheless, either can, under particular circumstances, have a
duty to examine, instruct or observe the products it sells, and liability can be established
under § 823 sec. I BGB in case of its violation. For example, both the marketer and the
importer are obliged to examine the products purchased from the assembler, if they had
knowledge of the occurrence of harmful events in which these products were involved,
or if other circumstances make such an examination necessary. •''^ If then no measures to
avert the danger coming from the product were taken, a violation of the marketing
company's and / or the importer's legal duty would exist and liability could be
established.
Although the standard of liability for both potential defendants is basically the
same, one could think about imposing stricter duties on the importer of motor vehicles
'38 Mertens, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 280.
'39 BGHZ 99,167 ff. - Honda; BGH NJW 1994,517(517 f.); THOMAS, supra note 66, § 823 BGB, Rn.
216.
''O BGHZ 99,167 (170 f.); MERTENS, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 280; THOMAS, supra note 66, §
823BGB, Rn. 216.
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than on domestic marketing companies. This consideration could at least be justified in
situations where a manufacturer abroad has to follow lower safety standards than the
one in Germany and / or where a suit and its enforcement against a foreign manufacturer
would be considerably aggravated.''*' However, the Supreme Court held in 1980'''2 that
the introduction of stricter duties was not necessary for those who import technical
goods from the six original European Union Countries. '"^^ Behind this decision was the
reasoning that these countries have basically the same safety standards for products.
Furthermore, it emphasized that the enforcement ofjudgments among member-states of
the European Union is sufficiently guaranteed by the "Agreement of the European
Communities concerning the judicial competence and enforcement of judicial decisions
in civil and commercial affairs."''*'* Due to EC-Directives''*^ leading to a progressive
Europeanwide unification of product liability laws and safety standards, this holding
might generally be extended to all member states of the European Union. Regarding the
duties of importers of U.S. or Japanese automobiles and motorcycles, one can hazard
the assumption that the Supreme Court would decide in a similar way, because safety
standards for motor vehicles in the United States and Japan are at least as high as in the
member states of the European Union. Thus, the one who imports motor vehicles out of
the mentioned countries will generally not be subject to stricter duties than a domestic
marketing company.
'"*' Mertens, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 280.
''*2 BGH NJW 1980,1219 (1219 f.) - Fahrradgabel (Bicycle-handle-bars).
''*' The six original member states of the European Coal and Steel Community, founded in Paris April
18, 1951, are: Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg.
^^ Uebereinkommen der Europaeischen Gemeinschaften ueber die gerichtliche Zustaendigkeit und die
Vollstreckung gerichtlicher Entscheidungen in Zivil- und Handelssachen v. 27.09.1968, BGBl. 72 11 774,
entered into force on 01.02.1973 between the six original member-states.
''*^ See, EC-Directives leading to the enactment of product liability laws, product safety laws zmd crash-
test-standards, see. Introduction, supra at 7-8.
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- Liability of the combine (group)
Motor vehicle manufacturers are often structured, or could at least often be
structured, in the form of a combine, which means that there is a controlling company,
mostly a corporation and several subsidiaries, frequently private limited companies. In
order to escape product liability, the combine could transfer the production of goods that
is the most likely to cause severe harm (e.g. airbags, brakes, tires, gas tanks) to a
combine-subsidiary. •'•^ The most important reason for such an extemalization of
liability is that the controlling company of the combine, which is usually the financially
strongest defendant, could through this behavior evacuate its assets fi-om the plaintiffs
access. 1'*'^ As a result, the number of defendants the plaintiff could potentially sue
successfully would be decreased, and its restriction to the combine-subsidiary as
defendant would be fatal for his claim in cases where the latter is insolvent or where the
claim is barred by the statute of limitation (§ 852 BGB).''*^ In consideration of these
facts, one has to raise the question of whether the combine's controlling company can
and should get off without being held liable when a harmful event has been caused by a
defective product manufactured by the combine-subsidiary. i"*^ Legal scholars'^o agree
that a company executing control over its dependent subsidiary should also be held
legally responsible in the above mentioned situations. They persuasively argue that a
controlling company has the legal duty resulting out of § 823 sec. I BGB to intervene
•'^ Kremer, supra note 82, at 138.
147m
148m at 135.
'49 This question has been raised in 1969 by Ekkehard Rehbinder and has been taken up again by Oehler,
Hommelhoff and Westermann in the beginning of the 1990s, see, id at 138 and notes 41, 43.
150 M. Theisen, Der Konzern - Betriebswirtschaftliche und rechtliche Grundlagen der
KONZERNUNTERNEHMUNG 443 (1992); T. Westermann, Umwelthafiung im Konzern, Zeitschrift flier das
gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht [hereinafter ZHR] 155,223 (1991); W. Oehler,
Produzentenhaftung im Konzern - Deliktsrecht und Haftungsbeschraenkungen, ZIP 1990,1445 (1451); T.
Hommelhoff, Produkthaftung im Konzern, ZIP 1990,761 ff.
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when its subsidiary puts products with a high risk of danger on the market. In cases
where an intervention was possible and necessary to prevent the sales of the harm-
causing product, but where it has been omitted, the controlling company is liable for the
consequences. '5' This result corresponds to the holding of the Supreme Court that any
enterprise that uses a third company for its purposes is to be held liable if it violates
either its duty to carefully observe it or its duty to intervene where an intervention is
necessary. '52
In my opinion, the key factor is whether the controlling company intends to take
a profit out of the combine-subsidiary, and whether the latter is dependant on the
former. The extemalization of liability for highly dangerous productions to a subsidiary
is acceptable without consequences for the controlling company as long as the latter
does not get any profit out of the marketing of these products. In other words, the one
who takes the entire risk should get the entire profit. However, a company that does not
want to take any risk, but wants the profit to be shared, enters a one-way-street in the
wrong direction and should not get off scot-free. The question is now how to determine
whether a controlling company intends to profit, or in fact does profit, from its
subsidiary. A profit can either be gained as direct financial benefit (e.g. in cases where
an agreement concerning the profit-sharing exists) or indirectly by somehow controlling
the subsidiary. 153
Thus, even if a motor vehicle manufacturer transfers the production of goods
with a high risk of danger to its depending subsidiary, he will still potentially be subject
to liability.
'51 Theisen, supra note 150, at 443; Oehler, supra note 150, at 1451.
•52 BGH NJW 1976,46 (46) - Oelabfall (Oil-waste).
153 Kremer, supra note 82, at 138.
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- Liability of the manufacturer's / supplier's employees
Until now we have spoken of the liability of the "manufacturer" or "supplier",
thus, of the liability of a company involved in the manufacture of motor vehicles or their
parts. However, the question arises whether the employees of these companies can be
held personally liable for harm caused by defective products. On the one hand, this
question is of particular importance in the field of criminal law, where not the company
itself, but its acting individuals can be subject to prosecution for an intentional or
negligent violation of their duties which leads to physical injury or to harm to
property. '54 On the other hand, its weight is qualified with regard to civil cases by the
fact that an individual employee will generally not be as financially strong as a business
enterprise. However, it will still be important in cases where the manufacturing
company (e.g. a small supply enterprise) is bankrupt, or where plaintiffs claim is barred
by the statute of limitation (§ 852 BGB).'55 If then the plaintiff has a valid claim against
an employee, especially against executives of the company, he might at least be able to
get some compensation.
When discussing employees, we must distinguish between the members of the
board of directors or employees on similar level, '^6 the members of the supervisory
board, the lab-managers responsible for design and manufacture of the motor vehicle,
and other employees below the management level. '^^ Additionally, it must be kept in
154 See, e.g., BGH NJW 1990,2560 (2564 ff. ) - Lederspray (Leather-spray); BGH NStE § 223 StGB Nr.
5 - Mandelbienenstich.
'55 Kremer, supra note 82, at 135. One might ask how plaintiff can sue an individual if his claim against
the company is barred by the statute of limitation. The answer to this is that the three year time period set
forth in § 852 BOB begins to run at the time where the plaintiff got actual knowledge of the tortious act
and the tortfeasor. Thus, although the plaintiff might know who the defendant company was, he might
not know who individually committed a wrongful act. Accordingly, the limitation period with regard to
plainfitff s claim against the company begins earlier than the one for the claim against the individual.
'56 E.g., in a private limited company which does not have a board of directors, the managers have to be
considered as "employees on similar level".
'57 Kremer, supra note 82, at 136-137.
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mind for the following that liability under § 823 sec. I BGB an "everybody" liability,
which means that everyone, regardless of his position, who unlawfully causes harm by
violating his duty of care, could be held liable. '^^
- Liability of members of the board of directors and of managers
In the area of product recalls, each person within a group of executives has a
duty to initiate the recall of the harm-causing product after the first serious hints of
health risks caused by the product come in.'59 in cases where the recall or similar
counter-measures have been omitted, although they would have been the adequate way
of eliminating the product's danger, liability will be established. '6°
With respect to responsibility for manufacturing, design, and warnings defects,
the general holding of the Supreme Court can be applied. This is that liability will fall
on each member of the board of directors or managers in situations where their duty to
carefully and entirely organize the enterprise has been violated. This is true even if none
of these persons has been actively involved in the actual harmful event, because,
according to the Supreme Court, it is sufficient that it has been facilitated by faulty
organization. 161 Thus, in cases where one of the above mentioned duties has been
flouted, the executive, director, or manager of the motor vehicle manufacturer or its
supplier can be subject to liability.
158 Mat 136.
159 See, BGH NJW 1990,2560 (2564 ff.) - Lederspray (Leather-spray); BGH NStE § 223 StGB Nr. 5 -
Mandelbienenstich; Kremer, supra note 82, at 136.
160m
161 BGHZ 109,297 (303); according to the legal literature, the Supreme Court is on the way to hold
members of the board of directors (in a corporation) and managers (in a private limited company)
personally liable for every tortuous act, see, S. Reuse, Die Haftung von Managern im Aussenverhaeltnis,
DStR 1995,688 (689) m.w.N.; Kremer, supra note 82, at 136.
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- Liability of members of the supervisory board
Next, one must examine the development of judicial decisions issued by the
Supreme Court for the liability of directors and managers and the establishment of
personal legal responsibility for members of the supervisory board. '^^ j\i\^ board has
the duty to supervise the activities of the board of directors '^^ or of the mamagement'^'*.
If it remains passive in situations where it has knowledge or could have had knowledge
that the executive organs of the company act or acted unlawfully, it violates its duty to
supervise. Thus, its members should be held personally liable in the same way as
directors or managers would when disregarding their duties.
- Liability of lab managers responsible for design and manufacture
According to the Supreme Court the lab manager as well as the production
manager of a product are subject to liability for design and manufacturing defects. '^^
The court's reasoning focuses on the fact that these individuals hold a highly
responsible position which not only allows them to organize, supervise and control their
departments but which also imposes on them the corresponding duties to do so.'^^
In my opinion it is reasonable to hold this group of employees liable for design
and manufacturing defects. After all it is they who have superior qualification,
knowledge, and power, which enables them to discover product defects and to initiate
product modifications if necessary. It is they who get detailed information concerning
the product so that they have the general overview about the ftinctioning of the product.
'^^ Kremer, supra note 82, at 137.
1" See, § 1 1 1 sec. I Aktiengesetz v. 06.09.1965 (BGBl. I S. 1089) [hereinafter AtkG].
1^ See, § 52 sec. 1 Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschraenkter Haftung v. 20.04.1892 (RGBl.
S. 477) [hereinafter GmbHG] in connection with § 1 1 1 sec. 1 AktG.




Finally, possible objections alleging that it would be unfair to impose liability on
these individuals, because a successful product liability suit could ruin them financially,
should be rejected. First, everyone takes a risk when he causes harm to a person or
property. Secondly, knowing that a risk of being financially ruined exists, lab and
production managers should be even more careful in the daily execution of their jobs or,
if they do not want to take this risk, they should quit this position. As a third argument,
it should be noted that, particularly in the motor vehicle branch, a series of product tests
(crash-tests, driving tests etc.) is carried out for several years before the final product is
put on the market. Therefore, the responsible managers have enough time and
opportunity to discover and eliminate product defects. Ultimately, the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving the defendant's faulty behavior, because the presumption of fault that
the Supreme Court'^^ generally uses in product liability cases'^^ is applied only when
the company's employee can be considered as its representative.'^^ Lab and product
managers, although holding powerful positions within the company, can hardly be seen
as representatives. Consequently, the plaintiff bears the fiill burden of proof in a suit
against these persons, a burden that significantly reduces his chances of success.
Therefore, the personal liability of this group of defendants is entirely justified.
- Employees underneath the management level
In contrast to the company's executives, the "blue-collar-worker" does not bear
as much responsibility in his job but is to a higher extent dependent on directives.
Moreover, he does not usually have the specialized technological knowledge, and his
salary is usually lower than that of the executive organs. Accordingly, this group of
employees is subject to a higher risk of being financially bankrupt if involved as
•6'' BGHZ 51,91 ff. -Huehnerpest (Fowl pest).
'^^ See infra, at pp. 41
.
169 Kremer, supra note 82, at 136-137.
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defendant in a product liability suit without having the power of influencing the design
and manufacturing process. Therefore, and because of constitutional objections based
on a possible violation of art. 2 sec. I Grundgesetz'^° as well as a violation of the
principle of social justice and the welfare state'"'', some courts and legal authors protest
against the liability of these employees. '"'^ However, in 1991 the Supreme Court held a
cook in a family enterprise personally liable for defective food products served during a
wedding.'"'^ This decision, however, must neither be regarded as the opposite of the
preceding line of arguments, nor must it automatically be applicable to the employee
working on the assembly line of an automobile or motorcycle manufacturer, because the
fact patterns of the "wedding-case" and the hypothetical "mess-up on the assembly-line-
case" can be clearly distinguished. In the decided case, the cook worked in a small
family business which consisted of a few "employees" only. In contrast, motor vehicle
manufacturers or suppliers are big enterprises with thousands of workers. Furthermore,
the number of potentially injured persons, and accordingly the number of potential
plaintiffs, in the "wedding decision" is reduced to only a few individuals. This can
generally not be grasped in our hypothetical case. This also means that the financial loss
the employee has to face is in general much higher in the latter situation.
For these reasons, the worker in a big motor vehicle manufacturing enterprise
should generally not be held individually liable for harm caused by a defective part of
the motor vehicle.
•70 Grundgesetz (Constitution) filer die Bundesrepublik Deutschiand v. 23.05.1949 (BGBl. S. 1)
[hereinafter GGj.
'7' This principle is guaranteed and finds its roots in art. 20 sec. I GG.
'72 M. Brueggemeier, Besprechung des Hochzeitsessen-Urteils, ZIP 1992,415 (415 f.); M.
Brueggemeier, Deliktsrechtliche Aspekte innerorganisatorischer Funktionsdifferenzierung, Archiv fiier
die civilistische Praxis [hereinafter AcP] 191,33 (1991).
173 BGHZ 1 16,104 ff. -Hochzeitsessen (Wedding meal).
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Nevertheless, an exception of this general consideration may be made if the
employee wrongfully manufactured the part of the vehicle for which he is responsible.
For example, one might think of a situation in which he forgot to install a gasket in the
gas tank of a car, leading to an explosion when fueled. Here, the defect would affect one
car only, and there would only be a few potential plaintiffs (the driver, passengers and
people injured by the explosion). In this case the risk of suffering financial loss would
not be higher for the defendant than in the "wedding case". Thus, one might argue that
in such a situation liability should be established against the employee. However, it
must not be disregarded that there is still a difference between the job of a cook and that
of a worker on an assembly line of a car manufacturer. Only the latter can be considered
as hazardous employment, because in case of a mistake the occurrence of severe injuries
is very likely, while a mistake in cooking a meal will usually only lead to a loss of taste.
Accordingly, in this kind of situation the worker should not be held liable for normal
negligence but only for gross negligence and intent.
- Joint tortfeasors
If the plaintiff is able to successfully sue more than one defendant in a product
liability action, each defendant is , according to § 840 sec. I BOB in connection with §§
421 ff BGB, liable as a joint-debtor. This means that the plaintiff can request full
payment of the amount of damages awarded from one defendant. The defendant who
completely satisfies the plaintiff then has a legal claim under § 426 sec. II BGB to get
proportional compensation fi^om the other debtors.
c) Distribution of burden of proof - background information
The distribution of the burden of proof is a very important factor that can and
will often be decisive in a torts action in which one party cannot provide evidence for its
40
claim, or where the party is not able to give sufficient evidence.'^'* Then, the party that
bears the burden of proof for this particular prerequisite will at least partly loose its
case. Although the details of the distribution of burden of proof in products liability
cases will be discussed in connection with the different categories of product defects'''^,
there are some general aspects to be mentioned in order to provide important
background information.
In a non-products liability claim based on § 823 sec. I BGB the plaintiff usually
bears the burden of proof for all seven prerequisites of this section. '^^ The same was
true for products liability claims before 1968. However, since that time the Supreme
Court''^^ has developed an important reduction with regard to plaintiffs burden in the
area of product liability,
(I.) The situation before the fowl-pest decision: Plaintiff bears full
BURDEN OF PROOF
Since about 1916 the liability of the manufacturer for defective products was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the German Reich. '^^ From this time until 1968 the
rules of traditional tort law were applied for such cases without modification concerning
the distribution of burden of proof This means that, at that time, the plaintiff had to
prove every single prerequisite of § 823 sec. I BGB, including in particular the violation
of a duty of care as well as fault on the side of the defendant. As the plaintiff normally
1'^'' Heinz Thomas & Hans Putzo, Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung [hereinafter Thomas-
PUTZO], vor § 284 ZPO, Pin. 17-40 {6"^ ed. 1992).
^''^ See infra, at 43.
'^^ Thomas, supra note 66, § 823 BGB, Rn. 167; ThoMAS-Putzo, supra note 174, § 284 ZPO, Rn. 17-
40.
•77 BGHZ 51,91 ff. - Huehnerpest (Fowl pest).
•78 RG Recht 1918 Nr. 1363 = JOACHIM Schmidt-Salzer, Entscheidungssammlung
ProDUKTHAFTUNG Nr. I. 7, at 40 f ; RG LZ 1916 Sp. 1025 - Freistelleiter = JOACHIM Schmidt-Salzer,
Entscheidungssammlung Produkthaftung Nr. I. 6 at 39 f. (1976).
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had knowledge neither about the internal organization of the manufacturer's enterprise
nor about the production process, his claim was rarely successful because of his
inability to provide evidence for the two last-mentioned elements. In addition, the
manufacturer was often able to provide decentralized'^^ exculpatory evidence in order to
escape liability for vicarious agents under § 83 1 BGB'^^.
(II.) The situation since the fowl-pest decision (1968): Reducing the
plaintiff's burden of proof in manufacturing defect cases
In its fowl-pest decision from November 26, 1968,'^' which dealt with a
manufacturing defect of a medication for chicken against fowl pest, the Supreme Court
set up the principles forming the foundation of product liability law for the ftiture. First,
it held that a privity between the plaintiff (consumer) and the defendant (manufacturer)
is not necessary in order to bring a successful product liability action. Instead, only tort
law (§§ 823 sec. I and sec. II BGB) provides the basis for such actions. Second, the
court modified the rules concerning the burden of proof in favor of the plaintiff in cases
involving a manufacturing defect. It decided that in such cases the plaintiff neither has
the burden of proving the breach of a duty of care, nor the fault of the defendant. '^^
Instead, the prerequisites of § 823 sec. I BGB are to be presumed in this kind of case so
that the defendant bears the burden of providing exculpatory evidence in order to reftite
this presumption. In its reasoning the court argued that on the one hand the plaintiff
generally neither has an insight into the details of the manufacturing process, nor, on
the other hand, can he control it. Thus, it would be nearly impossible for the plaintiff to
get information necessary to gather the facts of the case so that he could file a successful
'^^ With regard to the application of decentralized exculpatory evidence also for big enterprises, see,
BGHZ 4,1 (2); BGH VersR 1964,297 (297); THOMAS, supra note 66, § 831 BGB, Rn. 15.
•80 See, § 831 BGB, supra note 92.
181 BGHZ 51,91 ff. - Huehnerpest (Fowl-pest).
182 BGHZ 51,91 ff.
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suit. '8^ The manufacturer, on the other hand, initiates, controls, and supervises the
manufacturing process, which enables him not only to easily discover the source of the
defect but also to gather the entire facts of the case.
Both the holding and the reasoning of the court should be agreed upon for three
reasons. First, because of the closeness of the manufacturer to his internal
manufacturing process, secondly, because the large majority of product liability cases
would otherwise be doomed to failure, and finally, as a matter of fairness to the
unknowing consumer, who has to face the knowledgeable manufacturer who is still able
to provide exculpatory evidence concerning his lack of fault and his compliance with a
duty of care.
(III.) Extension of the shift of burden of proof to design defect
CASES
As the fowl-pest decision dealt with a manufacturing defect, the principles
established by the Supreme Court in this case are limited to this particular type of
defect. However, the court extended the scope of application of these principles to
design defects in another landmark decision. '8"* ^^^ The court argued that, with regard to
the lack of evidence, the plaintiff faces the same difficulties in design defect cases as he
does in manufacturing defect cases. Thus, in both kinds of situations the breach of a
duty of care by the defendant and his fault are presumed.
'^^ BGHZ 51,91 ff.; in addition it has to be said that, in contrast to the United States, a pre-trial discovery
- which enables the parties to gather information about the adversary - is not recognized in German Civil
Procedure so that the plaintiff in Germany is more likely to be lacking evidence than the one in the U.S.
'84 BGHZ 67,359 ff. Schwimmschalter (Swim-switch).
l«5Mat361.
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D) Three different categories of product defects
Under § 823 sec. I BGB the defendant is liable for a violation of his legal duty to
maintain safetyJ^^ The scope of this duty is to be determined according to the phases in
the course of the production process. Within this process, one can distinguish between
three different phases: the development of the product (design), its manufacture, and its
equipping the consumer with information in order to not only instruct him about the
product's use but also to warn him about the product's dangers. •^'^ According to this
structure, the different kinds of violations of the defendant's duty to maintain safety can
be divided into three categories: design defects, manufacturing defects, and instructions
or warning defects. '^^
(1.) Design defects
A product is defective in design when the defect occurred within the planning,
development, or choice of the production method. '^^ Contrary to manufacturing defects,
this kind of error typically affects the whole product series, and therefore it is the most
feared by the manufacturer. '^^ Although we now know in which phase of the production
process the product error must have happened, in order to constitute a design defect the
question remains how such a defect should be determined. i^i In general, one can say
that the key element of that question is whether the product is safe or safe enough for its
use in trade and business. Courts and legal literature make use of several factors in order
186 MERTENS, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 282; SCHIEMANN, supra note 135, § 823 BGB, Rn. 1 15.
187 SCHIEMANN, supra note 135, § 823 BGB, Rn. 1 15.
188 BGHZ 86,256 - Gaszug; BGHZ 51,91 ff. - Huehnerpest (Fowl pest); BGH NJW 1968,247 ff. -
Schubstrebe; MERTENS, supra note 52, § 823 BGB, Rn. 283-289.
189 SUSANNE WESCH, DIE PRODUZENTENHAFTUNG IM INTERNATIONALEN RECHTSVERGLEICH 104 (1994);
Hein Koetz, Deliktsrecht, Rn. 435 (6"^ ed. 1994).
190 Wesch, supra note 189, at 104.
1^1 This question is actually subject to a controversy in the product liability laws in the United States, see
infra, Chapter II, at pp. 107.
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to provide a satisfactory reply to this question. The courts hold that a product is
defective in design if it is, under safety aspects, not suitable for its intended purpose. '^^
In addition, it must provide both, operational safety ''^^ and compliance with existing
minimum safety requirements'^'*. Nevertheless, these expositions are not yet complete
but bring up two new issues: first, what standard is used to decide whether a product is
suitable for its intended purpose, and second, which role the manufacturer's compliance
with cogent safety regulations plays.
(a) Issue: Standard to determine whether a motor vehicle is safe
ENOUGH
As to the first issue, the Supreme Court focuses on the expectations of the
consumer'^5 and on a kind of cost-benefit-anaiysis'^^. The product (motor vehicle) will
not be considered defective in design if its safety features are in accord with the
consumer's expectations. The level of expectations will of course vary depending on the
kind of consumer group for which the product is designed. Motor vehicles, especially
automobiles, are generally intended to be used by the majority of the people, because
automobiles are the most important means of individual transportation. '^^ Thus, in this
area the "reasonable" consumer must be the standard to measure whether the individual
motor vehicle is safe enough. However, some vehicles, like racing cars or cross-country
motorcycles, are not to be used by "everybody" but only by experts. In these situations
the reasonable expectations of the latter provide the applicable standard. In addition, the
'92 BGHZ 104,323 (327); BGH VersR 1967,498 (500); OLG Koeln VerR 1993,1 10 (1 1 1).
'93 BGH VersR 1959,523 (524); OLG Karlsruhe NJW-RR 1995,594 (596 ff.); OLG Saarbruecken NJW-
RR 1993,990 (991).
'94 BGH NJW 1990,908 (909); OLG Koeln NJW-RR 1991, 285 (286).
'95 BGH NJW 1990,906 (906 f ); BGH VersR 1985,1093 (1094).
'96 BGH NJW 1990,906 (907); BGH NJW 1990,908 (909).
'9^ See, Introduction, supra at 2-3.
45
courts recognize the financial factor involved in the equipping of products with safety
features and require that their costs have to be in accord with their benefits. '^^
Moreover, several other factors that are equally recognized in the legal literature'^^ are
taken into consideration. Those factors are: the comparison of the actual product to that
which a reasonable manufacturer would have chosen in order to reduce or avoid an
unreasonable danger,2oo the state of science and technology at the time the product was
put on the market, the likelihood of a realization of the danger, its resulting type of
damages (bodily injury or property damage), and the consequences.^^' Accordingly, the
outcome of a claim alleging the failure of an automobile manufacturer to provide a
safety element in a passenger car, for example the lack of side-airbags, is not easily
foreseeable and will depend on the complex interaction of the mentioned factors.
This situation is comparable to the one in the United States where, depending on
the jurisdiction, a variety of tests to determine design defectiveness can be found.202
Among those tests are a form of risk-utility^o^ or risk-benefit^o^ analysis, the consumer
expectations test^o^^ the comparison to what a reasonable manufacturer would have
done206 and, the reasonable alternative design requirement^o^.
'98 BGH NJW 1990,906 (907); BGH NJW 1990,908 (909).
'99 Mertens, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 283; HEIN KOETZ, Deliktsrecht, Rn. 447-449 (6"^ ed.
1994).
200 hein Koetz, Delitsrecht, Rn. 447 (6'*' ed. 1994).
201 Id at Rn. 447, 449.
202 See, Chapter II, infra at pp. 107.
203 Thibault v. Sear, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843,846 (N.H. 1978); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.
2d 176 (Mich. 1984); Rix v. General Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195,201-202 (Mont. 1986); see further,
Chapter II.
204 West V. Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc. 220 Cal. Rptr. 437 (Cal. App. 1985), cert, denied, 479 U.S.
824 (1986); Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175,182,183-184 (Colo. 1992).
205 Lester v. Magic Chef, 641 P.2d 353,357 (Kan. 1982); Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co., 412 N.W.
2d 56 (Neb. 1987).
206 Nichols V. Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W. 2d 429 (Ky. 1980); Church v. Wesson, 385 S.E. 2d 393
(W. Va. 1989).
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(B) Issue: The role of compliance with existing safety
REGULATIONS208
The non-compliance of the manufacturer or supplier with existing obligatory
minimum safety regulations (e.g. crash-test standards) will generally constitute a design
defect and be considered as negligent conduct.209
(c) Issue: No liability for development risks
In section (a) it was mentioned that one of the factors for the determination of
product defectiveness is the manufacturer's compliance with the state of science and
technology at the time was introduced in the market. In this context the question arises
whether a product should also be considered defective if it does not comply with
scientific and technological standards that have been developed after its introduction on
the market. In other words, should the manufacturer be liable for development risks?
Courts^io and legal scholars^" generally deny this kind of liability, and the legislature
has recognized it only for a few products, such as medical drugs.212 in the motor vehicle
area, though, liability for development risks does not exist under § 823 sec. I BGB.^i^
This view should be entirely agreed upon considering that under the fault
standard of § 823 sec. I BGB a defendant can only be held liable for intent or
207 III. Comp. Stat. Ann. CH. 735 § 5/2-2104 (1993 & Supp. 1996); Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450
S.E.2d671(Ga. 1994).
208 This topic is even a bigger issue in the United States raising two questions: Whether the
manufacturer's compliance with federal safety regulations preempts state tort law, and, if not, whether
compliance serves as a defense in a state tort action, see. Chapter 11, infra at pp. 128.
209 BGH VersR 1959,523 (524); BGH VersR 1960,1095 (1096).
210 BGHZ 51,91 (105); OLG Muenchen VersR 1990,791 (792); OLG Duesseldorf NJW-RR 1992,284
(284).
211 Mertens, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 288; Hein Koetz, Deliktsrecht, Rn. 448 (6"^ ed. 1994).
212 Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Arzneimittelrechts (Arzneimittelgesetz) v. 24.08.1976, BGBl. 1 S. 2245,
§§ 84 ff. [hereinafter AMG], (Law governing the manufacture and prescription of drugs).
213 Neither does liability for development risks exist under the strict liability standard of the
Produkthaftungsgesetz, see, § 1 sec. 11 Nr. 5 ProdHaftG.
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negligence. This requires that he at least could have known that the actual product
design would lead to a violation of one of the plaintiffs rights protected under this
section. However, this prerequisite is not fulfilled with regard to new technologies
through the application of which actual product damages could have been avoided,
because they would not have been discemable during the time the product was designed
and finally marketed. This means that a plaintiff who alleges the defectiveness of his
automobile built in the 1960s because of the lack of a driver-airbag will not be
successful, as this safety feature was developed in the 1980s.
(D) Distribution of burden of proof
As the defendant's breach of duty of care and his fault are presumed in design
defect cases, the plaintiff only has to prove that one of his rights protected under § 823
sec. I BGB was violated due to the design defectiveness of the motor vehicle and that,
as a result, he suffered damages. In order to escape liability the manufacturer or supplier
has to provide evidence showing that he neither breached his duty of care nor acted with
fault.214
To provide the necessary evidence both parties can make use of five different
means of proof: expert witnesses,^!^ inspection (judicial view),2i6 interrogation of a
party,2i'7 instruments,^!^ and witnesses^i^. The plaintiffs proof of violation of a
protected right and the resulting damages can generally be presented easily by
interrogating the party and by the provision of witnesses or instruments, such as medical
documents. More difficult, however, is the provision of evidence for the product defect
214 BGHZ 67,359 (361 f.); BGH VersR 1971,80 (82).
215 See, §§402-414 ZPO.
216 5ee, §§371-372aZPO.
217 5ee,§§ 445-455 ZPO.
218 5ee,§§ 415-444 ZPO.
219 5ee,§§ 373-401 ZPO.
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and its causality for the damage, because, in the motor vehicle area in particular, this
determination requires scientific knowledge. Accordingly, the plaintiff will generally
have to rely on expert witnesses (e.g. engineers). In two situations, though, his burden
of proof with regard to product defect and its causality for the damage is reduced, and
he does not have to provide full evidence. First, when the damage is to be considered as
a typical result of this kind of defect, he is allowed to provide prima facie evidence.220
Second, if different circumstances point to the defectiveness of the product as a cause of
the damage it is sufficient for him to present circumstancial evidence.221
The defendant, on the other hand, will make use of expert witnesses to show that
the product was not defective. In addition, with respect to the provision of exculpatory
evidence for his non-breach of a duty of care and his non-fault, he has to show the two
elements. First, that the production process was organized and supervised in a manner
that excluded the genesis of sources of product defects,222 and, second, that it was not
subject to any disruptions caused by mistakes of his employees223. If the last-mentioned
element cannot be proven, the defendant first has to name every single employee who
was involved in the production process and then has to provide exculpatory evidence
220 BGHZ 51,91, (104); Mertens, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 298. As an example one could assume
of the following fact pattern: Plaintiff is inattentively driving in his car and collides with another vehicle.
He suffers serious injuries, among others, he broke the third neck vertebra. Plaintiff alleges that this kind
of damage occurred before the collision because the airbag in his car was defective and happened to
explode seconds before impact. It is known that fractures of the second and third vertebra are usually
caused by defective airbags exploding too early. In so far, plaintiffs harm is a typical result of the airbag
defect. He may introduce circumstancial evidence.
221 BGH NJW 1987,1694 (1694 f ); MERTENS, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 298. As an example one
could think of the following situation: Plaintiff is driving within the speed limit on a straight road, in dry
weather condition, it is daylight, and there is no other traffic. Suddenly, the car gets out of control and
plaintiff hits a tree. Under these circumstances nothing points to plaintiffs own misconduct. Also
misconduct of other traffic participants is excluded. Thus, there must have been a defect in the car.
Plaintiff is allowed to present circumstancial evidence.
222 BGHZ 51,91 (105, 107 f ); BGHZ 59,303 (309).
223 Mertens, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 299.
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that each of them was selected and supervised appropriately.^^-* For this kind of
evidence instruments, witnesses, and the interrogation of the party will come into play
as means of proof.
(II.) Manufacturing defects
As already disclosed by its name, manufacturing defects originate during the
manufacturing process of the product and are in most cases either caused by a failure of
a human being (e.g. mistake of a worker automobile assembly-line) or by the
breakdown of a machine.^^sjn contrast to design defects, the fault in the manufacture of
the product will typically not affect the whole product series but only a single
product.226 Thus, the latter kind of defect will have a much less severe financial
consequence for the manufacturer, because only one potential harmful event can occur,
and he will not have to recall a whole product series. In order to avoid or reduce the risk
of being held liable for this kind of defect, the motor vehicle manufacturer has to be
advised to completely organize and supervise the manufacturing process and to
introduce a reasonable number of quality checks for the incomplete as well as for the
complete vehicle.227
(a) Distribution of burden of proof
With regard to the provision of evidence, generally the same principles for
design defects apply. Therefore, the plaintiff must prove the defectiveness of the
product before it has been put on the market and its causal link to the damage. The
manufacturer has to provide the pursuant exculpatory evidence.
224 BGH NJW 1968,247 (248); BGH NJW 1973,1602 (1603); Mertens, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn.
292, 299.
225 Wesch, supra note 189, at 105.
226m
227 Mertens, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 287.
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(B) Presumption of existence of defect before marketing of product
However, the Supreme Court introduced, in cases dealing with manufacturing
defects of mineral water bottles,^^^ the so called "duty to secure the results"
(Befiindsicherungspflicht) or "duty to secure the status of the product"
(Statussicherungspflicht). This duty obliges the manufacturer of products that show a
"specific tendency to cause damage"229 to examine the condition ("status") of each of
them through a specific quality check that is even more thorough than the usual quality
controls. The reason for the introduction of this duty is to guarantee the faultlessness of
those products when put on the market, because they contain a particularly high risk of
danger for the consumer. A violation of this duty leads to the presumption that the
manufacturing defect already existed before the product was marketed, and that this
defect would have been noticed if the status had been appropriately secured.^^o Through
this presumption the Supreme Court has again shifted the burden of proof to the
manufacturer, who now has to offer additional exculpatory evidence showing that the
defect did not exist until the product was put on the market.
As a result of this legal development, the question arises whether this holding
not only applies to mineral water bottles but also to the entire motor vehicle or at least
to parts of it. The Supreme Court emphasized that the duty to secure the status exists in
situations in which the product shows a "specific tendency to cause damage".^^! This
tendency can be shown if the product in question contains considerable risks for the
consumer which are deeply rooted in its manufacture so that a normal quality check is
228 BGHZ 104,323 - Mehrwegflasche I (Returnable bottle I) with comment Ekkehart Reinelt, Comment,
NJW 1988,2614 (2614); BGH NJW 1993,528 - Mehrwegflasche II (Returnable bottle II); BGH NJW
1995,2162 - Mehrwegflasche III (Returnable bottle III).
229 5ee, BGHZ 104,323 (334); BGH NJW 1993,528 (529).
230 BGHZ 104,323 (336) - Mehrwegflasche I (Returnable bottle I); BGH NJW 1993,528 (529) -
Mehrwegflasche II (Returnable bottle II).
231 See supra, note 230.
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insufficient, and a particular status inquiry is necessary. A motor vehicle consists of
several parts which could meet these requirements. For example, brakes, tires and
steering gears-^- create a ver>' high risk of danger to automobile passengers and third
persons if they are faulty.
(C) No LIABILITY FOR "RUN-AWAY-PRODUCTS"
Although courts are generally reluctant in recognizing gaps of liability for the
defendant, an exception is made for so called "run-away-products".^^^ These are
manufacturing defects that occur in spite of all precautions. ^^-^ Because the manufacturer
did everything reasonably possible to prevent the occurrence of this kind of defect, he
did not act with fault.^^s Accordingly, one of the main prerequisites of § 823 BGB is
missing in those cases, and liability cannot be established.
(III.) Instructions and warnings defects
In contrast to design and manufacturing defects, an instructions or warnings
defect does not affect the constitution of the product itself but describes a lack of
information which the defendant should have reasonably included either at the time of
sale (pre-sale failure to instruct or warn) or after the marketing of the product (post-sale
failure to instruct or wam).^^^ Whether a dut}' to inform exists, and what the content of
the information should be, should be determined on a case-by-case basis. Within this
determination, the following factors have to be taken into consideration: the state of
science and technology at the time which the product was put on the market, the
^^^ Birkmann, supra note 1 14, at 129.
233 Wesch, supra note 189, at 105.
234 Thomas, supra note 66, § 823 BGB, Rn. 205.
235
id.\ see also, WESCH, supra note 189, at 105.
236 hein Koetz, Deliktsrecht, Rn. 454 (6* ed. 1994).
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likelihood of realization of the danger, the kind and extent of potential damages, and, in
particular, the knowledge of the expected consumer group.^^?
Before entering into detailed discussion, a notice serving semantic clarification
has to be given. Some authors^^^ ^q ^ot differentiate between instructions defects and
warnings defects but use the term "instruction defect" as generic term. However, if
using a generic term, the words "information defect" should be chosen instead, because
this term comprises more appropriately the two other terms. When talking about
"instructions" or "warnings" semantic differences should be kept in mind. To "instruct"
indicates how one is to do something, in particular, how the product has to be used. To
"warn", on the other hand, indicates that something is dangerous, in particular, it points
at the dangers involved in the use of the product.^^^ In the following these terms are
used with this meaning.
(a) Contents and form of pre-sale information
The maimer in which the manufacturer or supplier in the motor vehicle branch
has to create its pre-sale information for his products not to be subject to liability was
determined in a line of cases decided by the Supreme Court.^^o Although some of these
do involve other manufacturers than those of motor vehicles, this does not affect their
adoption for our topic, as the holdings and the reasoning in these decisions have a
general scope of application.
237 BGHZ 80,186 (192) - Apfelschorf I (Derosal); Hein KOETZ, Deliktsrecht, Rn. 455 (6*^ ed. 1994).
238 E.g.. Mertens, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 284; SCHIEMANN, supra note 135, § 823 BGB, Rn.
122.
239 This semantic distinction is borrowed from U.S. product liability law which, in my opinion, defines
the terms "instruction" and "warning" in an adequate way, see, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
Products Liability, Proposed Final Draft, § 2, cmt 1, at 3 1.
240 BGHZ 116,60 (64 ff.; 68 ff.) - Kindertee I (Child tea I); BGH NJW 1994,932 (933) - Kindertee II
(Child tea II); BGH NJW 1995,1286 (1287 f.) - Kindertee III (Child tea III).
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First, the automobile or motorcycle manufacturer has to inform the consumers
how to operate the vehicle and to point out the risks involved in its operation. ^^i This
requirement will generally be fulfilled, as motor vehicle manufacturers usually provide
extensive operating instructions manuals. However, the information provided has to be
as clear, detailed, and as understandable as reasonably possible, and, if necessEiry,
visually emphasis may be used to reach the average user.242 Of course, when not dealing
with people who have inferior or superior knowledge (e.g. experts), the manufacturer
has to adjust its information to this group of consumer.243 in addition, the potential
defendant also has to provide warnings concerning a foreseeable misuse^'*'' of the
vehicle by its user.2'»5 in this context it has to be mentioned that the compliance with a
statutory regulated duty to warn is "not always" sufficient.^''^ 247 However, the
manufacturer's duty to warn ends where the product misuse is absolutely unusuaP^s or
obvious^"*^ to the consumer.
241 BGH NJW 1975,1827 (1829); Mertens, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 284.
242 BGHZ 1 16,60 (64 ff.; 68 ff.) - Kindertee I (Child tea I); BGH NJW 1994,932 (933) - Kindertee II
(Child tea II); BGH NJW 1995,1286 (1287 f.) - Kindertee III (Child tea III); OLG Koeln VersR 1987,573
(573 f.); Mertens, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 286.
243 BGHZ 11 6,60 (65 f); BGH NJW 1992,2016 (2018); Hans Josef KuUmann, Die Rechtsprechung des
BGHzum Produkthaftpflichtrecht in denJahren 1995 - 1997, NJW 1997,1746 (1749).
244 BGHZ 129,353 (353); BGH z 106,273 (283); MERTENS, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 285.
245 As an example one might think of a manufacturer's duty to warn of the dangers arising when starting
a car with stick shift while in gear.
246 BGHZ 106,273 (280 ff ); BGH NJW 1987,372 (373).
247 The role of compliance with federal regulations is equally an important issue in the product liability
laws in the United States, see. Chapter II, infi-a at pp. 128.
248 BGH NJW 1981,2514 (2514). For example: Plaintiff wants to commit suicide and locks himself into
the trunk of his car. Then he changes his mind and suffers harm because he is captured in the trunk for
several days. He sues manufacturer for defectively designed trunk lock. Plaintiffs misuse was unusual
and manufacturer did not have a duty to warn of this danger.
249 OLG Koblenz VersR 1981,740 (740). For example: Plaintiff uses 1971 VW-van as cross country
vehicle and suffers harm because the car rolled over. Plaintiffs misuse was obvious and manufacturer
did not have a duty to warn of this danger.
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(B) Duty to observe products and post-sale duty to warn
Aside from cases dealing with a pre-sale failure to inform, one can also think of
cases in which the product information was appropriate at the time of marketing but,
due to new dangers discovered in the course of technological development, became
inappropriate in the future. Already the Supreme Court of the German Reich^^o has
basically recognized the manufacturer's duty not only to control the product until its
marketing but also to constantly observers i it in the future. Connected to this duty is the
obligation of the manufacturer to collect all new scientific findings and empirical data252
253as well as to observe the product development of his most important competitors^^-*.
Out of this information he has to take appropriate counter-measures, which can either be
the provision of additional warnings (post-sale warnings), the elimination of the source
of danger by repair, or the recallof the product.255 The determination of the
appropriateness of the measure depends not only on the concrete situation but also, in
any case, the factors "extent of risk of danger" and the "kind of potential damages" have
to be considered.256 In order to guarantee the flow of information from scientific
institutions, and especially from the consumer to the manufacturer, the latter has to take
250 RGZ 163,21 (26); RG DR 1940,1293; see, Birkmann, supra note 1 14, at 126.
251 Mertens, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 289; Friedrich Graf von Westphalen, Neue Gesichtspunkie
Juer die Produxentenhaftung, Betriebsberater [hereinafter BB] 1971,152 (156).
252 BGHZ 99,167 ff. - Honda; BGHZ 80.186 ff. - Apfelschorf I (Derosa!); BGHZ 80.199 ff. Apfelschorf
II (Benomyl).
253 £g these data could and should be gathered by analyzing test reports, specialist journals (scientific
and technological journals) etc., see, Hans Josef Kullmann, Die Produktbeobachtungspflicht des
Krafifahr-eugherstellers im Hinblick aufZubehoer, BB 1987,1957 (1958).
254 BGH NJW 1990,906 (907); MERTENS, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 289; Birkmann, supra note
114, at 127.
255 BGHZ 80,186 (190) - Apfelschorf I (Derosal); BGHZ 64,46 (49 ff.) - Haartonicum.
256 Birkmann, supra note 1 14, at 127.
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adequate organizational precautions.257 For example, a motor vehicle could set up of an
Auto-Safety-Hotline to which vehicle malfunctions could be reported. ^^^
If the manufacturer violates any of these duties he can be held liable under § 823
sec. I BGB.
(c) Duty to observe product accessories
In addition to the potential defendant's potential duty to observe his own
products, he also has a duty to observe other company's accessories that could be used
in combination with his products in order to discover potential dangers resulting out of
this combination (combination danger).^^^ 26o j^ the motor vehicle area, this duty was
established by the Supreme Court in 1986 in the famous "Honda-decision"26i where the
driver of a Honda GL 1 000 "Goldwing" motorcycle was killed when he crashed against
a crash-barrier while riding at a speed of 140 to 150 km/h (approx. 87 to 94 mph).^^^
The cause of the accident was the reduction of the driving stability of the motorcycle
due to the fact that its former owner had equipped it with a steering gear cover
manufactured and marketed by a German accessories-marketing company.263 The
Supreme Court held that, in addition to the company which produces the accessories,
the motor vehicle manufacturer also could be held liable. The reasoning focused on the
25^ In the United States a nationwide Auto-Safety-Hotline exists; however, this hotline has not been set
up by motor vehicle manufacturers but by a federal agency, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration which is part of the Department of Transportation, see,
<http:www.nhtsa.dot.gov./hotline/>.
259 BGHZ 99,167 (172 ff.) - Honda.
260 ^i^i^ regard to the manufacturer of pharmaceuticals the duty to instruct and warn of combination
dangers is regulated by statute, see, § 1 1 sec, I Nr. 7 AMG and § 1 la sec. I Nr. 7 AMG; see, Kulhnann,
supra note 253, at 1959.
261 BGHZ 99,167 ff. - Honda.
262 For further facts, see, Kallmann, supra note 253, at 1958.
263 Kulhnann, supra note 253, at 1958.
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circumstance that the latter is better able to test the accessories' influence on the entire
motor vehicle than the former. In addition, he saves costs for the development and
manufacture of accessories, the existence of which might increase the sale of his
vehicles.264 However, the question has to be raised whether this decision establishes
excessive demands on the motor vehicle manufacturers, as the world-market of
automobile and motorcycle accessories is large and almost impossible to keep in general
overview.265 A reply to this question has been given by the Supreme Court in the Honda
case, which distinguished between four different categories of accessories. The four
categories are commonly used accessories, necessary accessories, accessories the use of
which has been facilitated by the manufacturer and, finally, accessories that require the
addition of special mountings.
- Commonly used accessories
Commonly used accessories are the ones frequently used by consumers. With
regard to these accessories, a strict duty to observe exists and is at the same time
sufficient. This means that the manufacturer does not generally have the additional duty
to inspect these items.^^^ Nevertheless, the latter duty can originate if an immediate
cause exists (e.g. car accident probably caused by commonly used accessories). For
items not commonly used, on the other hand, the Supreme Court did not expressly
establish any duty . Therefore, it can be concluded that for those no strict duty to
actively observe exists.
^^ E.g., one can think of accessories provided by tuning companies that enhance both, the outward
appearance of the automobile, and its interior elements (e.g., more luxury or more powerful engine).
265 Kulbnann, supra note 253, at 1958.
266 BGHZ 99,167,174.
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- Necessary accessories and accessories facilitated by the
manufacturer
Necessary accessories are ones that are urgently needed for the functioning of
the motor vehicle (e.g. tires). ^^^ Accessories are facilitated if the manufacturer pre-
installed holes, hooks, bore holes or similar things so that they can easily be added to
the motor vehicle (e.g. a roof rack). For both kinds, the manufacturer not only has the
duty to observe but also to test in his own test roads.^^s In case he has doubts concerning
their safety, he either has to recommend the ones which he successfully tested, and
which he estimates to be safe, or to warn of their use.^^^
- Accessories requiring special mountings
For this group of accessories, mounting facilities do not already exist but have
yet to be installed. Here, generally, only a duty to observe is placed the motor vehicle
manufacturer, unless concrete circumstances advise him to take further measures.
- Existence of administrative operating permissions: No influence
ON the manufacturer's liability
A last issue that comes up in connection with accessories is whether the
potential defendant can be held responsible if the registration office issued a general
operating permission for them in accordance with §§ 22, 22a StYZO^''^. In the Honda
case the Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative and held that the
existence of operating permissions for accessories neither reduces the manufacturer's
duty to observe or test them nor his obligation to warn of their dangers.^^^ It based its
267 Kullmann, supra note 253, at 1958.
268m
269 /J.
270 See supra, note 8.
271 BGHZ 99,167 (172 ff.) - Honda.
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holding on the reason that a manufacturer is not allowed to conclude from the existence
of such permissions that the accessories companies developed and tested their products
carefully; neither shall he be allowed to presume that every potential defect of the
accessories has been already discovered.^^^
This is a proper consideration of the meaning and purpose of operating
instructions because, according to § 18 sec. I StVZO, their issue shows their admission
for traffic but does not constitute a guarantee for their faultless functioning.
(D) Duty to recall defective motor vehicles
Aside from his post-sale duties to provide additional instructions or warnings,
the motor vehicle manufacturer can be obliged to recall defective vehicles under § 823
sec. I BGB. A recall is the request of the manufacturer to the consumer to turn in the
product in order to repair or exchange it or to take it back.^^^ Today, a manufacturer can
be subject to a duty to recall under two different aspects. First, this duty can originate
out of traditional tort law.^^^ Second, since the enactment of the
Produktsicherheitsgesetz in August 1 997, the same duty can be imposed by the Federal
Office for Motor Traffic, thus by an administrative agency.
- Duty to recall under § 823 sec. I BGB
Recalls of motor vehicles took place for the first time in the United States and
are provable for the years 1903, 1916 and 1924.2^5 ^s a recall in the automobile
272 BGHZ 99,167 (172 ff.) - Honda.
273 Theo Bodewig, Zivilrechtliche Probleme des Rueckrufs fehlerhafier Produkte in der
Automobilindustrie, DAR 4/96, 341 (341) (1996).
274 Although the existence of a duty to recall is commonly recognized its dogmatic foundation is
controversial; it is discussed to base it on either § 823 sec. I BGB, § 1004 sec. I, cl. 1 BGB, or § 1004 sec.
I, cl. 2 BGB; see, Bodewig, supra note 273, at 344; see also, Ingeborg Schwenzer, Rueckruf- und
Warnpflichten des Warenherstellers, Juristenzeitung [hereinafter JZ] 1987,1059 (1060).
275 Levenson, Recalls: Tracing them back to the Turn ofthe Century, 1 13 Dun's Review 117 (1979); see
also, Bodewig, supra note 273, at 341.
59
industry normally affects thousands of vehicles, it is connected with a high financial
expenditure. Thus, manufacturers will consider this measure as "ultima ratio" only and,
if reasonably possible, will try to solve any problem, first by providing additional
instructions or warnings, which generally involve a smaller amount of money.
Considering this as background, the question arises, when is the manufacturer forced to
recall his products ? Although no universal reply to the question can be given, the
answer to this question has to be determined by using the following factors:^''^ which
object of legal protection is in danger (e.g. life or property), the likelihood of the
realization of the danger, the number of potentially affected persons, the magnitude of
the violation of the object of legal protection, the amount of expected damages, the costs
of the recall, the consequences of the recall on the reputation and goodwill of the
manufacturer, the existence of alternative counter-measures, the relation of his
individual advantage to the social benefit of the product, the kind of product and the
way of its marketing and the need of protection for the affected group of persons.
According to these factors a recall of motor vehicles will be inevitable for the
manufacturer in cases involving defects of safety-relevant parts (such as brakes, tires,
airbags, steering gear, gas tanks) that affect a large number of products. On the other
hand, a recall will not be necessary in cases where the defect only deteriorates the
outward appearance of the automobile or motorcycle. However, if a recall is necessary
and executed, the manufacturer will have to bear its costs as well as its related
expenditures like repair, exchange^'''' and putting a substitute car at the consumer's
disposal for the duration of the recall procedure. If the latter is not possible, the
manufacturer has to provide compensation for the consumer's inability to use the
2^^ See, Bodewig, supra note 273, at 342.
2^^ Mertens, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 289; Bodewig, supra note 273, at 344; Schwenzer, supra
note 274, at 1063.
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vehicle.278 On the other hand, the manufacturer is not obliged to refit motor vehicles
with safety features that have been developed or become the technical standard after the
marketing of the vehicle at no cost, because this would favor the consumer too much.^^^
Therefore, a duty to refit a vehicle with airbags or side-bags, which did not exist at the
time of its marketing, does not exist, even if newly manufactured vehicles would be
considered defective without these safety features.^so
- Duty to recall under the Produktsicherheitsgesetz
The Produktsicherheitsgesetz from August 1997 obliges the manufacturer to put
only "safe" products on the market (§ 4 sec. I ProdSG). If a product is not safe
according to the definition contained in § 6 ProdSG, the Federal Office for Motor
Traffic can intervene before or after the product has been marketed. Before its
marketing the Office has the power to forbid or to temporarily forbid the product's
placement on the market (§ 7 sec. II ProdSG). After its marketing the agency can either
force the manufacturer to give warnings, or it can give the warnings itself in case of near
danger (§ 8 ProdSG). In the same way it can force the manufacturer to recall its
products (§ 9 ProdSG). In cases where the manufacturer does not comply wdth the
agency's orders, an administrative fine up to 50.000,- DM can be imposed (§ 15
ProdSG).
2^^ In order to determine the amount of compensation the consumer is allowed to recover in such a case a
special catalogue can be used. It contains specific information with regard to how much the daily use of
different kinds of cars from different manufacturers is worth. However, the maximum amount that can be
awarded per day is 150,- DM. as an example, the use of a "BMW 3 1 SIS" is worth DM 98,- per day, the
use of a "Chevrolet Corvette Coupe" DM 134,- per day and the use of a Mercedes-Benz 500 SL 150,-
DM; see, Tabelle von Sanden/Danner/Kueppersbusch Stand 01.01.1995, in Palandt KOMMENTAR
ZUM BUERGERLICHEN Gesetzbuch, Anhang zu §§ 249, 250 BOB, PkW-Nutzungsausfallentschaedigung.
2^^ Bodewig, supra note 273, at 344.
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The existence of the Produktsicherheitsgesetz serves the prevention of accidents,
and thus extends^^' the protection of the consumer provided by traditional tort law and
the Produkthaftungsgesetz282, which both focus on a compensatory function. Moreover,
it creates new incentives for product manufacturers to create safer products. Therefore,
its enactment should be approved.
(E) Peculiarities in the distribution of burden of proof
With regard to the distribution of the burden of proof in instructions or warnings
cases, the Supreme Court^^^ distinguishes between two situations. The situation in
which an instruction or warning defect existed before the product was marketed (pre-
marketing situation), and one in which it became defective after it was put on the market
(post-marketing situation).
- The pre-marketing situation
In the first mentioned case, the same rules of distribution of burden of proof
apply for design and manufacturing defects.^^'^Eventually, all three kinds of defects put
the consumer in the same position, as he does not have any knowledge about the
internal structure of the manufacturer's enterprise and thus has to face a lack of
evidence.
- The post-marketing situation
In contrast, such a lack of evidence does not exits when the instructions or
warnings defect occurs after the product's marketing. Now, the plaintiff, as well as the
2^' Before the enactment of the Produktsicherheitsgesetz the Federal Office for Motor Traffic only had
the power to revoke the operating permission for a vehicle (§ 20 sec. V StVZO) so that its further
marketing could be prevented; see, Wegener, supra note 1 14, at 133.
282 See infra, at 82.
283 BGHZ 1 16,60 ff - Kindertee I (Child tea 1).
284 BGHZ 1 16,60 (73) - Kindertee I (Child tea I).
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defendant, has the same sources of information (news, test reports etc.) concerning the
practical proving of the product so that they are equally "strong". Accordingly, a
reduction of the plaintiffs burden of proof is not necessary. Although this view has
been criticized^^^, it appropriately considers that the difficulties of providing evidence
were the starting point for the Supreme Court's invention of the shift of the burden of
proof Where, like in post-marketing situations, this difficulty does not exist, there is no
need for a shift of this burden to the manufacturer,
- Presumption that the consumer would have followed adequate
instructions and warnings
Another peculiarity within this third category of defect exists with regard to the
proof of causality of omission of adequate information and occurrence of the damage.
Usually, it is the plaintiffs responsibility to provide this evidence, which means that he
will be required to prove that the damage would not have occurred had the manufacturer
provided adequate institutions or wamings.^^^ In practice, the plaintiff would argue that
he would have followed the information if it had been appropriate. However, in this
area the courts reduce the plaintiffs burden of proof by presuming that the consumer
would have complied with clear and understandable instructions or wamings.^^^
(IV.) Comment
As can be concluded fi^om the preceding, legislation and judicial decisions have
constantly increased the duty of motor vehicle manufacturers and suppliers in the
course of the last decade, either by intensifying already existing duties {e.g. duty to
2^^ Some authors consider the distinction between the pre-marketing and the post-marketing situation and
their consequences as "artificial", see, e.g., SCHIEMANN, supra note 135, § 823 BGB, Rn. 122, Hein
KOETZ, DELIKTSRECHT, RN. 448.
286 BGHZ 106,273 (284) - Asthma-Spray.
287 BGHZ 1 16,60 (73) - Kindertee I (Child tea I).
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observe product) or by introducing new duties (e.g. duty to secure product status) with
severe practical consequences. One explanation for this pro-consumer development
could be the influence of European law on German national law, because in the field of
legislation the Product Liability Act and the Product Safety Act found their origin in
E.G. directives. Another explanation is the belief that a risk-utility assessment must, as a
practical matter, be made by the product manufacturer rather than by the consumer.^*^ In
this context, it must also be kept in mind that the former generally has a better chance to
insure against this risk.289 However, in the end it will at least partly be the totality of the
consumers who will bear the product risk, as the manufacturer will shift its loss suffered
by taking insurance to his customers by increasing his product prices.
E) Defenses
In a products liability action the manufacturer could plead for dismissal of the
complaint based on five main arguments: (i.) compliance with cogent safety standards
or operating permissions, (ii.) a nin-away-product defense, (iii.) contributory negligence
of the plaintiff, (iv.) product misuse, and finally (v.) that the time set forth in the statute
of limitation elapsed.
(I.) Compliance with cogent safety standards / operating
PERMISSIONS
This kind of defense could be brought by the manufacturer in design or
information defect cases in which he complied with mandatory safety standards or
operating permissions (§§ 22, 22a StVZO). However, since safety standards constitute
only minimum standards, evidence of compliance may be introduced but is not decisive
on the question whether a manufacturer acted negligently.




This type of defense can be presented in manufacturing defect cases only as it
deals with a manufacturing defect that occurred in spite of all precautions. Due to a lack
of fault the defendant cannot be held liable in this situation.
(III.) Contributory negligence (§ 254 sec. I and II bgb)
If the plaintiff has contributed to the occurrence of the damage {e.g. driving
while intoxicated, speeding), the defendant's duty to compensate and the extent to
which the defendant will be required to provide compensation depend on the
circumstances, particularly, to what extent the damages have been caused by one party
or the other (§ 254 sec. I BGB). Thus, when successfully presenting this defense the
amount of damages for which the manufacturer will have to compensate the consumer
will either be reduced to a smaller amount or, more rarely, to zero.
The same is true under § 254 sec. II BGB, which provides a defense in situations
where not the occurrence of the damages but their extent has been partly caused by the
plaintiff because of the violation of his duty to minimize the damages (e.g. plaintiff
refiises medical treatment although he knows that he is seriously injured).
(IV.) Misuse of product
Eventually, the manufacturer can claim no responsibility for the harmful event,
because the plaintiff misused his product. However, it has been mentioned already that
the manufacturer can still be held liable for such a misuse in situations where it was
foreseeable and where he did not fulfill his duty to warn of the dangers resulting out of
the misuse. On the other hand, the defendant will not be subject to legal responsibility in
cases where the misuse was absolutely unusual or obvious to the plaintiff.^^o
290 Yox examples, see supra, at 54, notes 248,249.
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(v.) Statute of limitation: § 852 bgb
Finally, the manufacturer can allege that plaintiffs claim is barred by the statute
of limitation. According to § 852 sec. I BGB this is the case if plaintiff did not file a
lawsuit within three years after he gained knowledge of the tortious act of the tortfeasor.
F) Damages
If the plaintiff succeeds in the product liability suit, he will be entitled to
compensation from the defendant for his loss under § 823 sec. I BGB. This includes
compensation for all damages that have to be considered as a result of a violation of a
right protected under this section,^^! like compensation for medical expenses, loss of
earnings, property damage292, etc. In addition, in cases where the plaintiffs motor
vehicle has been recalled, he does not have to bear the costs of the repair / exchange
measures. Furthermore, he has the right to a substitute vehicle or adequate
compensation.
(I.) Compensation for pain and suffering (§§ 823 sec. 1, 847 BGB)
Moreover, under § 823 sec. I BGB, in connection with § 847 BGB, the plaintiff
is also allowed to get compensation for pain and suffering when bodily injured. This is
one of the most important differences between traditional tort law and the
Produkthaftungsgesetz, under which compensation for pain and suffering does not
exist.293
291 Mertens, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 293.
292 With regard to compensation for property damage the peculiarities developed by the Supreme Court
in BGHZ 67,359 ff. have to be considered, see, SCHIEN4ANN, supra note 135, § 623 BGB, Rn. 124,
headword: "Weiterfressender Mangelschaden".
293 See infra, at pp. 82.
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(II.) No COMPENSATION FOR PURE ECONOMIC LOSS
§ 823 sec. I BGB requires either the violation of life, body, health, personal
liberty, property or other rights. Because a violation of a pure pecuniary right is neither
expressively mentioned nor comprised in the field of "other rights"^^^, a compensation
for pure economic loss, a loss which did not occur as a result of a violation of a right
protected under § 823 sec. I BGB, is not given.^^s
(III.) No PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In contrast to U.S. product liability laws, an award of punitive damages for the
plaintiff and / or the state^^^ does not exist in German tort law. In 1992, in a case dealing
with the recognition and enforceability of of U.S. judgment awarding $ 400,000 in
punitive damages, the German Supreme Court held that, in general, these kind of
damages are incompatible with basic principles of German constitutional and tort
law.297 However, important arguments (e.g. increase of traffic consumer safety, in
particular, traffic safety) can be provided against this holding and lead to the conclusion
that capped punitive damages should be introduced by the German legislature. In order
to understand the rationale for this proposal, it is necessary to analyze the legal,
economic, and social background governing the institution of punitive damages in the
United States.
294 Thomas, supra note 66, § 823 BGB, Rn. 217.
295 Mertens, supra note 67, § 823 BGB, Rn. 293.
296 To which extent punitive damages are awarded to the plaintiff depends on the jurisdiction. In most
satates the plaintiff receives the entire amount of punitive damages awarded. Some states, however, have
enacted statutes that apportion punitive damages between the plaintiff and the state, see. e.g., Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 768.73(2)-(4) (West Supp. 1992) (35 % of punitive damage awards must be paid into state funds);
Ga. Code Ann. § 5 1-12-5. 1(e)(2) (75 % of the uncapped punitive damage award must be paid into state
treasury); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 537.675.2 (West Supp. 1992) (50 % of punitive damage award must be paid
to the Tort Victims Compensation Fund); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8701 (McKinney Supp. 1995) (20 % of
punitive damage award must be paid to state).
297 BGHZ 118,312,337-345.
67
(a) Punitive damages in the United States
Since tort law traditionally belongs to the province of the states,^^^ iYiq award of
punitive damages is governed by state common and statutory law. As a result, punitive
damages are treated differently from state to state. Some states have introduced caps on
punitive damage awards, raised the burden of proof from preponderance of evidence to
clear and convincing evidence, or passed legislation to apportion punitive damages
between the state and the plaintiff.299 These differences and the fact that vagueness
governs the state court's determination of liability and assessments of amounts leading
to excessive punitive damages awards, have kindled a controversy on whether punitive
damages should be subject to uniform federal legislation.^^o While the critics of such a
reform fear an encroachment of federal law upon a domain which historically belongs to
the states, the proponents favor it because it would provide more certainty, and
predictability, while protecting the defendant against excessive awards, leading to a
reduction of lawsuits.^^' However, it is important to notice that this controversy does
not question the existence of punitive damages. Rather, it focuses on how to award
punitive damages. Moreover, with regard to the issue of introducing punitive damages
into German law, this controversy is irrelevant. According to art. 72, 74 sec. I, Nr. 1 GG
(Grundgesetz, Constitution) tort law, as a domain of private law, is solely regulated by
the federal government. Thus, punitive damages would be introduced uniformly.
Therefore, the question of whether to favor state or federal tort reform in the United
States does not need to be answered. The same is true for issues arising out of the
^^^ Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, A Profile of Tort Litigation in Georgia and Reflections on
Tort Reform, 30 Ga. L. Rev. 627,632 (1996).
2^^ See supra, notes 50 and 296.
^00 See, e.g.. Eaton &. Talarico, supra note 298, at 670 - 691; Pace, supra note 41, at 1615 - 1632.
301 Pace, 5M/?ra note 4 1 , at 1615 - 1616.
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existence of a jury because this institution does not exist in German law. Instead, we can
focus on the objectives, prerequisites, and the constitutionality of punitive damages.
- Objectives of punitive damages: Deterrence and punishment
Punitive damages seek to achieve three basic goals. First, they are awarded to
deter the individual defendant {e.g. manufacturer) from repeating his misconduct
(specific or individual deterrence), second, to deter other potential defendants from
engaging in similar kind of behavior in the future (general deterrence),^^^ and third, they
serve to punish the defendant for outrageous conduct.^^^
- Prerequisite to award punitive damages: Reprehensible conduct
The key factor on which courts and juries focus in order to decide whether to
award punitive damages, and if so, to what extent, is the reprehensibility of defendant's
conduct. According to the definitions provided by the courts, reprehensibility can be
found if the defendant acted maliciously, willfully, egregiously, or with reckless
disregard for the rights of others.^^'* A significant example in which this prerequisite
was met is Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co?^^. The facts of this case provided that
numerous Ford Pinto vehicles were equipped with a defective fuel system which caused
fire in the vehicle's interior in 20 to 30 mile-per-hour collisions. The cost of recalling
and retrofitting the automobiles would have been $ 137 million. Ford estimated that the
costs resulting from liability for injuries caused by the defective fiiel system (180 bum
302 7X0 Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,456 (1993); BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 5 1 7 U.S. 559,560 ( 1 996); Pace, supra note 4 1 , at 1 579- 1 580.
303
Id. (BMW, TXO, Pace).
304 Hood V. Fulkerson, 699 P.2d 608,611 (N.M. 1985) (Holding that punitive damages may be awarded
only when the conduct of the tortfeasor is maliciously intentional, fraudulent, oppressive, or committed
recklessly or with a wanton disregard to the plaintiffs rights); Masaki v. General Motros Corp., 780 P.2d
566,570 (Haw. 1989) (stating that punitive damages are awarded only when the egregious nature of
defendant's conduct makes this remedy appropriate).
305 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App.1981).
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deaths. 180 serious bum injuries, and 2,100 destroyed vehicles) were only $ 49.5
million.^06 Consequently, Ford decided not to recall its vehicles, although the
management was aware of the crash tests showing the vulnerability of the Pinto's fuel
tank to rupture at low speed rear impacts. ^^^ The court held that Ford's decision to
expose consimiers to a high risk of injury and death constituted an unethical cost-benefit
analysis that egregiously undervalued "[h]uman lives and limbs against corporate
profit."30^ The jury awarded $ 127.5 million for the plaintiff, including $ 125 million in
punitive damages.^^^
- Assessment of punitive damages awards
In most states, the jury determines the amount of punitive damages. ^'o However,
the judge retains the power to review the jury award on punitive damages and can
reverse it if he believes that it is excessive, or the result of a prejudice or passion on the
part of the jury.311 In order to determine whether and to what amount punitive damages
should be awarded, courts and juries should take several factors into consideration.
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,^^- the Supreme Court recently
examined the constitutionality of a pimitive damage award in light of the Due Process
^^^ Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, "Crimtorts" As Corporate Just Deserts, 31 U. Mich. J.L. Ref.
289,312(1998).
307 Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348,385 (Cal. Cl App. 1981)
308
Id. at 384. (Grimshaw, Ford)
309 The punitive damage award was reduced by the trial judge to $ 3.5 million, see, id, at 358.
310 In some states, however, the judge determines the amount of punitive damages to be awarded, see,
e.g.. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-240b (West 1991) (stating that the judge determines the amount of
punitive damages in products liability cases); OHIO REV. CODE Ann. § 2307.80 (Anderson 1995); Lisa
M. Sharkey, Judge or Jury: Who should assess Punitive Damages ?, 64 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1089 (1996).
3" See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (the court upheld the trial court's
remittitur to $ 3.5 million of a jury award of $ 125 million in punitive damages).
312 517 U.S. 559 (1996). In 1990, plaintiff. Dr. Ira Gore, purchased a new black BMW sports sedan for S
40,750.88 from an Alabama BMW dealer. After nine months plaintiff noticed that the car had been
repainted (presumably because it had been exposed to acid rain during transit between the manufacturing
plant and BMW's preparation center in Brunswick, Georgia) and he sued BMW of North America, the
American distributor ofBMW automobiles. At trial, BMW acknowledged that since 1983 it had adopted
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment^'^ and provided three guideposts to determine this
question. First, and most importantly, the defendant's degree of reprehensibility has to
be considered in order to decide on the excessiveness of punitive damages since "[s]ome
wrongs are more blameworthy than others."^''* Factors which should be considered in
this determination are the harm that has been caused {e.g. in Gore pure economic loss
without impact on the vehicle's safety or performance), the harm that could have
occurred (potential harm), whether the defendant is a recidivist, whether he acted in bad
faith,^^5 the defendant's wealth,^'^ and whether the defendant gained a profit from his
misconduct. Second, the relationship between the plaintiffs compensatory damages and
the amount of punitive damages awarded must be a "reasonable one".^^' In Gore, the
the nationwide policy to sell previously damaged cars as new without advising the dealer if the repair
cost did not exceed 3 % of the suggested retail price. Furthermore, plaintiff introduced evidence that
since 1983 BMW had sold nationwide 983 refmished cars as new, including 14 in Alabama, without
disclosing that they had been repainted prior to sale. The jury returned a verdict awarding to the plaintiff
$ 4,000 in compensatory damages and $ 4 million in punitive damages, fmding that the nondisclosure
policy constituted gross, oppressive or malicious fraud. BMW filed a post-trial motion to set aside the
punitive damages, arguing that the award exceeded the constitutionally permissible amount. The trial
judge denied this motion and held that the award did not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it was not "grossly excessive". The Alabama Supreme Court agreed on the ground
that BMW's conduct was reprehensible. However, it reduced the punitive damages award to $ 2 million
because the jury had improperly multiplied plaintiffs compensatory damages by the number of similar
sales nationwide, not only those in Alabama. The United States Supreme Court, however, held that the $
2 million punitive damage award is grossly excessive and violates the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and reversed the judgment.
^'^ U.S. Const, amend. XIV. The Due Process Clause provides: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without the due process of law...". Also before Gore, the Supreme Court has
examined punitive damage awards in light of the due process clause, see, e.g, Pacific Mutual Life Ins.,
Co. V. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1,21 (1991) (holding that a jury award of $ 1,04 million in compensatory and
punitive damages did not violate the due process clause); TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., 509 U.S. 443,462 (1993) (holding that a $ 10 million punitive damage award - which was 526
times the actual damage - did not violate the due process clause).
314 BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517. U.S. 559,575 (1996).
315 Mat 575-581.
316 Whether defendant's wealth should be taken into consideration is controversial, see, e.g., Pace, supra
note 41, at 1584 (stating that a jury should take the defendant's fmancial position into consideration
"[bjecause it takes more to punish a wealthy defendant that a poor one."); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869,911 (1998) (arguing that
wealth should not be considered because punitive damages imposed on the basis of wealth would impose
a tax on large and successful corporations, discouraging development).
317 BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,580 (1996).
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relation between the plaintiffs compensatory damages ($ 4,000) and the punitive
damages awarded by the Alabama Supreme Court ($ 2 million) was 500 : 1 . The court
held that this was not a "reasonable" relationship.^ '^ However, the Court did not define
a standard when such a relation should be deemed reasonable and explicitly rejected to
adopt a mathematical formula that compares actual and potential damages to the
punitive damage award.^'^ As a third guidepost, the amount of punitive damages must
be compared to the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for a comparable
misconduct.320 jf ^he award in punitive damages is "substantially greater" than the
available statutory fines, there is an indication of excessiveness of the award. In Gore,
the maximum civil penalty for BMW's behavior was $ 2,000 (compared to $ 2 million
in punitive damages) and, consequently, served as one factor to declare the punitive
damage award "grossly excessive".^^!
- Constitutionality of punitive damages
The constitutionality of punitive damages can not only be challenged in light of
the Fourteenth Amendment but also under the Fifth and Eighth Amendment.
In providing "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb..." the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
prohibits punishment of a defendant twice for the same reason. In United States v.
Halper ^22 this clause was interpreted to limit the amount the government can recover
^'^ In its previous decision, TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,462
(1993), however, the Supreme Court held that a $ 10 million punitive damage award which was 526
times the actual damage did not violate the due process clause.
319 BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,582 (1996); some legal scholars propose to adopt
a mathematical formula, see, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 316, at 875 (proposing to multiply the
harm caused {e.g. $ 100.000) by the reciprocal of the probability of the defendant being found liable {e.g.
25 %)).
320 BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,583 (1996).
321
Id. at 584.
322 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
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for punishment in a civil action after the defendant had already been punished under
criminal law.323 in this case, the government brought a civil action against the defendant
after he had already been sentenced to two years imprisonment. In the civil action a $
5,000 penalty was assessed against the defendant. The Supreme Court held that the civil
fine was unconstitutional, because it constituted a second punishment for the same
offense.324
With the same argument, one could declare a punitive damage award to be
unconstitutional in cases where the defendant has either been previously criminally
punished or when considering awarded compensatory damages as first punishment and
punitive damages as second. However, the Supreme Court in Halper held that the
protection under the double jeopardy clause is "[n]ot triggered by litigation between
private parties,"^25 ^ut only if one is the government. Given this premise, a punitive
damage award that entirely goes to the plaintiff is constitutional imder the Fifth
Amendment. In some states, however, this award is apportioned between the plaintiff
and the state. ^26 Thus, in these cases one could argue that the state acts as a party, so that
the defendant would be protected under the double jeopardy clause. This, however, is
questionable when considering the fact that the state does not act as a plaintiff in the
action but only receives a portion of the punitive damages awarded. Moreover, in most
cases the defendant will not have been punished previously under criminal law. Then,
the argument that compensatory damages constitute a "punishment" has to be rejected
since this kind of damage is intended the plaintiff to the position he was in before the
harmful event occurred but does not pursue the goal of punishing the defendant.
323 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,446 (1989).
324
Id. at 448-449.
325 /rf at 451.
326 See supra, note 296.
73
Punitive damages awards also have been attacked under the Eighth
Amendment,^27 because they can constitute excessive fines, the imposition of which is
prohibited under this Amendment. However, in Browning-Ferris Indus, of Vt., Inc. v.
Kelco Disposal Inc.,^^^ the Supreme Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause did not
apply to damages awarded in litigation between private parties. In particular, the Court
stated that this Clause "[d]oes not constrain an award of money damages in a civil suit
when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a
share of the damages awarded."329 jhjs language reveals that in jurisdictions where the
plaintiff receives the entire amount of punitive damages this award should not be
unconstitutional. However, constitutional concerns could arise under this Amendment
when the punitive damage award is apportioned between the plaintiff and the state. The
Court in Browning-Ferris did not provide a solution for this concern, but left this
question explicitly open.^^^
- Comment
As we can see, punitive damages are subject to a controversial discussion in the
United States. It should be emphasized that this discussion centers on three different
points: whether punitive damages should be subject to federal or state tort reform, what
solutions can be provided in order to determine their reasonableness, and whether they
have to be deemed unconstitutional when the state gets part of them. However, the
existence of punitive damages has not been questioned.
With regard to the following discussion on the introduction of punitive damages
in German law, the controversy about federal or state tort reform will never be raised.
•^^^ U.S. Const, amend. VIII, provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
328 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
329 Browning-Ferris Indus, of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,264 (1989).
330m at 276 note 21.
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because tort law in Germany is federal law. Thus, only the latter mentioned issues
(reasonableness and state apportionment) remain to be answered under German law.
(B) Punitive damages under German law
Since punitive damages do not exist in Germany, there are obviously not many
cases dealing with this issue. The only chance for courts to decide on this issue arises
when the plaintiffs seek to enforce a foreign judgment of a jurisdiction that recognizes
punitive damages in Germany. That was the case in 1992, where the plaintiff, John
Doe,33' a U.S. and German citizen, sought to enforce a judgment issued by the Superior
Court of California against the defendant living in Germany.332 j\^q y g judgment
awarded the plaintiff $ 750,260 in damages, including $ 350,260 in past and future
medical expenses, cost of placement, pain and suffering, and $ 400,000 in punitive
damages. The trial court (Landgericht Duesseldorf, regional court) declared the U.S.
judgment to be enforceable in Germany. The Court of Appeals (Oberlandesgericht
Dueseeldorf, regional appeal court) declared the judgment to be enforceable to the
extent of $ 275,325. Before the Supreme Court, which subsequently dealt with the issue,
the defendant requested dismissal of the action, and the plaintiff requested to receive the
entire amount of damages. The Supreme Court held that the complaint had to be
dismissed with regard to the punitive damages, because punitive damages were
incompatible with basic principles of German law. Other than that, the plaintiff
prevailed.
^^' The name "John Doe" is the code name given to the plaintiff by the Superior Court of the State of
California, see, BGHZ 1 18,312,313.
332 BGHZ 118,312 ff: Both plaintiff and defendant used to live in South California before where the
plaintiff, at the age of 14, was sexually abused by the defendant. After a lifelong sentence of
imprisonment had been issued against the defendant by a another U.S. court, the defendant escaped to
Germany on May 10, 1984. The defendant, at the time of the decision, lived in Germany where he owed
real estate.
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- Holding of the German Supreme Court in BGHZ 118,312: "Punitive
damages are incompatible with basic principles of german law"
The Court started its analysis by focusing on §§ 723 sec II, 328 sec. I ZPO
(Code of Civil Procedure). These sections contain the rules governing the enforceability
of foreign judgments. § 723 sec. II, cl. 2 ZPO refers to § 328 sec. I ZPO which states in
its Nr. 4 that the "Recognition of a judgment issued by a foreign court is impossible if
the recognition of this judgment leads to a result that is obviously incompatible with
basic principles of German law, in particular, if the recognition violates constitutional
rights." The court held that, in general, punitive damages are incompatible with German
law, because they violate constitutional law and are incompatible with principles of
German tort law.^^s With regard to constitutional law the Court addressed issues similar
to those addressed under U.S. law. In particular, it held that punitive damages constitute
a double punishment, and therefore violate art. 103 sec. Ill GG (prohibition of double
punishment)334^ tj^^t t^gij. determination and their relation to the actual harm caused is
too indefinite so that they violate the principle that a punishment has to be definite (art.
103 sec. II GG)335, and that they violate the principle of the reasonableness of the means
set forth in art. 20 sec. Ill GG.^^^ With respect to the incompatibility with German tort
law, the Court stated that deterrence and punishment are objectives that are only known
to German criminal law.337 Furthermore, the Court held that punitive damages lead to an
enrichment of the plaintiff but that the general rules governing the law of damages, §§
249 -253 BGB, solely seek to compensate the plaintiff for the harm he suffered.
333 BGHZ 118,312,337-345.
334 BGHZ 118,312,337. Art. 103 sec. Ill GG reads: "Nobody may, on the basis of the general criminal





- Counter-arguments: Rejection of the Supreme Court's view.
Although these arguments do not seem to leave room for an introduction of
punitive damages in German law, it will be proved that every single argument provided
by the Supreme Court can be rejected, and that there are several reasons why punitive
damages should be adopted.
The issue of double punishment is addressed in both countries. In U.S. law, the
Supreme Court focused on the fact that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment does not apply to private parties. This is also true for German law.
Although one objective of punitive damages is the punishment of the defendant, the
language used in art. 103 sec. Ill GG ("...on the basis of the general criminal laws..."
and "'...offense...'''') implies that a double punishment is prohibited w^hen it is based on
criminal law. However, if punitive damages were introduced in German law, they
would supplement tort law and not criminal law. Furthermore, punitive damages differ
from criminal sanctions addressed in art. 103 sec. Ill GG in that they are not imposed by
the government upon a private party but are awarded in civil litigation between two
private parties. Thus, art. 103 sec. Ill GG is not applicable for punitive damages, at least
as long as the government does not receive a portion it.
The same is true for art. 103 sec. II GG which, according to its wording ("An
offense can only be punished if the punishability was definitely determined by law..."),
equally applies to punishments issued under criminal law. Moreover, the criticism on
the indefiniteness of punitive damages can be solved by introducing a law which sets
forth and defines the objectives, prerequisites, amounts, and factors according to which
punitive damages should be awarded. ^^8 Because of this, the argument based on art. 20
sec. Ill GG (reasonableness of the means) has to be rejected since the reasonableness of
pimitive damages could be determined explicitly in a statute. Consequently, the
3^^ The same solution is provided in U.S. law by the proponents of a federal reform on punitive damages.
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Supreme Court's arguments based on art. 103 sec. II GG and art. 20 sec. Ill GG are not
convincing.
The Supreme Court's arguments that the objectives of punitive damages
(deterrence and punishment) are known to criminal law only, and that §§ 249-253 BGB
generally seek to compensate instead of punishing, are generally true. However, with its
§§ 253, 847 BGB (pain and suffering), German tort law seeks to achieve two goals,
compensation and "satisfaction" (retaliation). ^39 Thus, with the latter goal at least the
notion of punishment is not unknown to tort law. This finding can even be enhanced by
the fact that German contract law recognizes in its § 336 - 345 BGB contractual
penalties. Thus, it can be concluded that the notion of punishment is not exclusively to
be found in criminal law. Accordingly, the Courts arguments are not compelling.
As a result of the precedent analysis we can see that every single argument
provided by the Court could be rejected. Thus, we now turn to the arguments that favor
the introduction of punitive damages.
(c) Arguments in favor of the introduction of punitive damages in
German law
The main argument in favor of punitive damages is provided by the goals of
punitive damages. Punitive damages deter the actual tortfeasor and other potential
tortfeasors fi^om engaging in misconduct that brings or could bring harm to potential
plaintiffs. Cases like Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. ^'^^ could happen in Germany all the
time. And, indeed, in 1994 the automobile manufacturer Opel violated its duty to recall
"Astra" vehicles that used to catch fire as a result of popping gas out of defective fuel
tanks. Although Opel already had knowledge of the existence of the defective condition.
339 Thomas, supra note 66, § 847 BGB, Rn. 4.
340i74Cal.Rptr. 348(1978).
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it did not intervene.^'" Thus, the manufacturer exposed numerous users to a high risk of
danger to Hfe and limb. One of the explanations for this kind of corporate conduct is
that manufacturers in Germany do not have the fear of paying a high amount of
damages. Of course, they would be liable for plaintiffs economic loss if the plaintiff is
able to fulfill his burden of proof. However, noneconomic loss is compensated at a
minimum level and rarely exceeds DM 100,000. Criminal prosecution may be started,
but, even if it is successful, it punishes the individual, not the entity.^'*^ The
administrative fine of DM 50,000 set forth in § 1 5 of the Product Safety Act hardly
deters manufacturers fi-om engaging or repeating their wrongful conduct. Given this
situation, the introduction of punitive damages would constitute an effective deterrence
mechanism and at the same time provide an incentive for manufacturers to create safer
products.3'*3 Moreover, it would guarantee that plaintiffs receive adequate compensation
for the harm they suffered.
However, manufacturers and other opponents to this proposal will provide the
same arguments against punitive damages as those used in the United States. Some of
them have already been presented earlier. Other important arguments often stated are
that punitive damages will cause unnecessary litigation by increasing the plaintiffs
motivation to go to court, that they are or will be "skyrocketing", and increase insurance
costs.3'*'* Empirical analyses show, however, that this fear is over-exaggerated.^'*^ For the
^'^^ Bodewig, supra note 273, at 346 note 36.
^'*2
It is not overseen that at the end the shareholders and the consumers carry the entity's financial loss
which is going to be reflected in increased product prices. However, as for shareholders, the ones that
have a high stock are partly responsible for the corporation's decision. Thus, it is not unfair that the
effects of punitive damages affect them. Shareholders with a low stock will suffer only a small loss. As
for the consumers it has to be said that nobody is forced to buy products of a company which increased
their prices since there is enough competition.
^'^^ As note by U.S. Senator Ernest Hollings (D-S.C): "[W]e could spend an afternoon pointing out the
good that product liability has done. We do not get blown up by that Pinto gas tank. Cars have all
antilock brakes. That elevator is checked...", see, 142 Cong. Rec. S2344 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Hollings).
3'*'* Pace, supra note 41, at 1575.
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United States it has been found that from 1965 to 1990, there were only 355 punitive
damage awards in product liability cases, and more than half of those were reduced in
settlement or by appellate courts. ^^^ Nothing else is to be expected in Germany, if the
legislature enacts a reasonably designed statute on punitive damages that foresees the
imposition of punitive damages as "ultima ratio".
(D) Proposal
From the precedent analysis can be concluded that the introduction of punitive
damages in Germany is not only possible but also desirable. From the legal point of
view there are no hurdles that could not be taken. However, the most important
prerequisite is that one wants and dares to introduce something that is new, which
comes from a different legal system, and which might not please everyone.
As can be gathered from the preceding it is the German legislature which should
introduce punitive damages by statute. In order to meet the constitutional requirements
capped punitive damages should be adopted. Prerequisites (e.g. reckless conduct),
determinative factors (degree of recklessness or reprehensibility, wealth etc.), and caps
should be explicitly defined in the statute. Moreover, a comment to the statute should be
issued in order to provide examples for the (non-) imposition of this kind of damages in
different areas of tort law (motor vehicles, aviation etc.). Further upcoming problems
could by providing own solutions combined with borrowing solutions from the law
governing punitive damages in the United States.
^^^ See, Eaton & Talarico, supra note 298, at 637, and 650 (noting that products liability cases only
accounted 1 .3 % of tort claims filed in Georgia courts outside Atlanta and that punitive damages were
rarely awarded); Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort
Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1992).
^^^ Rustad, supra note 345, at 57-58.
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3. LIABILITY UNDER § 823 SEC. II BGB
§ 823 sec. II BGB^'''^ is the second section under which the defendant in a
product liability action could be held liable. It requires the existence of a protective law
that must have been negligently or intentionally violated by the defendant. According to
art. 2 EGBGB a protective law is every legal norm that intends the protection of an
individualized group of persons. Thus, a law that seeks to protect the public at large
does not fulfill this requirement.^'*^
A) Protective laws concerning the motor vehicle area
With regard to the motor vehicle branch, three recognized protective laws can be
of importance. First, in cases where bodily injury or even the death of a consumer has
been caused by a defective product, §§212, 222, 223, and 230 StGB^'*^ can be relevant.
Under these sections negligent or intentional behavior of the manufacturer's employees
will be prosecuted.350 At the same time those provisions constitute protective laws under
§ 823 sec. II BGB for a violation of which the plaintiff has a claim to be compensated.
Second, the Road Traffic Registration Act (Strassenverkehrs-Zulassungs-Ordnung,
StVZO) that also constitutes a protective law, has to be mentioned. This law could be
violated by an automobile accessories manufacturer when a product is going to be
marketed although it lacks a necessary operating permission.^^i Finally, the
Produktsicherheitsgesetz from August 1997 has to be considered as protective law, as it
intends to protect the individual consumer from being exposed to dangerous products.
^*' See, § 823 sec. II BGB, supra note 91.
348 Thomas, supra note 66, § 823 BGB, Rn. 141; Hein KOETZ, Deliktsrecht, Rn. 170 (6"^ ed. 1994).
349 See, StGB, supra note 81 ..
350 See, e.g., BGH NJW 1995,2930 - Holzschutzmittel (Wood preservative).
351 This would constitute a violation of §§ 22, 22a StVZO.
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Thus, its negligent or intentional violation also gives the plaintiff a valid claim under §
823 sec. II BGB.
B) Peculiarities of § 823 sec. II BGB compared to § 823 sec. I BGB
(I.) Compensation for pure economic loss
The main difference between § 823 sec. I BGB and § 823 sec. II BGB resides in
the fact that only under the latter can the plaintiff get compensation for pure economic
loss as long as this kind of compensation is intended by the violated protective law. This
kind of compensation does not exist under § 823 sec. I BGB as here the damage is
recoverable only if it is the result of a violation of one of the enumerated protected
rights of this section.352
(ii.) Distribution of burden of proof
§ 823 sec. II, cl. 2 BGB states that the defendant can only be held liable if he
acted with fault, even if the protective law does not require such a behavior.
Accordingly, a shift in the burden of proof with regard to fault to the defendant as it
exists under § 823 sec. I BGB^^a would be a violation of the section's wording, and
therefore, has generally not been recognized by the courts. Therefore, the normal rules
of providing evidence are applicable, which means that the plaintiff generally has to
prove all prerequisites that favor his claim, including the faulty violation of the
protective law. However, also under this section a lightening for plaintiffs claim has
been established by the Supreme Court. It held that in cases where it is sure that the
violation of a protective right occurred, the fault of the defendant is presumed.354
352 Hein KOETZ, DELIKTSRECHT, Rn. 75 (6* ed. 1994).
353 See supra, note 90.
354 BGHZ 51,91 (103 f.) - Huehnerpest (Fowl pest).
82
C. Liability under the Product Liability Act (Produkthaftungsgesetz)
Since 1990, a product liability action can not only be based on traditional tort
law (§§ 823 - 853 BGB) but also on the Product Liability Act (Produkthaftungsgesetz,
ProdHaftG).355. The peculiarity of this Act resides in the fact that it establishes strict
liability for all three kinds of product defects (manufacturing, design and instructions or
warnings defects).^^^ This means that, contrary to traditional tort law, only the existence
of a product defect and its causality for the resulting harm are necessary requirements in
order to establish a valid claim. The breach of a duty or fault of the defendant are not
prerequisites, therefore, his provision of exculpatory evidence with regard to these two
elements is irrelevant. Accordingly, the plaintiff initially bears a lighter burden of proof
under this statute^^"^ than under the main provision of traditional tort law, § 823 sec. I
BGB. However, this seeming advantage for the plaintiff is balanced out by many
disadvantages which are evaluated together with similarities and other advantages in the
following comparison to §§ 823 - 853 BGB.
1. Structure of the statute
In total, the statute contains 19 sections. § 1 sec. I ProdHaftG^^s is the statute's
main provision, because it establishes strict liability for the manufacturer whose
defective products cause a harmful event. § 1 sec. II and III ProdHaftG^^^ contain
^^^ See, ProdHaftG, supra note 32.
356 5ee, § 1 sec. I ProdHaftG [Liability]:
(1) If a person is killed by the defectiveness of a product, his body or health is injured or a thing is
damaged, the maker of the product is obliged to compensate the injured person for damages arising
therefrom. This is only applicable in a case of damage to property if a thing other than the defective
product is damaged and that other thing according to its nature is destined for private use or consumption
and has been applied by the injured person mainly for that purpose.
35^ See, § 1 sec. IV, cl. 1 ProdHaftG which reads: "The burden of proof concerning the defect and the
causality between the defect and the damage lies on the person who suffered the damage."
358 Supra note 356.
359
§ 1 sec. II and III ProdHaftG read:
(2) The duty to compensate of the maker [of the defective product] is excluded if:
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provisions under which defendant's liability is excluded, and § 1 sec. IV ProdHaftG
distributes the burden of proof. § 2 ProdHaftG^^o defines the notion of product, followed
by the definition of "defect" under § 3 ProdHaftG^^'. Potential defendants are explicitly
mentioned in § 4 ProdHaftG^^^^ and § 5 ProdHaftG^^^ contains the rule for joint
1
.
he did not the thing into circulation;
2. according to the circumstances, the conclusion is that the product did not yet have the defect which
caused the damage when the maker put it into circulation;
3. that he did not make the product for sale or any other form of distribution for economic gain, nor
did he make or market it within the scope of his professional activity;
4. the defect is based on the fact that the product, at the time when the maker put it into circulation,
was in compliance with the compulsory requirements of the law applicable therefore;
5. the defect could not be discovered considering the state of science and technology at the time when
the maker put the product on the market.
(3) The duty to compensate of the maker of a part-product is furthermore excluded if the defect was
caused by the construction of the product into which the part-product was integrated, or resulted from the
instructions of the maker of the product. The firs sentence shall also apply to the makers of raw materials
mutatis mutandis.
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§ 2 ProdHaftG [Product]: Product within the meaning of this Act is every movable thing, also when it
forms the part of another movable thing or of an immovable thing, as electricity. Excepted are
agricultural products of the land, animal husbandry, bee-keeping and fishery (natural agricultural
products), which have not undergone primary manufacturing process; the same applies to hunter's booty.
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§ 3 ProdHaftG [Defect]:
(1) A product has a defect if it fails to offer the safety which, by considering all circumstances,
especially:
a) its offering;
b) the use, which can fairly be relied upon;
c) the time at which it has been put on the market
can be legitimately expected.
(2) A product does not have a defect merely for the reason that subsequently an improved product was
put on the market.
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§ 4 ProdHaftG [Producer]:
(1) A producer within the meaning of this Act is who produced the fmal product, a raw material or a part-
product. A person is also considered a producer if he, by lending his name, his trade mark or other
distinctive mark, holds himself out as producer.
(2) A person is furthermore considered a producer if he introduces or passes a product for the purpose of
sale, lease, hire-purchase or any other form of marketing for economic gain within the scope of his
business activity within the territorial scope of application of the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community.
(3) If the producer of a product carmot be ascertained, every supplier is deemed its producer, unless he
gives the name of the producer or of the person who was his supplier, to the person suffering the damage,
within one month following the date on which a demand therefor was delivered to him. This also applies
to an introduced product if, in that case, the person specified in subsection (2) cannot be ascertained, even
though the name of the producer is known.
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tortfeasors, which refers basically to §§421 - 426 BGB. With regard to contributory
negligence, § 6 ProdHaftG^^'* applies the same rules as § 254 BGB to which it refers. §§
7 to 10 ProdHaftG^^^ contains peculiarities that have to be taken into consideration in
cases of bodily injury or death. § 1 1 ProdHaftG^^^ establishes a deductible in situations
where harm to property occurred. The statute of limitation, according to which a claim
is barred after three years from the time at which the plaintiff obtained knowledge or
could have had knowledge of the damage, the defect and the defendant, is contained in §
12 ProdHaftG^^^, followed by the statute of repose in § 13 sec. I ProdHaftG^^s , under
^^^ § 5 ProdHaftG [When several persons are liable]:
If several producers are jointly liable for the same damage, they are jointly and severally liable. The
relationship as among the persons liable, unless otherwise provided, the obligation to make restitution, as
well as the amounts of damages, depends on the circumstances, especially on the extent to which the
damage was caused mainly by one or another party; otherwise §§ 421 to 425 as well as § 426 sec. I, cl. 2
and sec. II of the Civil Code aply.
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§ 6 ProdHaftG [Reduction of liability]:
(1) If the person suffering the damage negligently contributed to the causation of the damage, § 254 of
the Civil Code applies; in case of damage to property, fault of the person who has the actual control over
the thing is equal to a fauh by the person suffering the damage.
(2) The liability of the producer is not reduced if the damage is caused by a defect of the product and, at
the same time, by the act of a third party. § 5 cl.2 applies mutatis mutandis.
^^^ Of particular importance is § 1 ProdHaftG which contains a maximum cap for the compensation of
bodily injuries; § 10 ProdHaftG provides:
(1) If personal injuries have been caused by a product or products of the same kind with an identical
defect, the person having the duty to pay compensation is liable only to a maximum amount of 160
million DM.
(2) If the compensation payable to several injured parties exceeds the maximum amount of specified in
subsection (1), the individual compensations shall be reduced in the same proportion as their total amount
relates to the maximum amount.
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§ 1 1 ProdHaftG [Deductible in case of property damage]:
In case of property damage, the person suffering the damage shall himself bear the damage to the amount
of 1. 125 DM.
367
§ 12 ProdHaftG [Prescription]:
(1) A claim under § 1 is barred after three years from the time at which the person entitled to
compensation obtained knowledge of the damage, the defect and the identity of the person liable, or
ought to have obtained knowledge thereof
(2) If negotiations concerning the compensation payable are pending between the person liable and the
person entitled, the running of the prescriptive period is stayed until the continuation of the negotiations
is refiised.
(3) Otherwise, the provisions of the Civil Code on prescription shall apply.
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which a claim extinguishes after 10 years fi-om the time at which the product was put on
the market. § 14 ProdHaftG declares that the provisions of this statute cannot be
excluded or altered by mutual agreement. The applicability of other laws, such as
traditional tort law under the Civil Code, is established in § 15 sec. II ProdHaftG^^^. §
16 ProdHaftG defines the scope of the application of this statute and only applies to
products that were put on the market before it entered into force. As § 19 ProdHaftG
provides that the Produkthaftungsgesetz enters into force on January 1, 1990, liability
under this statute cannot be established for products marketed before that time.
Consequently, a motor vehicle manufacturer will not be held liable for damages
resulting from defective vehicles put in the stream of commerce before 1990. § 17
ProdHaftG, finally, contains only formalities concerning the legislative procedure.
2. Similarities between Produkthaftungsgesetz and traditional
TORT LAW
As under traditional tort law, the Product Liability Act (§ 1 sec. II Nr. 5) does
not recognize the defendant's liability for development risks. ^''o With regard to
damages, both laws deny compensation for pure economic loss^^' and for the defective
product itself (§ 1 sec. I, cl. 2)372. Also, the scope of potential defendants, the rule
governing joint and several liability, and the provision for contributory negligence set
•^^^
§ 13 sec. I ProdHaftG [Extinction of claims]:
(1) A claim under § 1 becomes extinct in ten years from the time at which the producer of the product
which caused the harm put it on the market. This does not apply when there is a legal dispute or a
collection proceeding pending.
'^^
§ 15 sec. II ProdHaftG reads: Liability under other provisions remains unaffected.
3'^^ See, § 1 sec. II Nr. 5, supra note 359.
37' For the fact that pure economic loss is not allowed compensation imder the Product Liability Act, see,
Thomas, supra note 66, at § 1 ProdHaftG, Rn. 8.
372 See, § 1 sec. I, cl. 2, supra note 356.
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forth in the Product Liability Act are closely related to the rules applicable under
traditional tort law.
3. Differences between the Product Liability Act and traditional
TORT LAW
However, there are several aspects in which the Product Liability Act differs
from traditional tort law:
A) Standard of liability
The standard of liability to which the defendant is held under the Product
Liability Act is one of strict liability (§ 1 sec. I, cl. 1 ProdHaftG), whereas under
traditional tort law negligence is the governing legal standard. Thus, a consumer who
sues a motor vehicle manufacturer under the Product Liability Act does not have to
prove faulty conduct of the latter. However, this advantage is diminished by the fact that
under traditional tort law the breach of a duty of care of the defendant as well as his
fault is presumed. Accordingly, in product liability actions the main difference between
strict liability and negligence is eliminated. The only advantage that remains under the
strict liability standard of the Product Liability Act is that, in contrast to traditional tort
law, the defendant's provision of exculpatory evidence is irrelevant. However, this
seeming advantage has lost much of its importance, because under traditional tort law
the requirements set by the courts to provide exculpatory evidence are very high, and a
defendant will rarely be able to successfully present this kind of evidence. Thus, it can
be concluded that, although in theory a big difference between strict liability under the
Product Liability Act and traditional tort law exists, this difference is small in reality.
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b) no liability for run-away products under the product liability
Act
As the standard of liability under the Produkthaftungsgesetz is not based on
fault, the motor vehicle manufacturer will, in contrast to § 823 sec. I BGB, be held
liable for products containing manufacturing defects that are inevitable despite all
precautions (run-away products).
c) no duty to observe or recall products under the product
Liability Act
One of the main difference between both laws is that the manufacturer's duty to
observe or recall products after their placement on the market is not established in the
Product Liability Act but only exists under traditional tort law. This weakness of the Act
resides in the fact that it only covers liability from the time until, or at which, a
defective product is marketed but does not cover the time after its marketing^'^.
Therefore, the plaintiff will be without remedy if the manufacturer violates one of his
post-marketing duties.
D) Limited scope of application of the Product Liability Act
As we have seen, § 16 ProdHaftG in connection with § 19 ProdHaftG limits the
scope of the application of the Product Liability Act to products put on the market after
January 1, 1990. Liability under traditional tort law, on the other hand, does not contain
such a limit. Thus, plaintiffs seeking remedies for damages caused by vehicles marketed
before that date can base their action successfully only on §§ 823 I or II BGB.
373 See, Hein KOETZ, DELIKTSRECHT, at Rn. 462 (6* ed. 1994).
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E) Limited award of damages under the Product Liability Act
The damages recoverable under the Product Liability Act are, in contrast to
traditional tort law, limited. In cases involving personal injury, the recoverable amount
is limited to 160 million DM (§ 10 ProdHaftG)^'''*. In situations where the plaintiff
suffers property damage, he will have to pay a deductible of 1.125,- DM (§ 11
ProdHaftG); moreover, according to § 1 sec. 1, cl.2 ProdHaftG, recovery for property
damage is restricted to things which are destined to private use or consumption and
which have been applied mainly for that person by the injured person. Thus, recovery
for damage on things used commercially will not be awarded. Furthermore, special
emphasis should be put on the fact that under the Product Liability Act a recovery for
pain and suffering is not recognized, because it does not explicitly mention this kind of
damage, a requirement set up by § 253 BOB. These factors constitute the most
important disadvantage of the Act and explain why most of the product liability actions
will be brought under §§ 823 ff BOB.
F) Statute of limitation
Although the time period of the statute of limitations in the Products Liability
Act (§ 12 ProdHaftG) and § 852 BGB are both three years, there is a difference. The
time limit of § 12 ProdHaftG is stricter in that it runs either if the plaintiff had
knowledge or could have had knowledge of the damage, the defect, and the defendant.
In contrast, the time limit of § 852 BGB begins to run only if the plaintiff has actual
knowledge of the tortuous act and the tortfeasor.
^""^ See, § 10 ProdHaftG, supra note 365.
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G) Statute of repose
In contrast to traditional tort law, the Product Liability Act contains in its § 13
sec. I ProdHaftG a provision of repose according to which the plaintiff has to file a
lawsuit within ten years from the time at which the product has been put on the market.
D. Conclusion
From the preceding analysis of German tort law can be concluded that the
plaintiff in a product liability suit has three options how to proceed in his action. He can
either base his claim on strict liability under the Product Liability Act, or base his claim
on negligence under §§ 823 sec. I, II BOB, or he can combine these two claims. With
regard to defendant's conduct the Product Liability Act applies a strict liability standard.
A consumer expectations test is used to determine the existence of a defect. Under
traditional tort law, on the other hand, a reasonable manufacturer standard is used to
determine whether defendant's conduct was negligent. In order to determine product
defectiveness, however, the courts use a consumer expectations test as starting point
which is supplemented by a risk-utility analysis and several other factors (reasonably
prudent manufacturer standard, state of science and technology).
As for the relation between the Product Liability Act and traditional tort law it
might seem that the former should be favored as basis for plaintiffs claims because of
its strict liability standard which eases plaintiffs burden of proof However, the facts
that the Product Liability Act fails to address important issues (e.g. post-sale duty to
warn and recall) characterizing product liability law, that it does not recognize damages
for pain and suffering and even introduces caps on economic damages makes it
relatively inefficient. Accordingly, plaintiffs base their claims in most cases on
traditional tort law which has been developed by courts to the extent that it covers every
issue arising in modem product liability law. Its fiirther advantage is that it applies a
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presumption of the manufacturer's violation of duty of care and of its fault which eases
plaintiffs burden of proof remarkably. Moreover, the plaintiff can recover for almost
every kind of damage, including pain and suffering, except for pure economic loss.
Thus, we reach the conclusion that traditional tort law from 1900, as it has been
developed by the courts, is much more efficient and advantageous for the plaintiff than
the modem Product Liability Act from 1 990.
Another important finding is that due to the absence of a statute covering
product liability law in its entirety, judicial decisions almost have the same importance
as common law in the United States. In the following Chapter II we will even see that in
addition to this common factor also the material law in both countries is very closely
related to one another. This is true for almost every aspect except the important fact that
punitive damages are solely recognized in U.S. law. This, however, could change if the
German legislature adopts the proposal to enact a statute introducing capped punitive
damages which is not only desirable but also necessary. The, the differences between
the law in both countries would be reduced to a few details only.
Chapter II
Product liability in the motor vehicle area in the United States
A. Sources of product liability law
In the United States three sources of product liabiHty law can be distinguished.
The first is state common law, the second one is state and federal legislation, and the
third arises out of the Restatements of Torts. This enumeration already points at the
interconnection between state and federal law, and for the following discussion, special
emphasis must be put on the fact that product liability law as part of tort law, in contrast
to Germany ,^"^5 traditionally belongs in the field state law.^^^ Accordingly, each of the
50 states has its own product liability law so that there is no uniform product liability
law applicable nationwide.^'''' Thus, although product liability law is influenced by
federal law, we must keep in mind that this is an encroachment upon state law, an
important fact in situations where both state and federal law conflict.
^^^ Compared to the United States the distribution of competence in Germany is reversed: According to
art. 72 sec. I in connection with art. 74 sec. I, Nr. 1 GG, tort law as part of private law is subject to federal
legislation excluding the 16 German Laender (states) from enacting separate product liability laws. Thus,
there is only one uniform product liability law applicable in the entire country.
376 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 1 16 S.Ct. 2240,2250 (1996).
377 The idea of a uniform federal common law was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Erie
R.R. V. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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1. State common law - comparison to the German Civil law system
Unlike under the German civil law system, the most important source of law in
the United States is not legislation but state common law (case law), which finds its
roots in English law.^^s 379
A product liability action can either be brought in the state court system or in the
federal court system. In the first one, the action is started in a state trial court^^o, then on
appeal goes to an intermediate appellate court,^^' and finally comes to the state Supreme
Court382. In the federal court system, in which state law is applied, the action is first
brought in a federal District Court383^ then goes to a U.S. Court of Appeal (Circuit
Court)^^'*, and eventually comes to the United States Supreme Court. However, these
two systems are not entirely separated from each other but can be cormected in
situations where an action brought in the state court system contains issues involving
federal law. Then, for example, a decision issued by a state Supreme Court can be
appealed to the United States Supreme Court^ss^ which can grant certiorari on the case.
^^^ Harald Koch, et al., Ipr und Rechtsvergleichung § 1 5 B. I., II., at 26 1 - 262.
^^^ However, in the area of products liability the role of German courts in the development of this field of
law is of extraordinary importance and comparable to the role of courts in the common law system of the
United States, see, Chapter I, supra, at 15.
^^^ In Georgia, state trial courts are: Superior Court, State Court, Probate Court, Magistrate Court, Civil
Court, Municipal Court.
^^' The names of the intermediate appellate courts vary from state to state: E.g., in Georgia, the
intermediate appellate court is called "Court of Appeals", in New York, on the other hand, it is called
"Appellate Division".
'^^ In Georgia, the Supreme Court which has its seat in Atlanta consists of seven Justices; the current
members of the Georgia Supreme Court are: Robert Benham, Chief Justice; Norman S. Fletcher,
Presiding Justice; George H. Carley, Justice; P. Harris Hines, Justice; Carol W. Hunstein, Justice; Leah J.
Sears, Justice; Hugh P. Thompson, Justice.
^^^ In Georgia, for example, there are three District Courts (for the Northern-, Middle- and Southern
District of Georgia).
^*^ In total, there are 12 Circuit Courts; each of them has jurisdiction over several states, e.g., in Georgia,
the 1 1* Circuit Court has jurisdiction over Georgia, Florida and Alabama.
^^^ The United States Supreme Court resides in Washington D.C. and consists of nine Justices; the
current members of this court are: Justice Rehnquist (Chief Justice), Justice Thomas, Justice Breyer,
Justice Ginsberg, Justice Kennedy, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice Souter, Justice Stevens.
93
This happened, for example, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,^^^ where the
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the constitutionality of punitive damages awards.
In contrast to Germany, the common law system of the United States is
characterized by the doctrine of "stare decisis",^^'' which describes the fact that lower
courts are bound by precedent cases decided by higher courts.^^^ In Germany, although
decisions issued by the Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) or the regional appeal
courts (Oberlandesgerichte) are strong authority, generally, and in theory, no lower
court is bound by their decisions. One exception, however, is made for decisions of the
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), which are considered to be
binding for all courts like statutory law.389 Another important difference between the
U.S. and the German court system concerns the process of fact finding during a trial. In
the United States it is the task of the jury^^o to find the facts of the case. In contrast, this
judicial institution is unknown to German law, and it is the court (the judge(s)) that is
(are) charged with this duty.
2. Legislation
In some states the common law of products liability is supplemented by state
legislation under which product liability statutes have been enacted. Some of them
contain codifications of important matters, such as the applicable standard for the
3«6 517 U.S. 559,568(1996).
387 pexer Hay, Einfuehrung in das amerikanische Recht 8 (4* ed. 1995).
^89 See, § 31 sec. I, II Gesetz ueber das Bundesverfassungsgesetz (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz,
BVerfGG) in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 12. Dezember 1985, BGBl. I S 2229, which reads:
(1) The decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court are binding for the federal and state constitutional
organs as well as for all courts and governmental agencies."
(2) With regard to § 13 Nr. 6, 11, 12 and 14. ..the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court has the
statutory power.
^^^ The jury "is a body of persons temporarily selected from the citizens of a particular district, and
invested with power... to try a question of fact.", see, HENRY Campbell Black., Black's Law
Dictionary 855 (6* ed. 1990).
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determination of design defectiveness^^' or the treatment of the defendant's compliance
with federal regulatory standards^^^ These standards can arise out of the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act^^^^ which was enacted by Congress in 1966. This
Act gives a special agency of the Department of Transportation, the National Highway
Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA)^^'*, the authority to promulgate and
enforce mandatory performance standards for motor vehicles (Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards, FMVSS).395 396
Thus, we can see that federal regulatory standards may overlap with state tort
law. Out of this overlapping arise two important issues relevant for our topic: first,
whether state tort law is preempted by federal law,397 ^nd second, if the first question is
negated, what consequences result out of compliance with those standards^^s.
39^ See, e.g., Louisiana Products Liability Act, La. Rev. Stat., § 9:2800.56 (1988) (requiring proof of a
reasonable, safer alternative design); Mississippi, MiSS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63 (1993) (same); New
Jersey, N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2 A:58c - 3a.(l) (1987) (same).
392 See, e.g., Kansas, KAN. Stat. Ann. § 60-3304 (a), (c) (1994) (presumption that compliance with
regulatory standards illustrates non-defectiveness of product); Tennessee, Tenn. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104
(1980 & Supp. 1995) (Rebuttable presumption of non-defectiveness of product and of defendant's
exercise of due care); Colorado, COLO. REV. Stat. § 13-21-403 (1) (B) (1989 & Supp. 1996) (same).
393 49 u.S.C. §§ 30101 - 30169 (formerly codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381 - 1431 [hereinafter Traffic
Safety Act].
39'* This agency builds the American counterpart to the German Federal Office for Motor Traffic
(Kraftfahrtbundesamt).
395 Ralph Nader & Joseph A. Page, Automobile-Design Liability and Compliance With Federal
Standards, 64 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 415,416-417 (1996).
396 As the Traffic Safety Act was passed, the regulatory authority was first delegated to the Secretary of
Commerce. However, Congress created the Department of Transportation two months after the Safety
Act's passage and transferred its administration to the newly established Department within which the
responsibility for writing the FMVSS rested upon the National Highway Safety Bureau. In 1970, finally,
Congress transferred the administration of the Safety Act to the NHTSA, see, John F. McCauley, Note,
Cipollone and Myrick: Deflating the Airbag Preemption Defense, 30 Ind. L. Rev. 827, note 29 (1997).
397 Cases dealing with the preemption issue are for example: Johnson v. General Motors Corp., F. Supp.
451 (W.D. Okla. 1995); Freightliner v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
398 E.g., in Jackson v. Spagnola, 503 A.2d 944,949 (Pa. Super Ct. 1986) the court deah with the question
whether compliance with federal automobile safety standards immunizes a car manufacturer
(Volkswagen) from strict liability; for a further discussion of the compliance issue, see infra, at pp. 128.
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3. Restatements
As third legal authority the Restatements of the law issued by the American Law
Institute (A.L.I.p^^ n^ust be mentioned. These are compendiums of case law, structured
systematically like a statute reflecting current common law and intended to develop the
law ("prestatements").'*oo However, it should be stressed that the Restatements are no
real source of law, as they do not provide conclusive authority.'*^' Nevertheless, they
provide persuasive authority and are, especially in the field of product liability, often
consulted by courts and legal professionals in order to support their arguments.'*^^ in
product liability law two different Restatements exist: The Restatement (Second) of
Torts, Products Liability from 1965 and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products
Liability, Proposed Final Draft, from April 1, 1997. Most importantly, the Second
Restatement literally adopted in its main provision, § 402 A,'*^'^ a strict liability standard
^^^ The American Law Institute is an association of Professors of Law, Judges and Attorneys which has
been founded in 1923; the A.L.L pursues the goal of unifying and improving American law; today, the
main focus of the institute is the publication of the Restatements of the Law, see Hay, supra note 387, at
14 and note 30.
"OO KoCH, supra note 378, at 264.
'^Ol Hay, supra note 387, at 1 5; KoCH, supra note 378, at 264.
'*^^ A recent example can be found in Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E. 2d 671 (Ga. 1994) where the
Georgia Supreme Court cited to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, Preliminary
Draft No. 1 (April 20, 1993) in order to support its application of the reasonable alternative design
requirement as standard to determine design defectiveness; see also. Pries v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 3
1
F.3d 543,545 (7* Cir. 1994) (applying Indiana law), where the court cited to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: Products Liability, Tentative Draft No. 1 (1994), § 2 (b) and cmt. c.
403 § 402 A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer
or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the uhimate user or consumer,
or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product fi-om or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller.
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for "[a]ny product in a defective condition../' without distinguishing between different
kinds of product defects. This distinction is now made in § 2 (a) - (c)-*^ of the Third
Restatement. This section is at the same time one of the most important and highly
criticized provisions set forth in the new Restatement. In reflecting current common law
it states that a strict liability standard applies to manufacturing defects only (§ 2 (a)). For
design and instructions or warnings defects § 2 (b) and § 2 (c) require the plaintiff to
prove the availability of a reasonable and safer alternative design or information. How
the legal academy reacted to this change will be discussed subsequently.
B. Development of product liability law
1. The privity requirement and its abolition
Like in Germany,'*05 the courts in the United States have dealt with the question
whether the existence of privity, a "[mjutual or successive relationship'*^^, between
consumers and manufacturers is a prerequisite for bringing a product liability action. In
the middle of the nineteenth century the liability of manufacturers for injuries to
consumers resulting from defective products was limited by requiring privity in order to
^ § 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, Proposed Final Draft, April 1,
1997, provides:
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a manufacturing defect, is
defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A product:
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended design even though all
possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product;
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or
a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders
the product not reasonably safe;
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed
by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or
warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and
the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.
'*^^ See supra, at pp. 12.
^^^ Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 390, at 11 99.
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protect the defendants (manufacturers).'*^'' However, the privity requirement and the
protective attitude towards manufacturers were abolished in 1916 in the landmark
decision MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company^^^, a decision in which Judge Cardozo
concluded that the duty to rescue life and limb can not only grow out of a contractual
relationship but also out of tort law.''09 Subsequently, the holding in MacPherson was
confirmed in other cases involving motor vehicle manufacturers, which held that
modem business transactions no longer involve a only buyer and a seller but the public
in general.'*'^ Thus, not only the parties of a contract but also injured third persons can
successfully bring a products liability suit against the manufacturer; the same result was
reached in 1968 by the German Supreme Court in its famous fowl pest case."*"
2. Development of three theories of liability
Today, a plaintiff can bring a product liability action based on three theories of
liability: negligence, breach of an express or implied warranty, and strict liability .'•^
Each of these theories focuses on different aspects. In negligence cases the conduct of
the defendant is subject to examination, while breach of warranty cases concentrate on
the performance of the product, and for strict liability actions the decisive question is
whether a product is defective.'* ^^
^^^ The privity requirement derived from the British Common Law as set forth in Winterbottom v.
Wright, 10 M. & W. 109,152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
408 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
'*09 Id at 1053; Judge Cardozo's words "[T]he law..." have to be read as "Tort law", see Robert L.
Rabin, Restating the Law: The Dilemmas ofProducts Liability, 30 U. Mich J. L. Ref. 197 (1997).
'*10 See, e.g.. General Motors Corp. v. Johnson, 137 F.2d 320 (4*^ Cir. 1943), holding that a motor truck
manufacturer owes the public a duty to use reasonable care in manufacturing and inspecting the vehicle,
irrespective of contract; Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W. 2d 805 (N.D. 1965) (as the defendant
had actively advertised its product to the general consumer public, the lack of privity of contract was no
defense and did not bar the action).
'*^^ See, Chapter I, supra, at pp. 41.





Negligence is the oldest and still the most commonly raised theory of recovery
in product liability suits.'*''' It consists of four basic elements: (1) the existence of a duty
to use reasonable care owed to the plaintiff, (2) the breach of that duty of care by the
defendant, (3) causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs
injury (cause in fact and proximate cause) and, finally, (4) actual harm, which the law
says is measurable and compensable.'' '^
(I.) Defendant's duty to exercise reasonable care
This element requires the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct
necessary to avoid an unreasonable risk of harm to others.**'^ In order to satisfy the
element of duty, the relation between the plaintiff and the defendant must be such that it
imposes upon the latter a legal obligation to use some degree of care for the protection
of the former.'' '"^ In the motor vehicle area this duty has been described as an obligation
to make the product safe for the use for which it is intended'"^ or for purposes for which
the manufacturer may reasonably expect the vehicle to be employed'*'^. The
manufacturer's duty to exercise reasonable care extends to manufacturing^'^o,
designing^'^i, and inspecting''22 the vehicle, as well as warning of hazards related to it''23.
It must be emphasized that a manufacturer's duty to inspect and test also extends to
''i^
Id. at § 7.02, at 8.
^^^ William Lloyd Prosser et al.. Torts 131 (5* ed. 1994).
^^^ Richard A. Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts 166 (6*^ ed. 1995).
'^^'1
Rossell V. Volkswagen of America, 709 P.2d 517 (Ariz. 1985), cert, denied, 106 S.Ct. 1957 (1986).
^^^ Sours V. General Motors Co., 7171 F.2d 151 1 (6*^ Cri. 1983) (applying Ohio law).
^^^ This is implied in Stammer v. General Motors Corp., 259 N.E. 2d 352 (1970).
''20 Necaise v. Chrysler Corp., 335 F.2d 562 (5* Cir. 1968).
''2' Sours V. General Motors Co., 7171 F.2d 151 1 (6* Cri. 1983) (applying Ohio law).
''22 King V. Ford Motor Co., 597 F.2d 436 (5* Cir. 1979) (applying Alabama law).
423 Id.; Schaeffer v. General Motors Corp., 360 N.E. 2d 1062 (1977).
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component parts integrated in the vehicle that were manufactured by another
company.'*24
(a) Standard of care: Reasonable person standard
With regard to the execution of these duties, the manufacturer has to use
reasonable or ordinary care. As this is a legal standard against which the defendant's
conduct is measured, the test for negligence is objective.'^^s Accordingly, it neither
matters whether he intended to exercise due care nor whether he did the best he could,
only whether defendant's behavior was that of a hypothetical reasonably prudent person
placed in the same circumstances is decisive.'*^^ in a particular case the answer to that
question depends on how the trier of fact (jury) thinks a reasonable person (a reasonable
motor vehicle manufacturer) would have acted.'*^^
(B) Effect of custom
Although industry custom is admissible as evidence of the standard of care
owed, it is never conclusive, as some customs may be found to be negligent
themselves.'^^s Thus, the standard of care is not defined by what other manufacturers in
^^'^ Alexander v. Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 261 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1958) (applying Pennsylvania law);
Bradford v. Bendix Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co., 517 P.2d 406 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973);
Karczewski v. Ford Motor Co., 382 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. Ind. 1974), affd mem., 515 F.2d 511 (7'*' Cir.
1975) (applying Indiana law); see also, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, P.F.D.,
§5.
"^25 Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837).
426 Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850); Triestram v. Way, 281 N.W. 420 (Mich. 1938).
427 Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8* Cir. 1959).
428 Rossell V. Volkswagen of America, 709 P.2d 517 (Ariz. 1985), cert, denied, 106 S.Ct. 1957 (1986):
The defendant alleged that the "reasonable man" standard was inapplicable in a negligent design case and
as product manufacturers are held to an expert's standard of care, the appropriate standard should be
custom in the profession. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected this argument and quoted from Judge
Learned Hand in The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737,740 (2d Cir. 1932): "What usually is done may be
evidence of what ought to be done but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable
prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not."
100
the motor vehicle industry are doing, but the test remains what a reasonable
manufacturer would have done.'*^^
(II.) Breach of duty to exercise due care
After it is shown that the defendant (manufacturer) owed a duty of care to the
plaintiff (consumer), it must then be shown that the former breached this duty by
exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. A test for determining whether a risk
of harm is unreasonable was provided by Judge Learned Hand in United States v.
Carrol Towing Co."^^^ In using three algebraic variables he balanced the risks of the
defendant's conduct against the benefits (utility) of running the risk and reached the
result that where the risk outweighs its utility an unreasonable risk, and thus negligence,
is created. The three variables are: (1) the probability that the injury will occur (P), (2)
the gravity of the injury (L), and (3) the burden of taking adequate precautions in order
to avoid the injury (B). A risk will be deemed unreasonable and liability will be
established only ifB is less than P multiplied by L. Thus, if B is less than P x L there is
no negligence according to the Hand Formula.'^^i For example, if the gas tanks of a
specific automobile model are likely to explode because the manufacturer decided to
use thin sealing rings instead of available thick ones for the sealing of the gas tanks.
The probability of the occurrence of the injury is high, as is the gravity of the injury
(serious bums), while the burden of taking precautions is low, because thicker sealing
rings were available at slightly increased costs. Here, the manufacturer has created an
unreasonable risk. Therefore, he acted negligently, and in the case of an injury he
would be liable.
429 See, in general, Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468 (1903).




The defendant's negligent behavior must be the cause of plaintiffs injuries in
order to impose liability. This involves two determinations: (1) whether the defendant's
conduct was the cause in fact of the injuries, and (2) whether it was the proximate cause
thereof. The first determination is made by the so-called "but for test", which is
comparable to the Aequivalenztheorie in German product liability law.''32. if t^g
plaintiff would not have been injured but for the defendant's act or omission, the act is a
cause in fact of the injury .'*33 The second determination is more a policy assessment than
an aspect of causation. Like the Adaequanztheorie in German product liability law,
proximate cause limits the responsibility of the defendant, because under some
circumstances it would be unfair to hold him responsible for all consequences of his
wrongfiil conduct. Therefore, the common law majority'*34 limits his liability to
foreseeable circumstances'^^s. As there is a high number of very complex proximate
cuase issues, a discussion of these issues is omitted and referred to special literature.'*^^
(IV.) Harm
Finally, once a negligent act (or omission) and causation are established, the
plaintiff must show that he suffered damages resulting therefrom in order to impose
^^^ See, Chapter I, supra, at 22.
433 Chaney v. Smithkline Beckman Corp., 764 F.2d 527 (8* Cir. 1985).
"•34 Palsgraf V. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (Court of App. N.Y. 1928); Overseas Tankship (U.K.)
Ltd. V. Mortsdock & Engeneering Co. Ltd., "Wagon Mound No. 1", 1961 A.C. 338 (1961); Overseas
Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. V. Miller Steamship Co., "Wagon Mound No. 2", 1967 1 A.C. 617 (1967).
^^^ Under the foreseeability approach, proximate cause questions can be divided into three basic patterns:
1
.
Unforeseeable manner: A foreseeable resuh occurs but it happened in an unforeseeable manner;
2. Unforeseeable result: The foreseeable plaintiff has been injured but an unexpected result or type of
injury has occurred;
3. Unforeseeable plaintiff: The injured person was not a member of the group of potential victims that
was exposed to a foreseeable risk.
'*36 E.g., Prosser, supra note 415, at 284-343; EPSTEIN, supra note 416, at 491-558.
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liability on the defendant. The plaintiff is entitled to recover for compensatory damages,
and, if the prerequisites are met, for punitive damages. Compensatory damages
comprise all economic losses and expenses such as medical bills, lost wages or business
profits, and pain and suffering. Recovery for punitive damages can only be awarded if
the defendant has engaged in "reckless conduct".'*^^
If each of these four (i. - iv.) general elements of negligence is fulfilled, the
defendant will be held liable, and the plaintiff will be able to recover. However, as we
will see in the section dealing with design and information defects, the general
negligence standard has slightly changed to the requirement of proving the availability
of a reasonable alternative design or information.'*^^
B) Breach of express or implied warranty
The second theory of liability on which the plaintiff can base his action is breach
of warranty. This theory, developed from contract law, is governed by the provisions of
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).'*^^ Warranties are either express'*^^
or implied, and implied warranties can be given in two different forms,
merchantability'*'* 1 and fitness for a particular purpose'*'*^ fhe prerequisites of this
theory are: (1) the existence of an express or implied warranty, (2) breach of that
warranty, (3) injury, (4) proximate cause between breach of warranty and injury, (5)
reliance of plaintiff on warranty and (6) notice requirement.'*'*^ If the plaintiff can prove
'*37 Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890 (1979); Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988).
^^^ See infra, at pp. 108.






443 MILLER, supra note 412, at § 7.03, at 36-64.
103
the fulfillment of these prerequisites, he will successfully sue the defendant
manufacturer.
c) Strict liability
The concept of strict liability, thus, of liability without fault, was first applied in
the product liability context in cases involving food.'*'*'' In modem times, strict liability
has been adopted in the landmark case Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.'^^. The
opinion, by Justice Traynor, stated that due to the manufacturer's ability to anticipate
the occurrence of hazards'*'*^, to take insurance against the risk of injuries of consumers,
and the possibility of spreading the increasing costs through product prices, and because
of increased incentives for manufacturers to provide safer products, strict liability in
tort, instead of negligence, should govern products liability cases.'*^''
Almost the same position has been adopted by § 402 A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, a section, which at its creation in 1965, was supported by Greenman
only.'*^^ Although § 402 A does not expressly distinguish between manufacturing,
design and instructions or warnings defects,'''*^ in contrast to Greenman, its scope of
application was intended to be limited to manufacturing defects.'*^^ However, its broad
language allowed the courts to interpret this liability standrad to be applicable, at least
^^ According to Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E. 2d 182 (1965), Dean Prosser traced the theory of
strict liability back to the year 143 1
.
445 377 p.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
446 Especially motor vehicle manufacturers can anticipate that many (serious) accidents will occur in
which their vehicles are involved because this is common knowledge.
447 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897,900-901 (Cal. 1962); see also, Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436,440-444 (Cal. 1944); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153,
1162-1163 (Cal. 1972).
448 Michael J. Tdoke, Categorical Liability For Manifestly Unreasonable Designs: Why the Comment D
Caveat Should be Removedfrom the Restatement (Third), 8 1 Cornell L. Rev. 1 1 8 1 , 1 1 96 ( 1 996).
449
§ 402 A only speaks of a "[p]roduct in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous...".
450 George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 2301,2311
(1989).
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in its wording, to all kinds of product defects''^' which were then categorized as
manufacturing, design, and instructions or warnings defects.'*^^ 7^^ controversy arising
out of the fact that the Third Restatement limits strict liability to be applicable to
manufacturing defects will only be discussed in connection with design defects.'^^s
D) Comparison to German product liability law
With regard to the different theories of liability, U.S. and German product
liability laws are very similar. The law in both countries recognizes a negligence and a
strict liability theory.'*^'' However, in contrast to the United States, a cause of action
based on breach of warranty is not recognized in German product liability law; this kind
of theory can only be brought under contract law (§§ 459 ff. BGB).
C. Manufacturing and design defects
Today, product defects are divided into three different categories: manufacturing
defects'*^^, design defects'*^^, and instructions or warnings defects'*^^. In order for the
plaintiff to recover in an automotive product liability case, he must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the motor vehicle contained a defect at the time of
'^^^ Tdoke, supra note 448, at 1 191; it has to be stressed that the liability standard applied by the courts to
determine design- or information defects may sometimes have been hidden under the label of "strict
liability", however, in reality, most of the courts used a negligence standard to determine these kinds of
defects, see infra, at pp. 107.
^^^ James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402 A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 11 Cornell L. Rev. 1512,1515 (1992); Tdoke, supra note 448, at 1 191.
^^•^ See, design defects, infra at pp. 108,
'*5'' In German products liability law, the negligence theory is based upon §§ 823 sec. I and II BGB and
the strict liability theory is to be found in § 1 sec. I of the Produkthaftungsgesetz.
"•SS Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871,881 (Alaska 1979).
^^^ General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1 176 (Ala. 1985).
457 LaCoste v. Ford Motor Co., 322 N.W. 2d 898 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982).
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the accident.''^^ In order to prove the defect, the plaintiff can either provide direct'*^^ or
circumstancial evidence'*^^. In addition to this burden of proof, the plaintiff also has the
burden to provide evidence that the vehicle was defective when it left the control of the
defendant.'*^'
1. Manufacturing defects
A product contains a manufacturing defect when it departs from the
manufacturer's own design specifications for that product.'*^^ Typically, manufacturing
defects appear in products that are incorrectly assembled, physically flawed, or
damaged.'^^
a) Standard of liability
The governing standard of liability for manufacturing defects is one of strict
liability. This is recognized by common law^^, both Restatements of Torts'*^^^ and legal
"^^S Hurt V. General Motors Corp., 553 F.2d 1 181 (8* Cir. 1977) (applying Missouri law); Segler v. Ford
Motor Co., 438 So. 2d 297 (Ala. 1983).
^^^ Direct evidence in automotive product liability cases is usaully presented in the form of expert
testimony, see, Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 360 N.W. 2d 2 ((Wis. 1984).
"^^O Holloway v. General Motors Corp., Chevrolet Div., 271 N.W. 2d 777 (Mich. 1978).
461 Baughman v. General Motors Corp., 627 F. Supp. 871 (D.S.C. 1985), aff d 780 F.2d 1 131 (4* Cir.
1985) (applying South Carolina law); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, P.F.D., §
2, cmt. c, at 17.
'*62 Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443,454 (Cal. 1978); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d
871,881 (Alaska 1979).
'^^ Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, P.F.D., § 2, cmt. c, at 17. For example:
Manufacturer's employee is inattentive and installs screws retaining the left front wheel of a passenger
car not appropriately. After plaintiff used the car for one week, the wheel falls off while he is driving.
Plaintiff can sue the manufacturer (and the employee) in strict liability because there was a
manufacturing defect.
"^64 Suvada V.White Motor Co., 210 N.E. 2d 182,186(111. 1965).
'^65 For the Second Restatement, see § 402 A; for the Third Restatement, see § 2 (a): "[A product:]
contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended design even though all
possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product."
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scholars"*^^. As already stated in Greenmart*^'' , one of the rationales for the application
of such a standard is that it is not only a deterrent for manufacturers to create
unnecessary risks but also a safety incentive.''^^ Another principle reason why strict
liability was introduced is the development of more complex products (e.g.
automobiles) in which a multiplicity of hazards could be incorporated that are often
hidden from physical view.'*^^ Closely related to this aspect is the fact that product
sellers are generally better able to identify the product risks and that consumers are
basically unable to protect themselves from defective products.'*''^ At the time the
consumer discovers product risks it might be too late, and the harmful event might
already have occurred. Then, the plaintiff would have difficulty in discovering and
proving negligence on the part of the defendant. Moreover, since the defendant has
superior knowledge of the product related risks and is generally in a better financial
position than the plaintiff, it is easier for him to obtain adequate insurance.'*^' In
addition, strict liability is based on the grounds that, unlike plaintiffs, the manufacturer
is able to spread the risk or loss he suffers through increased product prices.'*''^
B) Run-AWAY PRODUCTS
As we have seen under German product liability law, due to a lack of fault, the
motor vehicle manufacturer is not liable under the negligence standard of § 823 sec. I
BGB for manufacturing defects that are inevitable despite all precautions ("run-away
products"). In contrast, such an exemption from liability cannot be made under U.S.
466 David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations ofProduct Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 427 (1993).
467 377 p 2d 897 (Cal. 1992).
468 Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W. 2d 379,391 (Wis. 1977).
^69 David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies ofStrict Products Liability, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 681 (1980).
470m
471 John W. Wade, On the Nature ofStrict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973).
472/^.
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product liability law, as the exclusive standard for manufacturing defects is strict
liability. Thus, the non-existence of fault is irrelevant.
2. Design defects
a) Definition and standard to determine design defectiveness
The definition of design defctiveness depends on how the liability standard for
design defects is determined. This, however, is highly controversial.
(I.) Former common law approach and § 402 A of the Second
Restatement
In Greenman^'^'^ and § 402 A of the Second Restatement a strict liability standard
was adopted for all kinds of product defects without distinguishing between the three
categories of product defects. In response to this failure, courts have developed a variety
of methods to determine whether a product is defectively designed. Some courts apply,
in varying detail, a form of risk-utility'*'''* or risk-benefif^'^^analysis. Under this analysis,
the risks and benefits of the product itself or of the product compared to an alternative
version are evaluated. If this evaluation shows that the overall risk of injury could have
been significantly reduced or avoided by the use of an alternative at reasonable cost
without significant loss of utility, the product is considered to be defective.'*''^ In
''3 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Gal. 1962).
474 Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843,846 (N.H. 1978); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365
N.W. 2d 176 (Mich. 1984); Rix v. General Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195,201-202 (Mont. 1986); see
further John H. Chun, The New Citadel: A Reasonably Designed Products Liability Restatement, 79
Cornell L. Rev. 1654,1681, note 33 (1994).
475 West V. Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc. 220 Cal. Rptr. 437 (Cal. App. 1985), cert, denied, 479 U.S.
824 (1986); Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175,182,183-184 (Colo. 1992).
476 Tdoke, supra note 448, at 1 192.
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connection with the application of this test, the courts'*'''' often use seven risk-utility
factors, which have been developed by Professor Wade (the "seven Wade factors").'*''*
Other courts'*''^ use a "consumer expectations test" to define design defectiveness
of a product. Applying this analysis, a product is defective in design if, at the time of
sale, it is in a condition that could not have been reasonably expected by the
consumer.'*^^ Again, different courts'*^' have chosen to adopt an approach introduced by
the California Supreme Court in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.'**^ under which both
above mentioned methods are applied in order to determine the defectiveness of a
product. Thus, according to this so-called "two-prong" test**^, a product is defective
either if it fails to meet the requirements of a risk-utility analysis, or if it does not satisfy
the consumer expectations.'*^'* Still other courts'*^^ consider a product to be defective in
'•'7 See, e.g.. Caterpillar Tractor v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871,883 (Alaska 1979); Klein v. Sears, Roebuck &.
Co., 608 A.2d 1276,1280 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
^'^^ John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L. J. 825,837-838
(1973); the "seven Wade factors" are:
(1) The useftilness and desirability of the product - its utility to the user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable
seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing its
usefiihiess or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because
of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or the existence of suitable
warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the
product or carrying liability insurance.
'•''9 Lester v. Magic Chef, 641 P.2d 353,357 (Kan. 1982): The Supreme Court of Kansas adopted the
consumer expectations test to defme the term "unreasonably dangerous" in § 402 A, cmt i (Restatement
(Second) of Torts); Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co., 412 N.W. 2d 56 (Neb. 1987).
^^^ Tdoke, supra note 448, at 1 193.
'*8l Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp., Inc.
659 P.2d 734 (Haw. 1983).
482 Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443,457-458 (Cal. 1978).
^^^ Chun, supra note 474, at 1655 (stating that California and Alaska apply the two-prong test).
484 Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443,454 (Cal. 1978).
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design if a reasonable product manufacturer who is aware of the product's risk would
not have decided to place it on the market.'**^
(II.) Today's common law and legislative approach and § 2 (b) of the
Third Restatement
Today's majority opinion'*^^ considers a product to be defective in design when
the risk of harm posed by the product could have been avoided, or at least reduced,
through a reasonable, safer alternative design whose omission rendered the product not
reasonably safe. However, this approach is subject to high criticism and has been
rejected by a minority of courts'*^^ and numerous scholars'*^^. Criticisms have been based
485 Nichols V. Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W. 2d 429 (Ky. 1980); Church v. Wesson, 385 S.E. 2d 393
(W. Va. 1989).
486 Nichols V. Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W. 2d 429,433 (Ky. 1980).
487 The majority opinion comprises common law, state legislation, the third Restatement and legal
scholars: For common law, see, e.g.. General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176,1191 (Ala.
1985); Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 184-185 (Colo. 1992); Betts v. Robertshaw Controls
Co., 1992 WL 436727,* 1 (Del. Super Ct. 1992); Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E. 2d 671,674 (Ga.
1994); Jackson v. Warrum, 535 N.E. 2d 1207,1220 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384
N.E. 2d 1 188,1193 (Mass. 1978); Reeves v. Cincinnati, Inc., 439 N.W. 2d 326 (Mich. 1989); Kallio v.
Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W. 2d 92,96 (Minn. 1987); Rix v. General Motors Corp., 723 P. 2d 195,202
(Mont. 1986); Garcia v. Rivera, 553 N.Y.S. 2d 378,380 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 577 P.2d 1322,1326-1327 (Or. 1978); Fitzpatrick v. Madonna, 623 A.2d 322,326 (Pa. Super Ct.
1993); Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 8 F.3d 1470,1479 (lO"" Cir.1993); Church v. Wesson, 385 S.E. 2d 393,396
(W. Va. 1989); for legislation, see, e.g.. La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2800.56 (1988); ILL. COMP. STAT. +ANN.
Ch. 735 § 5/2-2104 (1993 & Supp. 1996); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63 (1993); N.J. REV. STAT. §
2A:58C-3A.(1) (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75 (A) - (F) (Anderson 1993); TEX. CiV. Prac. &
Rem. Code Ann. § 82.005 (West 1993); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, P.F.D.,
§ 2 (b); for legal scholars, see, e.g., Chun, supra note 474; Tdoke, supra note 448; James A. Henderson,
Jr., & Aaron D. Twerski, Arriving At Reasonable Alternative Design: The Reporters Travelogue, 30 U.
Mich. J. L.Ref 563(1997).
488 Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 241 Conn. 199,219 (Conn. 1997); Binakonsky v. Ford Motor
Co., 133 F.3d 281,285 (4"^ Cir. 1998) (adhering to die standard to determine design defectiveness
established under § 402 A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
489 Oscjir S. Gray, The Draft ALI Product Liability Proposals: Progress or Anachronism ?, 61 Term. L.
Rev. 1105 (1994); Howard Klemme, Comments to the Reporters and Selected Members of the
Consultative Group, Restatement of Torts (Third): Products Liability, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1173 (1994);
Jerry J. Phillips, Achilles' Heel, 61 Tenn. L Rev. 1265 (1994); Elizabeth C. Price, Toward a Unified
Theory of Products Liability: Reviving the Causative Concept of Legal Fault, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1277
(1994); Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2 (B): The
Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1407 (1994); Frank J. Vandall, The
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on the following seven arguments. (1) The approach is neither supported by current law
and policy^'^o (2) Its risk-utility balancing does not constitute a narrow test for
determining design defectiveness'*^'. (3) The approach is, to the detriment of the
consumer, too manufacturer-friendly in placing an undue burden on plaintiffs'*^^^ ^nd (4)
must be regarded as a political statemenf*^^. (5) Finally, it missed its goal of clarifying
product liability law.'*^'*
(III.) The criticism on today's majority approach
(a) Argument of critics that the reasonable alternative design
requirement is not supported by current law and counter-arguments
The first argument brought against the new approach, which is adopted in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts as black letter rule in § 2 (b), is that it is based on an
inaccurate legal analysis so that it does not reflect the current law and policy''^^
In particular, it is contended that only three jurisdictions support the alternative
design requirement of § 2 (b).'*^^ The jurisdictions that apply this standard as legislation
Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability, Section 2 (b): Design Defect, 68 Temp. L. Rev. 167
(1995); Angela C. Rushton, Design Defects under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: A Reassessment of
Strict Liability and the Goals ofa Functional Approach, 45 Emory L. J. 389 (1996); John F. Vargo, The
Emperor 's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a "New Cloth"for Section 402 A Products
Liability Design Defects - A Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 493
(1996); David G. Owen, Risk-Utility Balancing in Design Defect Cases, 30 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 239
(1997); Frank J. Vandall, Constructing a Roof before the Foundation is prepared: The Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2 (B) Design Defect, 30 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 261 (1997).
^^^ Potter V. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 241 Conn. 199,219 (Conn. 1997); Frank J. Vandall,
Constructing A Roof Before The Foundation Is Prepared: The Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products
Liability Section 2 (b) Design Defect, 30 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 261,273 (1997).
"^^l Owen, supra note 489, at 241.
''92 Potter V. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 241 Conn. 199,217 (Conn. 1997); Vandall, supra note 490, at
269,279.
'*93 Price, supra note 489, at 1355; Vandall, supra note 490, at 279.
'*94 Vandall, supra note 490, at 278.
'*95 Potter V. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 241 Conn. 199,219 (Conn. 1997); Vandall, supra note 490, at
261.
Ill
(Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, Ohio, and Texas)'*^'' should not be taken
into consideration, because, due to the fact that the founders of the American Law
Institute, which issues the Restatements had an "aversion against legislation", this
would violate basic principles of the A.L.I.'*^^. Unlike § 2 (b), its predecessor, § 402 A,
is the provision that should be considered as accurately reflecting the law^^^, because it
is based on over 500 years of tort cases that have been "put into the paper shredder"50o
by the new approach.
- Counter arguments
In this line of arguments, however, several factors are neglected. First, the
Reporter's notes expressly cite to the jurisdictions that have adopted the reasonable
alternative design requirement through legislation-^^' This shows that the Reporters (and
the A.L.I.) agree to take them into account. Only if they had not done so would there be
a basis for criticism, because in that case they would have neglected an important source
of law. Moreover, the critics overlook the fact that the personnel composition of the
A.L.I. has changed compared to former times so that, even if the founders of the A.L.I,
had an antipathy against legislation, there is now room for a different opinion. In the
same way the contention that the reasonable alternative design standard has only been
adopted by three jurisdictions, is wrong. In total, six jurisdictions have codified this
496 Vargo, supra note 489, at 556; Vandall, supra note 490, at 274.
'97 See, La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2800.56 (1988); III. Comp. Stat. Ann. Ch. 735 § 5/2-2104 (1993 &. Supp.
1996); Miss. Code Ann. § 1 1-1-63 (1993); N.J. Rev. Stat.. § 2A:58C-3A.(1) (1987); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2307.75 (A) - (F) (Anderson 1993); TEX. CiV. Prac. &. REM. CODE ANN. § 82.005 (West 1993).
^^^ Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2 (B): The Reasonable
Alternative Design Requirement, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1407,1408-1409 (1994).
'*99 Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability, Section 2 (b): Design Defect,
68 Temp. L. Rev. 167,196 (1995).
500 Vandall, supra note 490, at 265.
50' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, Products Liability, P.F.D., Reporters notes to § 2, cmt. d, L(citing
Mississippi, New Jersey and Texas), cmt. d, II (citing Ohio).
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standard^02 and 13 have adopted it as their case law^o^. Thus it is out of question that the
new Restatement is not supported by current law.^o^
In response to the argument that the approach chosen under § 402 A has been
based on 500 years of case law and still reflects the current law, it should be noted that
in fact this section was only based on one case, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.^^^. Furthermore the critic's argument discloses that they neglect the factor that law,
especially the common law, is exposed to a high dynamism. ^^^ This means that law can
change in a short period of time, and what might have been "true" in former times may
now have become questionable.
(B) Critic's argument that the new approach does not leave room
FOR A STRICT LIABILITY APPROACH
Another argument on which the critics of the new approach focus is that it does
not leave room for a strict liability standard for design defects, although it would be
available.^^'' In not doing so it has to be considered as giving a misleading trend in a
wrong direction,508 ie.. through creating a disincentive for manufacturers to produce
^^^ Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, Ohio and Texas, see, P.F.D, Reporter's note to § 2, cmt.
d L, n.
503 General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 11 76,1 191 (Ala. 1985); Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842
P.2d 175, 184-185 (Colo. 1992); Betts v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 1992 WL 436727,* 1 (Del. Super Ct.
1992); Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E. 2d 671,674 (Ga. 1994) (holding that the reasonable
alternative design requirement is relevant evidence); Jackson v. Warrum, 535 N.E. 2d 1207,1220 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1989); Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E. 2d 1188,1193 (Mass. 1978); Reeves v. Cincinnati,
Inc., 439 N.W. 2d 326 (Mich. 1989); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W. 2d 92,96 (Minn. 1987); Rix v.
General Motors Corp., 723 P. 2d 195,202 (Mont. 1986); Garcia v. Rivera, 553 N.Y.S. 2d 378,380 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1990); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322,1326-1327 (Or. 1978); Fitzpatrick v.
Madonna, 623 A.2d 322,326 (Pa. Super Ct. 1993); Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 8 F.3d 1470,1479 (10*
Cir.1993); Church v. Wesson, 385 S.E. 2d 393,396 (W. Va. 1989); see, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
ToRTS: Products Liability, P.F.D. , Reporter's note to § 2, cmt. d I., II.
504 Tdoke, supra note 448, at 1 197.
505 377 p.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
506 Rabin, supra note 409, at 204.
507 Phillips, supra note 489, at 1272.
508m
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safer products. ^^^ However, the severity of this argument can be qualified by
considering the following aspects. First, it can be said that the new approach, in
establishing a negligence liability standard, does not in fact create a totally different
standard compared to that which courts formally applied under the approach contained
in § 402 A. Although some courts used to cite the term "strict liability", they carried out
a fault-based liability scrutiny, which was hidden behind the label of "strict liability".5io
Thus, the criticized change appears to be "more semantic than real". 5' • Finally, the
existence of strict liability can also be viewed as a disincentive and overdeterrence for
manufacturers to create new and better products by using new technologies.^'^
(c) Disproving of the argument that the reasonable alternative
DESIGN APPROACH IS A "GRAB-BAG" APPROACH
It has been held that the reasonable alternative design requirement does not
constitute a proper balancing test for design defect cases in that it uses a "grab-bag"
approach, which throws almost everything into the balance.^'^ Indeed, it is true that the
comment to § 2 (b),^''* as well as the courts approving this section,^!^ mention several
factors that can be relevant in determining whether the omission of a reasonable
alternative rendered a product not reasonably safe. But, in order to make a decision on a
case-by-case basis possible, it is necessary that a variety of factors are available to carry
out the above named determination. This makes the law flexible and allows its
application not merely to a few, but to a broad range of different cases that are based on
509/^. at 1274.
510 Chun, supra note 474, at 1670 and note 122.
511 Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E. 2d 671,674 note 3 (Ga. 1994); Chun, supra note 474, at 1670.
512 Phillips, supra note 489, at 1274.
513 Owen, supra note 489, at 24 1
.
514 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, P.F.D., § 2, cmt. f.
515 See, e.g.. Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E. 2d 671,675 and note 6 (Ga. 1994).
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different fact patterns. Thus, instead of condemning the availability of various factors,
one should appreciate its existence.
(D) Disproving of the argument that the new approach neglects the
CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS TEST
Some scholars lament that the reasonable alternative design requirement does
not give an adequate position to, or even neglects, the role of consumer expectations.^!^
However, although it is correct that consumer expectations alone are no longer
considered to be the determinative factor in showing design defectiveness,^!'' this result
is justified because the drafters of the new Restatement and the courts share the same
view that the reasonable alternative design requirement is the preferable standard.
Furthermore, the importance of consumer expectations is not neglected within the third
Restatement, because it considers them to "constitute an important factor in determining
the necessity for" and "the adequacy of an alternative design.^'^
- Comparison to German product liability law
In this context it is interesting to compare the standard of determination for
design defects chosen in U.S. law to the one applied in German law. We have seen that
the common law majority in the United States uses a risk-utility test in which the
reasonable alternative design requirement plays an important role. However, a consumer
expectations test supplements this approach. German traditional tort law and the Product
Liability Act, on the other hand, use a consumer expectations test as a starting point in
^!^ Roland F. Banks & Margaret O'Connor, Restating the Restatement (Second). Section 402 A - Design
Defect, 72 Or. L. Rev. 41 1,420 (1993); Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability:
The ALI Restatement Project, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 631,666 (1995).
51"' Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, P.F.D., § 2, cmt. g.
518 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, P.F.D., § 2, cmt. g.
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their analysis.^ '^ Nevertheless, at least under traditional tort law, a risk-utility balancing
test is used in addition to that. Thus, German and U.S. law only differ in that they use
another sequence in their determination of design defects. The result of this
determination, however, will be similar since the law in both countries basically applies
the same factors.
(e) Argument that the new Restatement is too manufacturer-
friendly - TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE CONSUMER520
An important argument against the new standard for design defects focuses on
the aspect that it protects the potential defendants (manufacturers) and, at the same time
ignores, or even damages, the interests of the plaintiff (consumer). In particular, it is
argued that through the requirement of showing a reasonable alternative design, which
can be called "radical' negligence,^^! the plaintiff has to jump higher hurdles than in the
case of strict liability or traditional negligence. ^^2 jhjs [^ true, because the plaintiff bears
the burden of knowledge and proof. Of course, one could reply that he could use expert
testimony to show the availability of a reasonable alternative design. But it should be
considered that obtaining expert testimony in these cases creates enormous costs523, a
factor which might deter the plaintiff from bringing suit, and which can lead to the
elimination of smaller suits.^^'* This effect constitutes, in the eyes of the critics, the
purpose of the new Restatement.^^s One objection to this is that the plaintiff can make
^^^ See Chapter I, supra, at 90.
^2° Professor Vandall considers §2 (b) as a "wish list from manufacturing America", see, Vandall, supra
note 490, at 261.
"1 Vandall, supra note 490, at 262.
522 Potter V. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 241 Conn. 199,217 (Conn. 1997) (holding that "[t]he feasible
alternative design requirement imposes an undue burden on plaintiffs..."); Vandall, supra note 539, at
1424.
523 Vandall, supra note 498, at. 1425.
524 Vandall, supra note 490, at 277-278.
525 Vandall, supra note 498, at 1426.
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use of § 3 of the Restatement (Third)^26 which provides that, in certain circumstances,
he is allowed to provide circumstantial evidence without having the burden of proving
the specific nature of the defect. ^27 Nevertheless, it must not be neglected that, although
this might be a reduction of the plaintiffs burden, it does not rescue him from his
burden of proof Furthermore, the question has to be raised whether the protection of the
manufacturer can be justified under the aspect of fairness. Against the position taken by
the majority approach, it can be argued that a motor vehicle manufacturer can take
insurance against the risk of injury to consumers through defective products and that he
can spread the increased costs by raising his product prices. ^28 Although the consumer
could insure against bodily harm or damage to his property, he can neither spread these
costs, nor is he as financially strong as the manufacturing company. Thus, the latter is
able to protect the consumer better than the consumer can. In connection herewith, it is
held in support of the majority opinion that a manufacturer might find it difficult, if not
impossible, to provide himself with adequate insurance. ^^9 Assuming this contention is
true, this is a risk of which a manufacturer has to think before entering in business. If he
is willing to take the profits of making business, then he should also carry the losses. If
he is not willing to do that, he should quit. Thus, the mentioned counter argument has to
526 § 3 Circumstantial Evidence Supporting Inference of Product Defect
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a product defect existing at the
time of sale or distribution, without proof of a specific defect, when the incident that harmed the plaintiff:
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect; and
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes other than product defect existing at the time
of sale or distribution.
527 James A. Henderson, Jr. &. Aaron D. Twerski, Arriving at a Reasonable Alternative Design: The
Reporters' Travelogue , 30 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 563,578-581 (1997).
528 Escola V. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436,440-444 (Cal. 1944); Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897,900-901 (Cal. 1962); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1 153,1 162-1 163
(Cal. 1972).
529 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, Tent. Draft No. 1, 1994, § 2, cmt. a, at 13;
see, Gray, supra note 489, at 1 134 and note 34.
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be rejected, so that under the aspect of fairness the direction chosen by the majority of
courts, legislators, scholars and the Third Restatement can not be approved.
- Comment: Solving the problem through presumption of
availability of an alternative design
It has been stressed that the majority approach does not provide adequate
protection for the consumer. Although the adoption of strict liability, not only for
manufacturing but also for design and warnings defects, could be considered as one
possibility for solving the problem, it would be too radical from the point of view of the
manufacturer. Therefore, I favor the following proposal. Similar to German law,530 a
balanced compromise could be found through the introduction of a presumption that a
reasonable alternative design was available for the manufacturer at the time of sale.
Then, the plaintiff would be relieved from his burden of proof, and he would no longer
be deterred from bringing a products liability action, giving his suit a better chance of
succeeding. Now, the manufacturer would have to prove that a reasonable alternative
was not available at the time of sale, a result which is fair with regard to the fact that he
is the one who produces the product and the danger, not the "innocent" consumer. The
question that arises, however, is how can a defendant prove that a reasonable alternative
design did not exist? Here, the comment to the new Restatement provides one answer.
The defendant has to show that his product conforms either to industry custom, or that it
"reflects the safest and most advanced technology" that was available at the time or that
it "reflects technology at the cutting edge of scientific knowledge. "^^i Moreover, the
defendant would meet this burden of proof if he could show that the costs of the
alternative design are unreasonably higher than its benefits.
^^^ See, Chapter I, supra, at pp. 41
.
531 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, P.F.D., § 2, cmt. d.
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(F) Argument that the reasonable alternative design approach of
THE Third Restatement is a political statement
Some scholars consider the new Restatement as a political statement.532 They
base their statement on the fact that the writings of the last twenty years of the Reporters
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Professors Henderson and Twerski, disclose their
affection for conservatism, negligence, and pro-manufacturer attitude."3 Against this,
one may object that the so-called "Habush-Amendment''^^^ has been introduced. It
provides that the plaintiff does not always need to prove the availability of a reasonable
alternative design. When a product possesses only low social utility but a high risk of
danger, this requirement can be dropped. However, it has to be outlined that only the
comment to § 2 (b) refers to this amendment, whereas the black letter text of § 2 (b)
does not take any position thereto. In addition, the cases dealing with products with low
social utility and high danger will neither represent the majority in product liability
cases in general, nor will one find them in the motor vehicle area, because automobiles
and motorcycles have to be considered as highly socially valuable for the reasons set
forth above. ^35 Thus, the advantageous effect for the plaintiff resulting from the Habush-
Amendment will generally not find application in the motor vehicle area.
(G) Conclusion
It has been shown that the reasonable alternative design requirement established
in the majority of jurisdictions and contained in the Restatement (Third) of Torts is the
prevailing approach to determining design defectiveness, and that almost every
532 Phillips, supra note 489, at 1265; Price, supra note 489, at 1277; Vandall, supra note 490, at 279.
533 Phillips, supra note 489, at 1265.
534 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, P.F.D., §2, cmt. e is called the "Habush
Amendment" because one of the advisers, Robert Habush, a plaintiffs lawyer, proposed this amendment,
see, Henderson & Twerski, supra note 102, at 587.
535 See, Introduction, supra at 2-3.
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argument brought against it can be objected to. Critics allege that the weakest point of
this approach is its favoring of manufacturers, which goes to the detriment of the
consumer. If this were true, we could find contrary tendencies in the development of
product liability law in Germany (and in the whole European Union) compared to the
United States, because the laws in the Member states of the European Union are
characterized by a growing trend towards consumer protection. However, it seems that
the critics of the reasonable design requirement overlook one important fact. In the
overwhelming majority of cases the plaintiff voluntarily offers evidence on this issue.536
Thus, it seems that this evidence, as a practical matter, is already part of plaintiff s case.
In presenting this kind of evidence, plaintiffs presumably expect to increase the
likelihood of winning the case. Thus, the argument presented by the critics seems to be
of more theoretical than practical importance. Nevertheless, the introduction of evidence
on a reasonable alternative design still places a high burden on plaintiffs (e.g. increased
financial expenses for expert witnesses). Therefore, a more equalized balance of power
between the plaintiff and the motor vehicle manufacturer could be established by
adopting the proposal of introducing a presumption of availability of an alternative
design.
536 See, e.g., Finchum v. Ford Motor Co., 57 F.3d 526,531 (T^ Cir. 1995); Montag v. Honda Motor Co.,
75 F.3d 141,1416 (10"" Cir. 1996) (plaintiffs sought to introduce evidence that Honda could have used an
alternative restraint system (airbag)); Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck, N.V. 112 F.3d 291,293 (7*^ Cir.
1997); Rogers v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.Supp. 606,614-615 (D. N.D. Ind. 1997); Green v. General
Motors Corp., 1998 WL 116851,*9 (Mar. 18, 1998, N.J. Super A.D.).
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D. Special issues pertaining to automobile design litigation
1. Crashworthiness: Definition and development of the
crashworthiness doctrine
In connection with design defects the problem commonly referred to as the issue
of "crashworthiness", "enhanced injury", or "second collision" has been raised since the
mid- 1960s. 537 The doctrine of crashworthiness, which most frequently arises in
automobile accident cases, deals with the question whether a motor vehicle
manufacturer can be held liable for plaintiffs enhanced injuries in the following
situation. Initially, a traffic accident caused by circumstances other than the vehicle's
defect (e.g. through plaintiffs or another driver's negligence) occurred, and the plaintiff
suffered some injuries (e.g. a broken arm) as a result of this accident. However, the
plaintiff alleges that his initial injuries were enhanced (e.g. he was burnt) by a defect in
the vehicle (e.g. a faulty designed gas tank), in particular, by the vehicle's failure to
reasonably protect its occupants in the case of an accident.^^*
In 1966, in Evans v. General Motors Corp.^^^, the Seventh Circuit denied this
question. In this case the plaintiffs decedent was killed when his Chevrolet station
wagon was involved in a side collision. The plaintiff alleged that the car's design was
defective in that it lacked side rails, which would protect occupants in a side impact
collision. The court held that an automobile manufacturer does not have the duty to
construct a crashworthy vehicle^^o. In its reasoning the court argued that a
53^ The courts consider the three mentioned terms to be interchangeable, see, e.g., Sumnicht v. Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. 360 N.W. 2d 2 (1984); see also. MILLER, supra note 412, § 7.05[4], at 131-
133.
538 Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Young, 321 A.2d 131,139-1AS (Md. 1974); Binakonsky v. Ford Motor
Co., 133 F.3d 281,284 (4"^ Cir. 1998); Miller, supra note 412, § 7.05 [4], at 133-134.
539 359 F.2d 822 (7*^ Cir. 1966) (applying Indiana law), cert, denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1066); Evans was
overruled later in Huff v. White Motor Co., 565 F.2d 104,1 10 (7* Cir. 1977).
540 Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822,824-825 (7* Cir. 1966).
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manufacturer's duty only extends to build an automobile which is safe for its intended
purposes, and that such purposes do not comprise collisions with other vehicles,
although they might be foreseeable for the manufacturer. 5'*'
However, in 1 968, the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit took the opposite
point of view in Larsen v. General Motors Corp^^^. In this case the plaintiff collided
head-on with another vehicle while driving his 1963 Chevrolet Corvair and contended
that the design and placement of the steering column was defective, leading to
aggravated injuries. The court first held that automobile manufacturers can anticipate
the risk and the occurrence of collisions of vehicles, because it is common knowledge
that they are driven on crowded roads, in high-speed situations, and in any weather
condition. Based on this finding, the court then concluded that a manufacturer has the
duty to design a vehicle so as to withstand at least some highway crashes and to
minimize foreseeable harm resulting out of such crashes. Thus, the court established the
manufacturer's duty to build crashworthy motor vehicles.
Today, the controversy on the issue in question is settled, and the overwhelming
majority ofjurisdictions approves the position taken in Larsen, holding a motor vehicle
manufacturer potentially liable for injuries aggravated because of the defective design of
the vehicle if it was not reasonably crashworthy. ^43 However, the manufacturer's duty to
541
Id. at 825.
542 391 F.2d 495 (8"" Cir. 1968) (applying Minnesota law).
543 See, e.g., Nanda v. Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213 (V"*" Cir. 1974): The manufacturer has been held
liable because of the defective design of a fuel tank catching fire in a rear-end collision; Horn v. General
Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359 (1976): Liability of manufacturer has been established for the faulty design
of a horn cap coming off the steering wheel and exposing sharp prongs aggravating the injuries the driver
would have suffered from the initial collision; Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162 (1978):
Decedent was ejected and killed when the door of his Opel opened in a collision with a metal divider
fence; the plaintiff contended that the vehicle was not crash-worthy because the door latch was
defectively designed; Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying New Jersey law):
Plaintiff (a policeman) contended that the door of the 1974 Dodge Monaco police car was defectively
designed because it was not strong enough to resist foreseeable side-impact collisions (here: a collision
with a steel pole); the court held that Chrysler had a duty to protect vehicle occupants against harm
resulting from such automobile accidents; Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1987),
cert, denied, 485 U.S. 901 (1988) : A motorcycle may be defective because it lacks crash bars protecting
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build crashworthy vehicles also has limits, because he cannot be required to construct
automobiles and motorcycles that are crash-proof or accident-proof^'*'* or that have the
crash-resistance of an M-2 army tank^^'s.
a) Issues arising in connection with the crashworthiness doctrine
(I.) Determination of defect and of what harm would have occurred
in its absence
The plaintiff, who alleges in a crashworthiness case that the motor vehicle
should have been designed more safely in order to avoid enhanced injuries, must
establish that a reasonable alternative design could have been adopted, which not only
would have reduced the plaintiffs harm but also increased the overall safety of the
vehicle.5'*^ Moreover, the plaintiff must show that the defect was an essential factor in
increasing his damage beyond the harm that would have occurred as result of the initial
collision.
5'*'' Thus, it has to be determined what portion of the harm occurred as a
consequence of the collision (in absence of the defect) and which portion was caused by
the vehicle defect. This is important and necessary to apportion liability between the one
responsible for the initial collision on the one hand and the vehicle manufacturer on the
other hand. If this apportionment can be proven and accomplished, the latter will
usually not be held liable for the entire damage but only for that portion of the harm
the driver's legs; for an exhaustive review and listing of the cases which follow Larsen, see, Barry
Levenstam & Daryl J. Lapp, Plaintiff's Burden Of Proving Enhanced Injury In Crashworthiness Cases:
A Clash Worthy ofAnalysis, 38 DePaul L. Rev. 55,61 note 33 (1988).
544 Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Volkswagen of Am., Inc., v.
Young, 321 A.2d 737 (Md. 1974).
545 Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8* Cir. 1976), applying Nebraska law, (Bright, J.,
dissenting).
546 See, e.g.. General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176,1 188 (Ala. 1985); Miller v. Todd, 551
N.E. 2d 1 139,1 143 (Ind. 1990); Hillrichs v. Avco Corp., 478 N.W. 2d 70,75 (Iowa 1991).
547 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, P.F.D., § 16, cmt b, at 291-292.
123
which had been caused by the vehicle defect (divisible injury).^''^ The manufacturer,
then, is jointly and severally liable with the other party who is responsible for causing
the other part of the damage. ^^^^ As to the provision of evidence for the apportionment of
injuries and responsibility, courts must rely on expert testimony (e.g. engineers or
medical doctors) in order to obtain a result on this difficult issue.^^o
(II.) Extent of manufacturer's liability if there is no proof for the
APPORTIONMENT OF HARM
A problem arises in cases in which the injuries are indivisible, when it carmot be
proven which part of the damage occurred because of the initial collision and which part
was caused by the vehicle defect.
(a) Common law approach
Between the courts there is a split of authority with regard to this issue. The
majority of courts^^i hold that in such a case the manufacturer is liable for the entire
harm suffered by the plaintiff from both the defect as well as the initial collision. Thus,
the burden of proving the divisibility of the injury shifts from the plaintiff to the
defendant, who will be liable for all the harm unless he can show an apportiormient of
548 Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495,503 (S"" Cir. 1968) (applying Minnesota law); Fox v.
Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774 (10* Cir. 1978); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY,
P.F.D.,§ 16(b).
549 Mitchell V. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 669 F.2d 1199 (8*^ Cir. 1982) (applying Michigan law); General
Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 11 76 (Ala. 1985); McDowell v. Kawasaki Motor Corp. U.S.A., 799
S.W. 2d 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
550 Hillrichs v. Avco Corp., 478 N.W. 2d 70 (Iowa 1991); Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W. 2d 224
(Iowa 1992).
551 For the majority approach commonly referred to as the "Fox-Mitchell-approach", see, e.g.. May v.
Portland Jeep, Inc., 509 P.2d 24,26-27 (Or. 1973); Lee v. Volkswagenwerk of Am., Inc., 688 P.2d
1283,1287-1288 (Okla. 1984); General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176,1189 (Ala. 1985);
McDowell V. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 799 S.W. 2d 854,867 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Czamecki v.
Volkswagen of Am., 837 P.2d 1143,1148 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Oakes v. General Motors Corp., 628
N.E. 2d 341,348 (111. App. Ct. 1993).
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the damages. 552 in this situation the manufacturer will again be jointly and severally
liable with the other party who caused the harm, however, the manufacturer will
generally be financially stronger than the other party (e.g. an individual) and can
therefore be considered as the "deepest pocket". Consequently, the plaintiff will be well
advised to try hard to fulfill every requirement necessary in order to succeed in his suit
against this defendant.
A minority of courts,553 however, argue that the plaintiff must prove the extent
of the increased harm, which means that he has to show that the initial collision-related
injuries can be distinguished fi"om the enhanced injuries, if this is impossible he will not
be able to recover.
(B) Restatement approach
The Restatement (Second) of Torts addresses the issue of apportionment of
damages in enhanced injury cases in its § 433 B (2). This section provides that among
two tortfeasors, the first is the one causing the initial collision, the second one is the
manufacturer who is responsible for the vehicle defect, the one bearing the burden of
proof for this apportionment is he who claims that the harm is apportionable. Thus, the
motor vehicle manufacturer who seeks to limit its liability to the harm caused by the
defect by claiming that plaintiffs damage is divisible would bear the burden of proof.
A provision similar to § 433 B (2) of the Second Restatement can be found in §
16 (c)554 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts. This section reflects the view of the
552 See, e.g., Czamecki v. Volkswagen of Am., 837 P.2d 1 143,1 148 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
553 For the minority approach to which is often referred to as the "Huddell-approach", see, e.g., Huddell
V. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976) (applying New Jersey law); Duran v. General Motors Corp., 688
P.2d 779 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Sumner v. General Motors Corp., 538 N.W. 2d 112 (Mich Ct. App.
1995).
554 § 16 (b) and (c) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts read:
(b) If proof supports a determination of the harm that would have resulted from other causes in the
absence of the product defect, the product seller's liability is limited to the increased harm attributable
solely to the product defect.
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common law majority in that it holds the product seller liable for all of the plaintiffs
harm if his harm is not apportionable. Although, in contrast to its predecessor, (§ 433 B
(2)) § 16 (c) does not explicitly shift the burden of proof for the apportionment of
damages to the defendant, its effect is practically the same, because the defendant's only
chance to escape liability for the entire harm is to prove the divisibility of the plaintiffs
injuries. 555 Thus, both Restatements support the position taken by the common law
majority.
(c) Comment
The approaches taken by the common law majority, on the one hand, and the
minority of courts on the other hand, constitute two extreme positions. The "Fox-
Mitchell approach" (majority view) goes entirely to the detriment of the manufacturer as
he is liable for all of plaintiffs damages, and the "Huddell-approach" (minority
position) takes the opposite point of view in not allowing the plaintiff to recover if he
cannot prove the apportionment of damages. The question that arises now is which of
the two approaches should be approved.
In order to provide an answer to this question the following background has to
be considered. In motor vehicle crashworthiness cases we typically have two
wrongdoers, first, the one causing the collision, and second, the motor vehicle
manufacturer responsible for the defect in the vehicle. Before reaching the issue of
apportionment of damages, the plaintiff usually has already proven that the defect was a
substantial factor in increasing his harm. Thus, it is clear that the manufacturer was a
cause in fact of the harm to the plaintiff. In this situation it would be unjust to allow the
(c) If proof does not support a determination under Subsection (b) of the harm that would have resulted
in the absence of the product defect, the product seller is liable for all of the plaintiffs harm attributable
to the defect and other causes.
555 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, P.F.D., § 16, Reporters' Note to cmt d, at
300.
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manufacturer who has been proved to be a tortfeasor to escape Hability just because
there was another tortfeasor involved in the harmful event and the circumstances are
such that an apportionment of damages is impossible. ^^^ Accordingly, the "Huddell-
approach" has to be rejected, and the solution provided by the common law majority
("Fox-Mitchell-approach") to be approved.
B) Comparison to German product liability law
Under German product liability law two solutions could be provided in order to
solve the problem of apportionment of damages in enhanced injury cases. § 830 sec. I,
cl. 2 BGB557 could be applied directly or by analogy. § 830 sec. I, cl. 2 BOB refers to §
830 sec. I, cl. 1 BGB and provides that each of several parties involved in the tortuous
act is liable for the entire damage, if it cannot be discovered which party caused the
damage. In addition, it is recognized that this section also applies to situations in which
the extent of harm caused by each wrongdoer is not provable^^s. In both cases, the
tortfeasors would, like in U.S. product liability law, be jointly and severally liable (§§
840 sec. I, 421 ff. BGB). However, § 830 BGB is designed for situations in which
several persons act deliberately together. This can be concluded from its wording, as §
830 sec, cl.l speaks of a tortuous act that must have been committed "jointly", § 830
sec. II only applies to "instigators" or "accomplices" in the wrongful act, and § 830 sec.
I, cl. 2 finally speaks of "participants" (Beteiligte), a term that in this context describes
persons acting deliberately together. ^ 59 in crashworthiness cases, however, the person
556 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, § 433 B (2), cmt d.
557 § 830 BGB [Accomplices and participants]
(1) If several persons through a jointly committed tortious act have caused damage, each of them is
responsible for the damage. The same applies if it cannot be discovered which of several participants has
caused the damage through his action.
(2) Instigators and accomplices are in the same position as joint actors.
558 BGH NJW 1990,2882; THOMAS, supra note 66, § 830 BGB, Rn. 9.
559 Thomas, supra note 66, § 830 BGB, Rn. 1
.
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causing the initial collision and the motor vehicle manufacturer responsible for the
vehicle defect do not act deliberately together but have to be considered as
independently acting wrongdoers. Thus, § 830 sec. I, cl. 2 BGB cannot be applied
directly to these kind of cases.
Nevertheless, this section could be applied if two prerequisites are fulfilled.
First, there must be a gap of statutory regulation with regard to this issue, and second a
similar state of interest must exist.^^o Because the issue in question is not explicitly
addressed by the German Civil Code, the first prerequisite is fulfilled. With regard to
the second requirement, it should be said that § 830 sec. I, cl. 2 BGB serves the purpose
of eliminating the difficulties that the plaintiff has to face in situations where it is either
unclear, which person was the cause in fact of the harm, or where it is clear that each
participant caused the harm, and only the extent of the damage attributable to the
different tortfeasors is not provable. ^^i Here, like in U.S. product liability law, it would
be unjust to let one of the tortfeasors escape from liability. The same is true in
automobile crashworthiness cases where the manufacturer caused at least part of the
harm because the vehicle was defective. Thus, a similar state of interest exists, and both
prerequisites of an analogous application of § 830 sec. I, cl. 2 BGB are met.
Accordingly, this section can be applied in analogy, which means that in enhanced
injury cases where the extent of plaintiffs injuries cannot be apportioned, the motor
vehicle manufacturer is liable for all of plaintiffs harm. Finally, we can see that
German product liability law is in accord with the common law majority view as well as
both Restatements' approaches under United States product liability law.
560 Karl Larenz, Methodenlehre des Rechts 391 (6* ed. 1990).
561 BGHZ 55,86; BGH ZIP 1994,374; THOMAS, supra note 66, § 830 BGB, Rn. 7.
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2. Preemption of state tort law by federal law and compliance
WITH federal safety STANDARDS
Closely related to the issue of crashworthiness are two other, very important
issues. The first is the issue of preemption of state tort law by federal law, and the
second focuses on the question of what effects result from compliance with federal
safety standards.
a) Preemption - background information
Preemption finds its roots in art. VI, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution
(Supremacy Clause)562 and is defined as a"[d]octrine adopted by the United States
Supreme Court holding that certain matters are of such national, as opposed to local,
character that federal laws preempt or take precedence over state laws."^^^ Thus, if there
is preemption, neither state common law nor statutory law can be applied to a case. In
the motor vehicle product liability context, the issue of preemption arises most
fi-equently in situations where the NHTSA promulgates Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards (FMVSS), which it is empowered to do under the traffic Safety Act. One of
those standards is FMVSS 208^64 which requires manufacturers to install occupant
restraint systems^^^ j^ their automobiles. The kind of restraint system that has to be
562 See U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2.
563 Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 390, at 1 177; see also, Painter's Local Union No. 567 v. Tom
Joyce Floors, Inc., 398 P.2d 245,246 (Nev. 1965) (stating that "Preemption rests upon the supremacy
clause of the federal constitution, and deprives a state of jurisdiction over matters embraced by a
congressional act regardless of whether the state law coincides with, is complementary to, or opposes the
federal congressional expression.").
564 49 c.F.R. §571.208.
565 There are active and passive occupant restraint systems. A safety system is characterized as "passive"
rather than "active" when it does not require any independent action taken by the vehicle occupants to
render it effective. Encompassed within the definition of passive occupant restraint systems are, for
example, windshield, roof, head restraints, energy absorbing steering columns, and airbags. In opposite to
that, active restraint systems comprise door locks and seat belts which have to be fastened manually, see,
Higgs v. General Motors Corp., 655 F.Supp. 22,24 (E.D. Tenn. 1985); Kurt B. Chadwell, Automobile
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installed depends on the year in which the vehicle was manufactured. For passenger cars
that have peen manufactured on or after September 1, 1989, but before September 1,
1996, for example, it allows manufacturers to choose from three options. The first
option is a complete passive restraint system, automatic seat belts with or without
airbags. The second option is a passive protection for frontal crashes, for example,
automatic shoulder belts or airbags, plus manual lap belts for lateral crashes and
rollovers with a seat belt warning system, or as a third option, a manual lap and shoulder
belts with a seat belt warning system.566 As a practical matter, it is likely that most of
the manufacturers will choose to install ^67 automatic seat belts rather than airbags since
the latter are more expensive. In such a situation plaintiffs often allege in products
liability actions that the manufacturer failed to install an airbag in the vehicle which
rendered it defective in design.^^s The manufacturer, on the other hand, will bring two
defenses in order to avoid liability. First, he will argue the inapplicability of state tort
law, because the field of occupant restraint systems has already been addressed by
federal law (FMVSS 208.) Therefore, the manufacturer will argue that state law is
preempted under the Supremacy Clause. Second, he will contend that he complied with
FMVSS 208 since he chose to install one of the safety features (automatic seat belts)
required under this standard. He will further argue that, as a result of such compliance,
he should be immunized from tort liability under state law.569
Passive Restraint Claims Post-Cipollone: An end to the Federal Preemption Defense, 46 Baylor L. Rev.
141, note 24 (1994).
566 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, s 4.1.4; see also, Irving v. Mazda Motor Corp., 136 F.3d 764 (1 1*^ Cir. 1998).
567 Chadwell, supra note 565, at 150.
568 See, e.g., Pokomy v. Ford Motor Co., 714 F.Supp. 739 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Johnson v. General Motors
Corp., 889 F.Supp. 451 (W.D. Okla. 1995).
569 See. e.g., Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 481 S.E.2d 518,520 (Ga. 1997).
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B) Difference between the "preemption" and "compliance"
ARGUMENT
Although the manufacturer's arguments related to preemption and compliance
seem to be similar, a sharp distinction must be drawn between the two.
(I.) Preemption
The key factor to determine whether state tort law is preempted by federal law is
the intent of Congress.^^^ In other words, the decisive factor is whether Congress, by
enacting a statute, intended to preempt state law or not. In order to make this
determination, courts must consider the language, history, structure, and purpose of the
statute.5^' Thus, courts deciding on this issue have to make these findings by
exclusively taking into consideration federal law.^''^ If the court comes to the conclusion
that Congress intended state law to be superseded, it is not applicable, and the defendant
would escape liability. If the court reaches the opposite result, state courts will be able
to decide on the further issues of the case.
(II.) Compliance
The question of which consequences result from compliance with federal safety
standards arises only if the court comes to the conclusion that state law is not
preempted. The answer to this question depends on what the law of the specific state
provides with regard to this issue. 5"^^ As we will see in the further discussion, the
majority of jurisdictions today holds that compliance with federal safety regulations is
570 Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497,504 (1978); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504,515 (1992); Medtronic, Inc., v. Lohr, 1 16 S.Ct. 2240,2250 (1996).
571 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,517 (1992); Medtronic, Inc. v. lohr, 116 S.Ct.
2240,2250-2251 (1996).
572 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, P.F.D., § 4, cmt e, atl41.
573 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, P.F.D., § 4, cmt e, at 141
.
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relevant and admissible, but not controlling, evidence of defendant's exercise of due
care and product defectiveness.
^'''*
Consequently, it can be concluded that the question of preemption is determined
by the courts as a matter of federal law, whereas the issue of compliance is to be
decided as a matter of state law. Moreover, the two doctrines can be distinguished with
regard to their consequences. While preemption of state law immunizes the defendant
from state tort liability, this is not necessarily the case where he complied with federal
safety regulations.
c) Recent development and changes in the preemption doctrine
(I.) Three categories of preemption: Express-, conflict-, and
OCCUPATION OF THE FIELD PREEMPTION
Before analyzing the court decisions regarding the preemption doctrine in the
context of motor vehicles, it is important to keep in mind that the United States
Supreme Court distinguishes between three different categories of preemption. First,
preemption of state law can take place where Congress explicitly states this intent in the
statute's language. Second, if there is no explicit statutory language, state law is
preempted when it regulates a field that Congress intended to be occupied exclusively
by federal law, and third, preemption takes place where state law conflicts with federal
law.575 Since the two latter forms of preemption are not explicitly stated in a statute's
language, they are both forms of implied preemption.576
^'''^ See infra, at \52.
"5 English V. General Elec. Co., 476 U.S. 72,78-79 (1990); Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc., 933 F.2d
1548,1552 (11* Cir. 1991), affd, 507 U.S. 658 (1993); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504,517(1992).
"6 Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88,98 (1992); Public Health Trust v.
Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d 291,294 (1 1'' Cir. 1993).
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Express preemption occurs when Congress declares its intent to preclude state
law in a particular area through the use of explicit language. ^'^^ In this context, in has to
be stressed that the Traffic safety Act contains in its § 30103 (b)-''''^, a preemption clause
which has been interpreted differently by the courts. Occupation-of-the-field preemption
occurs when Congress intends to entirely preclude state law in a particular field by
enactment of specific legislation. ^^^ Conflict preemption, finally, exists when state law
conflicts, or is otherwise inconsistent, with applicable federal law^^o so that it is
impossible for a party to comply with both state and federal law.^^i
(II.) The preemption doctrine in the context of motor vehicles pre-
ClPOLLONE^^^, FREIGHTLINER^^-^, AND MEDTRONICt'^^
From the mid 1980s until the early 1990s several lawsuits were filed in both
state and federal courts claiming that the manufacturer's failure to install safety features
such as airbags rendered the vehicle defective. In most of these lawsuits the defendants
brought the preemption defense. At the federal district level, of the sixteen courts
addressing the issue of preemption of "no-airbag" claims^^s only a few586 found these
"7 Pokomy v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1 1 16,1 120 (3d Cir. 1990).
"8 Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745,943 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 30103 (b)
(1995)). This section corresponds to § 1392 (d) (1988) and is frequently referred to as the preemption
clause. § 30103 (b) reads: "When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or
political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard practicable to the same
aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to
the standard prescribed under this chapter."
^^^ Chadwell, supra note 565, at 152; see also Pacific Gas &. Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,203-204 (1983).
580 See, e.g.. Sears, Roebuck &. Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,231 (1964).
58' McCauley, supra note 396, at 840.
582 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
583 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
584 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 1 16 S.Ct. 2240 (1996).
585 See, e.g.. Cox v. Baltimore County, 646 F.Supp. 761 (D. Md. 1986); Vanover v. Ford Motor Co., 632
F.Supp. 1095 (E.D. Mo. 1986); Staggs v. Chryler Corp., 678 F.Supp. 270 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Hughes v.
Ford Motor Co., 677 F. Supp. 76 (D. Conn. 1987); Murphy v. Nissan Motor Corp., 650 F.Supp. 922
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claims not to be preempted by federal law. At the federal appellate level, a number of
Circuit Courts have considered the issue and held that "no-airbag" claims were
preempted the Traffic Safety Act and federal safety standards. ^^^ In contrast, most of the
state courts that have addressed the issue, take the opposite position. ^^^ The differences
between courts arguing in favor and against preemption reflect a number of different
concerns and interpretations of the Traffic Safety Act.
(a) Different interpretations of the Traffic Safety Act's
PREEMPTION CLAUSE (§ 30103 (b)): PREEMPTION OF STATE COMMON LAW
LIABILITY ?
§ 30103 (b) of the traffic Safety Act states that "When a [federal] motor vehicle
safety standard is in effect..., a State or political subdivision of a State may prescribe or
continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor
vehicle... only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter."
A controversy among the courts focuses on the question of whether the preemptive
effect of this section also applies to common law actions. If yes, this action would have
to be dismissed, and judgment would have to be issued in favor of the defendant
manufacturer. § 30103 (b) mentions that action taken by the "state" or "political
subdivision of a state" can be preempted. This does not include courts or juries, because
they make part of the independent judicial branch and cannot be considered as
(E.D.N.Y. 1987); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1987) (Wood I),
remanded, 865 F.2d 395 (1" Cir. 1988) (Wood II); Richart v. Ford Motor Co., 681 F.Supp. 1462 (D.N.M.
1988); Pokomy v. For Motor Co., 714 F.Supp. 739 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Tammen v. General Motors Corp.,
857 F.Supp. 788 (D. Kan. 1994) Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 889 F.Supp. 451 (W.D. Okla. 1995).
586 Wood V. General Motors Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1987) (Wood I); Murphy v. Nissan
Motor Corp., 650 F.Supp. 922 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Richart v. Ford Motor Co., 681 F.Supp. 1462 (D.N.M.
1988).
587 Wood V. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (P' Cir. 1988) (Wood II); Kitts v. General Motors
Corp., 875 F.2d 787 (10"^ Cir. 1989); Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816 (ll*^ Cir. 1989);
Pokomy v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1 1 16 (3d Cir. 1990).
588 See. cases cited by Chadwell, supra note 565, note 99.
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dependent political organs. ^^^ Nevertheless, some courts have held that because of the
language of this section, it can be applied to common law actions as well as to state
regulatory bodies.^^^ These courts argue that § 30103 (b) does not explicitly state that a
safety standard can only be effected by a regulatory body. They further hold that a
common law decision, according to which an automobile is defective because it is not
equipped with a specific safety feature, (e.g. airbag) is a safety standard set by the state
when it enforces the decision.^^i Accordingly, not only a state or a political subdivision
of a state, but also a court or a jury is precluded by § 30103 (b) from imposing liability
based on a common law standard that is not identical to the federal standard. Given that
FMVSS 208 allows manufacturers to choose from three different occupant restraint
options (automatic seat-belts, airbag, etc.), a jury finding that an airbag should have
been installed is a common law standard which is not identical to the federal standard.
Thus, these courts came to the conclusion that state common law is expressly preempted
by the traffic safety Act's preemption clause. ^92
However, other courts have interpreted § 30103 (b) differently. ^93 They have
concluded that this section does not preempt state tort law claims in light of the Traffic
Safety Act's savings clause, § 30103 (e)^^^. 595 According to this rationale they fiirther
^^9 See also, McCauley, supra note 396, at note 90: "There do not appear to be any court decisions
holding that a jury is a political subdivision."
590 See. e.g., Cox v. Bahimore County, 646 F.Supp. 761,763 (D. Md. 1986); Vanover v. Ford Motor Co.,
632 F. Supp. 1095,1097 (E.D. Mo. 1986).
59
J Cox V. Bahimore County, 646 F.Supp. 761,763 (D. Md. 1986); Vanover v. Ford Motor Co., 632 F.
Supp. 1095,1096-1097 (E.D. Mo. 1986).
592 jj_ ; however, among the courts fmding preemption, the majority found implied preemption instead of
express preemption, see infra.
593 Garrett v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.Supp. 407 (D. Md. 1987); Baird v. General Motors Corp., 654
F.Supp. 28 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
594 § 30103 (e) corresponds to § 1397 (k) (1988) and is referred to as the savings clause. It states that
"Compliance with any Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard issued under this title does not exempt any
person from liability under common law."
595 Garrett v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.Supp. 407,41 1 (D. Md. 1987); Baird v. General Motors Corp., 654
F.Supp. 28,30 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
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held that the preemption clause only precludes states from implementing motor vehicle
safety regulations which differ from their federal counterparts but do not address state
common law.596 Hence, in preserving common law claims in § 30103 (e), Congress
distinguished between the imposition of sanctions by the state, or a political
subdivision, for non-compliance with a regulatory provision and awards of tort damages
compensating for injuries. ^^^
(b) Different assessment of occupation-of-the-field preemption
Another source of conflict between the courts concerns the question of whether
Congress intended to occupy the entire field of motor vehicle safety through the
enactment of the Traffic Safety Act in 1966. The District Court in Staggs v. Chrysler
Corp. 598cited International Paper Co. v. Ouellette^^^ for the holding that general savings
clauses such as § 30103 (e) will not preserve common law actions that interfere with or
frustrate the purposes of the legislative act as a whole "[wjhere Congress... has drawn a
comprehensive statute for dealing with a particular subject."^oo j^ application of this
rationale to the airbag cases, the court in Staggs found that where Congress enacted a
carefully drafted complex regulatory scheme for motor vehicle safety, the
implementation of non-identical state standards is precluded. This opinion has been
shared by the District Court in Doty v. Ford Motor Co.^^K In this decision, the court
held that "Congress has legislated so comprehensively in the area of motor vehicle
safety through the Safety Act that it has left no room for the States to supplement
596 Baird v. General Motors Corp., 654 F.Supp. 28,30-31 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
597m
598 678 F.Supp. 270,274 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
599 479 U.S. 481,493-494 (1987): The court held that where Congress enacted a carefully written and
comprehensive statute, the inclusion of a savings clause should not preclude a court from finding that
Congress impliedly preempted a particular field of law.
600 Staggs V. Chrysler Corp., 678 F.Supp. 270,274 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
601 Civ. A. No. 85-3591, 1987 WL 31 143 (D.D.C. Feb.4, 1987) = Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) P 1 1,273.
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federal law."602 in contrast, the court in Garret v. Ford Motor Co. ^^^held that two
aspects undermine the occupation-of-the-field argument favored in Staggs and Doty.
First, the court did not consider the Traffic safety Act to be a comprehensive legislative
scheme.^^ Second, the court concluded that, according to the language of the traffic
Safety Act, it is most reasonable to interpret this statute as not preempting common law
claims. 605
(c) Conflict preemption
Still another point of disagreement between courts is whether state common law
decisions would conflict with federal law to an extent that would preempt the former.
As mentioned earlier, conflict preemption occurs when a state law directly conflicts
with federal law, making it impossible for a party to comply with both state and federal
law. Courts arguing in favor of preemption contend that Congress intended FMVSS 208
to be a minimum as well as a maximum standard for automobile safety. The rationale
for this argument is that a common law judgment holding a manufacturer liable because
the automobile was defectively designed due to the absence of an airbag would force
manufacturers to install this kind of safety feature into their vehicles.^^^ Since state
common law would de facto eliminate the choices given to manufacturers by FMVSS
208 to integrate different kinds of passive safety restraints, it is argued that such a result
stands in conflict with federal law.^^^
602 Doty V. Ford Motor Co., 1987 WL 31143, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb.4, 1987).
603 684 F.Supp. 407 (D. Md. 1987).
604 /J. at 409.
605 Id at 412; see also, Perry v. Mercedes-Benz, 957 F.2d 1257,1264 (5* Cir. 1992) (holding that there is
no occupation-of-the-field preemption under the traffic safety Act).
606 Staggs V. Chrysler Corp., 678 F.Supp. 270 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Schick v. Chrysler Corp., 675 F.Supp.
1183(D. S.D. 1987).
607 Baird v. General Motors Corp., 654 F.Supp. 28,32 (N.D. Ohio 1986); Wood v. General Motors Corp.,
865 F.2d 395,412 (P Cir. 1988) (Wood II).
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However, not all courts have agreed with this argument. The court in Richart v.
Ford Motor Co.^^^, for example, rejects the proposition that a state tort damage award
compels automobile manufacturers to install passive restraints, thereby foreclosing the
choice authorized under FMVSS 208. The court held that damage awards do not
necessarily impose a legal duty on manufacturers to change their product design. It
argued that such an award is one part of the risk of doing business and putting products
on the market. Rather than eliminating an option given by federal law, a damage award
holds motor vehicle manufacturers liable for harm resulting from their negligence in
choosing among federally authorized options.^^^
(D) Controversy about the importance of uniformity
A final point of divergence between the courts is whether the state's role in
setting safety standards is subordinated in the interest of national uniformity created by
the Traffic Safety Act. Some courts have held that one significant purpose of the Traffic
Safety Act was to create uniformity with regard to motor vehicle safety standards.^'^
According to this premise, they concluded that Congress must have intended to preempt
state common law, because the adoption of common law safety standards by single
states would frustrate Congress' goal of establishing uniform safety standards
throughout the whole country.^'' On the other hand, the argument that uniformity is the
controlling purpose of the Traffic Safety Act has been rejected by several other
608 681 F.Supp. 1462 (D. N.M. 1988).
609 Richart V. Ford Motor Co., 681 F.Supp. 1462,1467 (D. N.M. 1988); see also. Wood v. General
Motors Corp., 673 F.Supp. 1 108,1 1 13 (D. Mass. 1987) (Wood I).
610 Cox V. Baltimore County, 646 F.Supp. 761,763-764 (D. Md. 1986); Vanover v. Ford Motor Co., 632
F.Supp. 1095,1096-1097 (E.D. Mo. 1986); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395,412 (T' Cir.
1988) (Wood II).
611 See, e.g., Cox v. Baltimore County, 646 F.Supp. 761,764 (D. Md. 1986).
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courts. ^'2 According to these authorities uniformity was only one of Congress'
objectives. The main purpose pursued by Congress in passing the traffic Safety Act was
to reduce traffic accidents, deaths, and injuries.^'^ Given this premise, states must be
able to set identical or even higher safety standards than those set by the federal
government. Consequently, rather than conflicting with Congress' intent, state tort
damage awards, through which liability for defective design is imposed on automobile
manufacturers, are consistent with the Traffic Safety Act's purpose.^''*
(E) Comment
We have seen that from the mid-1980s until the early 1990s courts were in
disagreement on whether state common law liability was preempted by the Traffic
Safety Act or federal safety standards. An important point that should be emphasized for
the following discussion is that among the courts favoring preemption a majority found
implied preemption, occupation-of-the-field preemption or conflict preemption, while
only a few courts argued in favor of express preemption. It is against this backdrop I
now discuss recent Supreme Court decisions and their impact on the preemption
doctrine.
(III.) The change of the preemption doctrine brought by Cipollone,
Freightliner and Medtronic
A dramatic change in federal preemption analysis came with the Supreme
Court's decisions in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.^^^, Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,^^^
and Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.^^'^
^•2 See, e.g.. Garret v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.Supp. 407,409 (D. Md. 1987); Richart v. Ford Motor Co.,
681 F.Supp. 1462 (D. N.M. 1988); Perry v. Mercedes Benz, 957 F.2d 1257,1266 (5*^ Cir. 1992).
6'3 See, e.g., Richart v. Ford Motor Co., 681 F.Supp. 1462,1469 (D. N.M. 1988).
614
Id. at 1463.
615 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
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(a) The Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone: If there is express
preemption, there is no need for an implied preemption analysis
Although Cipollone did not address the preemption issue in the context of motor
vehicles, but rather dealt with a claim against cigarette manufacturers, it is still
important for our analysis, because in this case the Supreme Court shed a different light
on the preemption issue. In Cipollone, the son of a woman who developed cancer after
she had been smoking regularly for more than 40 years brought an action against the
cigarette manufacturers. Among other things, he alleged that the cigarettes were
defective in design because of the manufacturer's failure to use safer alternatives, and
that they negligently failed to appropriately test and advertise their products (warnings
defect).^' ^ The manufacturers, on the other hand, raised the preemption defense,
contending that the Federal Cigarette Labeling Act of 1965^'^ and the Public Health
Smoking Act of 1969^^0 protected them from liability under state common law. The
court had to consider whether these claims could survive the language of the Act's
preemption clauses, according to which states were barred from imposing other warning
requirements relating to the advertisement or promotion of cigarettes.^^i x^g issue in
Cipollone was whether the Act's preemption provisions precluded state common law
claims - the same issue has been raised in the airbag cases. In the first part of its analysis
616 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
^•^ Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 1 16 S.Ct. 2240 (1996).
618 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505. U.S. 504,508 (1992).
619 Pub. L. 89-92,79 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1994).
620 Pub. L. 91-222,84 Stat. 87 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. §§1331-1341 (1994).
621
§ 4 of the Federal Cigarette Labeling Act of 1965 made it unlawful to sell or distribute cigarettes in
the United States unless the package bore a label stating: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be
Hazardous to Your Health." § 5 of the Act contains the preemption provision:
"(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by section 4 of this
Act, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the advertising of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act."
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the court reviewed some of the basic principles governing the preemption doctrine.
These are the inviolability of the Supremacy Clause and the presumption that historic
police powers of the states, such as tort law,622 ^q ^ot superseded by federal law unless
it is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.^^a Most importantly, the court then
held that "When Congress has considered the issue of preemption and has included in
the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that
provision provides a 'reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state
authority,... there is no need to infer congressional intent to preempt state laws from the
substantive provisions of the legislation."624 since the 1965 Act and the 1969 Act
contained express preemption provisions, the Supreme Court determined that its only
task was to "[IJdentify the domain expressly preempted by each of those sections"625^
whereas there was no need to perform an implied preemption analysis. In applying the
above mentioned rule and the presumption against preemption, the court then
determined that a narrow reading of both Acts' preemption clauses was necessary.626
Finally, the court held that none of plaintiffs claims were preempted by the Act of
1965, but, because of the broader language used in the Act of 1969, some of his claims
were.^27
From the preceding, it can be concluded that Cipollone dramatically changed
previous preemption analysis by holding that where Congress has explicitly addressed
the preemption issue in a statute, the preemptive scope of this statute is limited to its
^22 See, e.g., Tebbetts v. Ford Motor Co., 665 A.2d 345,346 (N.H. 1995); Irving v. Mazda Motor Co.,
136 F.3d 764,767 (ll*^ Cir. 1998) (stating that "[tjhe provision of tort remedies. ..is one that has
traditionally been regarded as properly within the scope of the states' rights.").
623 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,516 (1992).




Id. at 5 1 8-5 1 9 and 530-53 1
.
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express terms precluding a finding of implied preemption. Thus, it seems that Cipollone
constitutes a case for the plaintiff rather than for the defendant.
However, the language used in Cipollone qualifies this finding. In analyzing the
language of the 1969 Cigarette Act, the Court stated that the words "[no] requirement or
prohibition" suggest that there is no difference between positive enactments and
common law.^^s j^ contrast, the Court found that this phrase "[ejasily encompass[es]
obligations that take the form of common law rules."629 -p^js finding was further
enhanced by the statement that "[state] regulation...can be exerted through an award of
damages... which is designed to be a potent method of governing conduct and
controlling policy.''^^^ Accordingly, the Court held that state common law liability can
be considered as a type of "regulation". This is the key factor to determine the scope of
application of a preemption clause, since courts arguing in favor and courts arguing
against preemption agree that a preemption clause generally encompasses "state
regulations" or "state regulatory bodies. "^^i Thus, since state regulations comprise
common law liability, a preemption clause similar to the one of the 1969 Cigarette Act
will generally expressly preempt state common law. Consequently, Cipollone





631 See infra, notes 590,596 (Some courts interpret the Traffic Safety Act's preemption clause to apply to
"state regulatory bodies" and common law. Other courts restrict its scope to "state regulations".).
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(B) The interpretation of Cipollone in Freightliner: Cjpollone o^l\
DEVELOPED AN INFERENCE BUT NOT A RULE
In Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick ^^Hhe Supreme Court altered its position
regarding the issue of preemption previously taken in Cipollone. In Freightliner, one of
the plaintiffs, Ben Myrick, was the driver of an oncoming vehicle that was hit by a
tractor-trailor, which ended up jackknifmg into oncoming traffic when suddenly
braking. The plaintiff alleged that the tractor trailor, manufactured by Freightliner, was
defective in design because it was not equipped with anti-lock brakes. Like in the airbag
cases, the relevant safety standard, FMVSS 121, gave manufacturers the choice of
whether to install anti-lock brakes or not. Because of this, the manufacturers argued that
state common law actions dealing with their failure to install this kind of safety feature
were impliedly preempted due to a conflict between the FMVSS and the plaintiffs
claim which made it impossible to comply with both federal and state law. The
peculiarity in this case, however, resided in the fact that the applicable federal safety
standard (FMVSS 121) was not in effect at the time at which the harmfiil event
occurred. Prior to that time the Ninth Circuit Court had reviewed FMVSS 121 and
found that the standard was neither practicable nor reasonable, because the NHTSA had
failed to take into consideration the high failure rate of anti-lock brake devices and
created a more hazardous highway situation than existed before the standard became
operative.633 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit Court suspended FMVSS 121.
The court in Freightliner first analyzed whether there was express preemption
and found that because of the suspension of FMVSS 121 there could be no express
preemption.^3'* Since there was no federal safety standard in effect at the time, the court
632 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
633 Id at 285.
634 jd at 289.
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rejected the manufacturer's argument that the plaintiffs claims were precluded by
implied conflict preemption. The court held that it was not impossible for them ''[t]o
comply with both federal and state law because there simply was no federal standard to
comply with. "635 Most importantly, however, the court reconsidered Cipollone and held
that Cipollone only established an inference, but not a rule, that where a particular field
of law is expressly preempted in a statute by Congress, matters outside this field are not
preempted. 636 Thus, the court in Freightliner read Cipollone in a way that the existence
of an express preemption clause merely creates a presumption that Congress did not
intend to preempt matters not explicitly contained in the provision. However, an implied
preemption analysis is thereby not excluded but can still be used in order to extend the
preemptive scope of a statute.637
(c) The Supreme Court's opinion in Medtronic
A third decision in which the Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of
preemption is Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.^^^ The plaintiffs cardiac pacemaker,
manufactured by Medtronic, failed in 1990, leading to a complete heart block and
requiring her to undergo several surgeries. The plaintiff alleged that the pacemaker was
defective in manufacture and design, and that the defendant had failed to warn her or her
physicians of the product's tendency to fail despite knowledge of previous product
failures. Medtronic argued that the plaintiffs claims were preempted by § 360 k (a)639
635
Id. at 288.
636 Id. at 288 ("At best, Cipollone supports an inference that an express preemption clause forecloses
implied preemption; it does not establish a rule.").
637m
638 116 S.Ct. 2240 (1996).
639 21 U.S.C. § 360 k (a) (1996); this section reads:
"Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political subdivision of a State may
establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device,
and
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of the Medical Device law. As in Cipollone, the court in Medtronic reviewed the basic
principles governing the preemption doctrine and stated that there is a presumption
against preemption of state police power and that Congress' intent is the "ultimate
touchstone" in preemption cases.^^ In addition, the court confirmed Cipollone in
holding that there is no need to "[g]o beyond § 360 k (a)'s preemptive language to
determine whether Congress intended... to preempt... state law..."^' and that the court's
only task is to determine the domain that is expressly preempted by this section.^^ j^ j^s
analysis the court concluded that according to the language used in § 360 k and its
legislative history, state common law may set higher safety standards than prescribed by
federal law^^ and that none of the plaintiffs claims were preempted^^. ^^
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a
requirement applicable to the device under this chapter."
^0 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 1 16 S.Ct. 2240,2250 (1996).
641 Mat 2243.
642m
643 Mat 2244 and 2255.
644
Id. at 2259.
645 In its analysis of the preemption issue the Court in Medtronic had to deal with a complex fact pattern.
This is one reason why this decision cannot be considered as a comprehensive framework for a
preemption analysis. The Medical Device Amendments (MDA) from 1976 classified medical devices in
three categories. Pacemakers are Class III devices which either present a potential unreasonable risk of
illness or injury or which are of substantial importance to prevent impairment of human health. Before a
new Class III device may be introduced on the market the manufacturer must provide the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) with "reasonable assurance" that the device is safe and effective. In order to
establish this assurance the device is subject to a rigorous premarket approval (PMA) process under
which the manufacturer has to submit detailed information regarding safety and efficacy of their devices,
which the FDA then reviews, spending an average of 1,200 hours on a single submission. However, a
"grandfather" clause of the medical device law foresees an important exception to this PMA process.
This provision (also known as "§ 510 (k) process") permits most Class III devices to be sold without
going through the premarket approval process. New devices may be marketed simply by notifying the
FDA of the intent to market at least 90 days prior to marketing, and by demonstrating the new product's
"substantial equivalence" to a "predicate device" (a device that was already on the market when the
medical device laws were passed in 1976 or that has itself received a "substantial equivalence"
determination). As most Class III devices today, also the plaintiffs pacemaker reached the market
through this quicker procedure (it is completed by the FDA in an average of 20 hours). Medtronic
claimed that Lohr's negligent design claim was preempted by the § 510 (k) process because defendants
fiilfiUed the federal "substantial equivalence requirement" Plaintiff Lohr contended that the § 510 (k)
premarket notification process imposes no "requirement" on the design of defendant's pacemaker. The
Supreme Court held that the § 510 (k) process did not "require" Medtronic's pacemaker to take a
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Thus, it can be concluded that the court in Medtronic returned to adopt the
limited scope of application of the implied preemption doctrine established under
Cipollone.
(IV.) The Aftermath: Application of Cipollone, Freightl/ner, and
Medtronic 10 the motor vehicle product liability context by U.S.
Courts of Appeals and State Supreme Courts
Although one might think that after Cipollone, elucidated by Freightliner, and
Medtronic, the preemption discussion must be more clear, uniform, and consistent than
before, a review of recent U.S. Courts of Appeals cases and State Supreme Court
decisions reveals a different picture.
At least four Circuit Courts have dealt with this issue in the context of motor
vehicle product liability after 1995. They have held unanimously that the automobile
manufacturer's liability based on state common law is either expressly or impliedly
preempted by the Traffic Safety Act and the relevant Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards.^^ In addition, at least eight State Supreme Courts have addressed the same
particular design but it simply allowed the product to be marketed without the rigorous PMA process.
Accordingly, the court found that the "substantial equivalence" provision did not preempt plaintiffs
design claim.
^6 Montag V. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414,1417 (10* Cir. 1996): Plaintiff's wife, Diane Montag, was
killed when her 1988 Honda Prelude collided with a freight train. Although she was wearing a seat belt,
she was ejected from her car and received serious brain injuries from which she dies 2 1 months later. The
Plaintiff alleges that the car's seat beh was defectively designed and that Honda failed to install an airbag
as an alternative restraint system. The defendant argued that federal motor vehicle safety regulations
barred plaintiffs claim. The court held that plaintiffs claim was impliedly preempted.; Harris v. Ford
Mortor Co., 110 F.3d 1410,1416 (9'*' Cir. 1997): While driving a rented 1992 Mercury Topaz, plaintiff,
sixteen year old Jennifer Harris, lost control of the vehicle, smashed into a tree and sustained serious
injuries. She alleged, among other things, that the car was defectively designed and that Ford was
negligent in failing to install a driver side airbag. Ford raised the preemption defense. The court held that
plaintiffs action was expressly preempted by the Traffic Safety Act; Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck, N.V.
1 12 F.3d 291 (7* Cir. 1997): While driving as a passenger in a 1986 Volvo truck, plaintiff, Gracia, was
catapulted through the windshield opening on the pavement when the truck rear-ended another vehicle.
She sustained a spinal injury. Plaintiff alleged that the truck was defective under Illinois common law for
the windshield retention system was unreasonably dangerous and inadequate to prevent the windshield
from ejecting during impacts. Volvo argued that Gracia's claim is preempted by the traffic safety Act.
The court held that § 30103 (b) expressly preempted plaintiffs claim; Irving v. Mazda Motor Corp., 136
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issue in this period of time. However, in contrast to the four federal courts, there is a
split of authority among the state courts as to whether the Traffic Safety Act and the
FMVSS preempt state common law actions. According to the Supreme Courts of New
Hampshire, Indiana, Arizona, New York, and Ohio, these actions are neither expressly
nor impliedly preempted.^'*'' In contrast, the Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania,
Mississippi, and Idaho have concluded that such state tort claims are preempted.^'*^ The
differences between the courts finding preemption and those finding no preemption
reflect basically the same considerations that have already been discussed by courts
prior to Cipollone, Freightliner, and Medtronic.^^ Therefore, these arguments do not
F.3d 764,769 (iC Cir.l 1998): Plaintiffs daughter, Bonita Irving, was killed in a single-car accident
while driving a 1990 Mazda MX-6. Plaintiff, Juliette Irving, alleged that the car's seat belts were
defectively designed and that Mazda failed to warn adequately of the risks of not utilizing the manual lap
belt. Mazda replied that the claim was both expressly and impliedly preempted. The court found that
FMVSS 208 impliedly preempted plaintiffs action.
^^ Tebbetts v. Ford Motor Co., 665 A.2d 345,346-347 (N.H. 1995): Plaintiffs daughter, Rebecca
Tebbetts, was fatally injured while driving a 1988 Ford Escort. Plaintiff, Jo-Ann Tebbetts alleged that the
car was defectively designed for that it did not contain a driver-side airbag. Ford argued that plaintiffs
claim was preempted by the Traffic Safety Act and FMVSS 208; Wilson v. Pleasant, 660 N.E. 2d
327,330,339 (Ind. 1995): The estate of automobile driver who died in automobile accident brought
negligence action against the vehicle manufacturer based on the manufacturer's failure to install an
airbag; Munroe v. General Motors Corp., 938 P.2d 1114,1120 (Ariz. 1997): While driving a 1990
Chevrolet Corsica, plaintiff, Kenneth Munroe, collided with another vehicle and was rendered
quadriplegic. Plaintiff contended that General Motors was failed to equip the car with a supplemental
driver side airbag. General Motors raised the preemption defense; Drattel v. Toyota Motor Corp., 662
N.Y.S.2d 535,537-538 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997): A motorist who was injured in an automobile accident
sued the manufacturer, alleging that the vehicle was defectively designed in that it was not equipped with
a driver side airbag; Minton v. Honda of Am., Inc., 684 N.E.2d 648,662 (Ohio 1997): Executor of estate
of motorist who was killed in a head-on collision brought a products liability action against the
manufacturer (Honda). The plaintiff alleged that the vehicle was defectively designed because it did not
contain an airbag.
^^ Zimmermann v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc. 920 P.2d 67,72 (Idaho 1996) (Failure to include lap belt
claim); Cooper v. General Motors Corp., 702 So. 2d 428,433-444 (Miss. 1997) (Failure to install airbag
claim); Celucci v. General Motors Corp., 706 A.2d 806,811-812 (Pa. 1998) (Failure to install airbag
claim).
^9 See supra, at pp. 132; see. e.g., Harris v. Ford Mortor Co., 1 10 F.3d 1410,1412 and note 3 (9*^ Cir.
1997) (focusing on the uniformity argument); id. at 1413 (stating that the language of § 30103 (b)
preempts state common law claims); Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck, N.V. 112 F.3d 291,298 (7* Cir.
1997) (holding that uniformity was Congress' an essential goal that would be frustrated if state common
law claims were not preempted; id. at 297 (arguing that § 30103 (b) has to be interpreted as to encompass
state common law liability).
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need to be repeated. Instead, we now focus on how the courts applied the leading U.S.
Supreme Court cases.
(a) Controversy about the similarities of the preemption clauses in
CiPOLLONE AND MEDTRONIC TO § 30103 (B) OF THE TRAFFIC SAFETY ACT
One important argument of courts finding preemption is that the preemption
clause of the Traffic Safety Act (§ 30103 (b)) uses language similar to the one used in
the preemption clause of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1 969, which was
at issue in Cipollone. Since under the 1969 Act some of plaintiffs claims were
preempted, it is argued that the Traffic Safety Act must have the same effect.^^o y^e
1969 Act provided in its preemption clause that "[N]o requirement or prohibition. . .shall
be imposed under state law...".65i j^ Cipollone, the Supreme Court held that the
preemptive scope of the this clause not only encompasses enactments by legislatures or
agencies but also state common law, because the "[ejssence of the common law [is] to
enforce duties that £ire either affirmative requirements or negative prohibitions."652
The court in Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck, N. V. ^^^and Harris v. Ford Motor
Co. ^54 argued that the term "safety standard" used in § 30103 (b) of the traffic safety
Act's preemption clause carmot be distinguished from the terms "requirement or
prohibition" in the 1969 Cigarette Act. Therefore, the courts concluded that § 30103 (b)
also preempts state common law.^^s Jq reinforce this argument, the court in Harris
pointed to the dissenting opinion in Medtronic where it was held that "[cjommon law
650 Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck, N.V. 1 12 F.3d 291,297 (7* Cir. 1997); Harris v. Ford Mortor Co., 1 10
F.3d 1410,1414 (9*^ Cir. 1997).
651 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,504 (1992).
652
Id. at 522.
653 112F.3d291 (7"^ Cir. 1997).
654 llOF.Sd 1410 (9"^ Cir. 1997).
655 Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck, N.V. 1 12 F.3d 291,297 (7* Cir. 1997); Harris v. Ford Mortor Co., 1 10
F.3d 1410,1414 (9"^ Cir. 1997).
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damage actions do impose requirements."^^^ This argument is consistent with the earlier
finding that the Supreme Court in Cipollone considered state common law as safety
"regulation".657
(B) Finding preemption on the ground that Freightliner rejected
Cipollone
Another argument which courts finding preemption often provide is that the
reluctant attitude of the Supreme Court towards implied preemption in Cipollone was
rejected three years later in Freightliner. In Freightliner, the Supreme Court held that
the court in Cipollone did not establish a rule but at best an inference that an express
preemption clause forecloses implied preemption.^^^ Therefore, the U.S. Court of
Appeals in Montag v. Honda Motor Co.^^^ and in Irving v. Mazda Motor Corp.^^^, did
not consider themselves to be bound by Cipollone and found implied preemption. The
Circuit Court in Gracia even cited Freightliner in order to support its finding of express
preemption.^^i However, the courts in Gracia and Irving, although citing Medtronic,
seem to have ignored that Medtronic confirmed the position taken by the United States
Supreme Court in Cipollone. Accordingly, the decisions issued by these Circuit Courts
should be disagreed with.
(V.) Comment
Eventually, it can be concluded that the discussion of the preemption issue is,
even after Cipollone, Freightliner, and Medtronic, still highly controversial. To a
656 Medtronic, Inc. v. lohr, 1 16 S.Ct. 2240,2262 (1996).
657 See supra, at 142.
658 Freightliner v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280,288-290 (1995).
659 75 F.3d 1414,1417 (10* Cir. 1996).
660 136 F.3d 764,768 (1 1*" Cir. 1998).
661 Gracia v. Volvo Europa Truck, N.V., 1 12 F.3d 291,294-295 (7* Cir. 1997).
149
certain extent this is due to the fact that in these decisions the United States Supreme
Court failed to establish a clear standard on how to handle this issue. However, part of
the reason why the Court was not able to provide a comprehensible framework for a
preemption analysis is that Freightliner and Medtronic dealt with peculiar and complex
fact patterns which limited the establishment of clear guidelines. Congress, on the other
hand, could make an end to this controversy by clearly stating its intent in the
legislation. However, Congress has not attempted to resolve this issue. Instead, it has
enacted statutes containing "preemption clauses" that tend to reflect an intent to preempt
and "savings clauses" that tend to reflect an intent to preserve common law liability.
One reason for this congressional ambivalence may be found in the political domain.
That is, it was probably easier to pass legislation without directly resolving the
preemption issue than it would have been had the issue been clearly resolved. As long
as such a clarification is missing, the controversy on how to interpret federal statutes
containing preemption and savings clauses will continue among federal and state courts.
(VI.) Comparison to German product liability law: Non-existence of
A PREEMPTION ISSUE
In German law the area of private law that includes tort law is, according to Art.
72, 74 sec. I, Nr. 1 GG, solely regulated by the federal government. This is reflected in
the fact that there is only one nationwide applicable tort law. Consequently, the issue of
preemption does not exist in the German law of product liability.
3. The effects of compliance and noncompliance with federal
safety standards
As we have seen, the issue of what effects the motor vehicle manufacturer's
compliance with federal safety standards has regarding its liability under state common
law arises only if state tort law is not preempted by federal law.
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a) Compliance: The old common law
The issue in question was addressed by the United States Supreme Court for the
first time in 1 892 in Grand Truck Railroad Co. v. Ives^^^. In this case, safety regulations
prescribing the nature and placement of precautionary measures, such as crossing
signals and flagmen, were imposed upon a railroad company. The issue was whether, in
case of an injury, the company could be held liable under a negligence standard,
although it complied with the safety regulations. The Supreme Court held that
regardless of such compliance, common law dictates that "everyone must so conduct
himself. ..as that... he will not injure another, in any way."^^^ Thus, compliance with
safety standards did not mean that the defendant automatically met the duty of care
which would immunize him from liability under a negligence standard. The Supreme
Court's approach in Ives has been adopted by the majority of American courts,^^
mostly arguing that the defendant's standard of due care has to be established by the
characteristics of the particular case and not by compliance with safety standards. ^^^
In contrast, a minority view^^^ considered statutory compliance to immunize the
defendant from liability. However, the court in Shramek v. Hujp^'^ supporting this view,
neither cited to sources for its holding nor provided sufficient reasoning for its opinion,
and therefore the minority view must be rejected.
662 144 U.S. 408 (1892).
663 /J. at 421.
664 Mitchell V. Hotel Berry Co., 171 N.E. 39 (Ohio Ct. App. 1929); Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 41 A.
2d 850 (Pa. 1945); Southern Pac. R.R. Co. v. Mitchell, 292 P.2d 827 (Ariz. 1956).
665 Mitchell v. Hotel Berry Co., 171 N.E. 39,41 (Ohio Ct. App. 1929).
666 Shramek v. Huff, 280 N.W. 450,452 (Neb. 1938); see further, Paul Dueffert, Note, The Role of
Regulatory Compliance in Tort Actions, 26 Harv. J. on Legis. 175,186 note 53 (1989).
667 280 N.W. 450 (Neb. 1938).
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B) Compliance: Today's common law rule: Evidence of compliance
IS admissible but not controlling
Today, the overwhelming majority ofjurisdictions^^^ holds that compliance with
product safety statutes and regulations is relevant and admissible, but not controlling,
evidence of a defendant's exercise of due care and product defectiveness.^^^ The
rationale for this rule is that statutes, ordinances, and regulations are considered to act
only as a minimum floor of satisfactory behavior.^^^ Consequently, the judicial system
has to serve as an additional check, which allows it to consider specific facts, the
existence of which may justify the imposition of a higher standard of care than the one
dictated by the regulation. However, a few courts give regulatory compliance substantial
weight^'^^, or even recognize it as conclusive evidence for non-negligence or non-
668 Sours V. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511,1517 (6* Cir. 1983) ("GM's alleged compliance with
FMVSS 216. ..was properly left for the jurors to factor into the calculus..."); Shipp v. General Motors
Corp., 750 F.2d 418,421 (5"^ Cir. 1985); Jackson v. Spagnola, 503 A.2d 944,949 (Pa. Super Ct. 1986)
("The introduction of [the federal automobile safety standard] into evidence was proper, although
compliance by Volkswagen with the standards is 'only a piece of the evidentiary puzzle' and does not
grant immunity from state liability."); Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54,63 (N.M. 1995)
("Evidence of compliance with applicable regulations is relevant to whether the manufacturer was
negligent..."); Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 481 S.E.2d 518,521 (Ga. 1997).
669 The same position has been taken in § 30103 (e) of the Traffic Safety Act, § 288 C of the
Restatement (Second) Of Torts, § 4 (b) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability, and the majority of legal scholars, see, e.g., Christopher Scott D'Angelo, Effect ofCompliance
or Noncompliance with Applicable Governmental Product Safety Regulations on a Determination of
Product Defect, 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 453,454 (1995); Teresa Moran Schwartz, Regulatory Standards and
Products Liability: Striking the Right Balance between the Two, 30 U. Mich. J. L. Ref 431,460 (1997);
Nader & Page, supra note 395, at 459; Ashley W. Warren, Compliance with Governmental Regulatory
Standards: Is it enough to immunize a Defendantfrom Tort Liability ?, 49 Baylor L. Rev. 763,766, 772
and 816 (1997).
670 Southern Pac. R.R. v. Mitchell, 292 P.2d, 827,832-833 (Ariz. 1956); Smith v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
814 F.2d 1481,1487 (10* Cir. 1987); Plenger v. ALZA Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 811,819 note 7 (1992);
Feldman v. Lederie Laboratories, 625 A.2d 1066,1070 (1993); see also, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
Torts: Products Liability, P.F.D., § 4, cmt. e, at 141.
671 Miller v. Lee Apparel Co., Inc., 881 P.2d 576 (Kan. App. 1994); Sims v. Washex Machinery Corp.,
932 S.W.2d 559,565 (Tex. App. 1995).
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defectiveness.^''^ ^ similar point of view has been taken by a minority of states that
have enacted statutes establishing a rebuttable presumption that the product is not
defective or in an unreasonably dangerous condition. ^'^^
c) Compliance: Arguments against common law liability when
THERE IS COMPLIANCE
Although the majority of courts and secondary authority (Restatements, legal
scholars) reject compliance as a complete defense to tort liability, the motor vehicle
manufacturer as defendant in a products liability suit might still try to convince the
court of the opposite in order not to be held liable. To reach this goal he could present
six arguments which will subsequently be analyzed: (1) that statutory compliance as a
defense leads to a reduction of costs spent on lawsuits, (2) that it prevents the tort
system from "getting out of control", (3) that an extra judicial check is not needed, (4)
that instead of jurors the agency's experts should regulate industry conduct, (5) that
there is a need for uniformity and, finally (6) that it would create incentives for the
development and marketing of new products.^'''*
With the first argument, it is alleged that a statutory compliance defense would
reduce the costs arising out of tort litigation, because such a defense would create an
incentive for manufacturers to adhere to regulations deterring them at the same time
from engaging in undesired behavior. Thus, fewer trials would take place, and fewer
costs would be spent on lawsuits.^'^^ Against this argument one can object that a plaintiff
6^2 Jones V. Hitle Services, Inc. 549 P.2d 1383,1390 (Kan. 1976); Lorenz v. Celotex Corp., 896 F.2d 148
(5*^ Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, 901 F.2d 1110 (5"^ Cir. 1990); Ramirez v. Plough, Inc. 863 P.2d 167,176
(Cal. 1993).
^^^ Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3304 (a), (c) (1994) (presumption that compliance with regulatory
standards illustrates non-defectiveness of product); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (1980 &
Supp. 1995) (Rebuttable presumption of non-defectiveness of product and of defendant's exercise of due
care); Colorado, COLO. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403 (1) (b) (1989 & Supp. 1996) (same).
674 Warren, supra note 669, at 798-806.
675 Id. at 798.
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will only be dissuaded from filing suit if he knows prior to that, that the defendant
complied with all safety standards. Generally, the plaintiff lacks this knowledge,
because he only gets to know these facts in the discovery phase of the suit.^'^
Furthermore, even if fewer trials may take place if regulatory compliance were adopted
as a defense, it may not be neglected that the trial phase is only one of many phases
through which a lawsuit passes. A high amount ofjudicial resources are spent in pretrial
matters, hearings, motions, including the discovery period.^''"' On the other hand, it may
not be neglected that recognizing the compliance defense would make it more difficult
for plaintiffs to ultimately prevail. Plaintiffs attorneys working on a contingent fee
would have an economic incentive to screen cases more carefully. Cases that are not
likely to be won will not be filed in the first place. A decrease in the amount of litigation
would reduce litigation costs. Thus, it is true that a recognition of compliance as a
defense will save judicial expenses.^"^*
The second argument that a statutory compliance defense prevents the tort
system from "getting out of control" is based on the allegation that awards in tort suits
have reached astronomical amounts which sometimes lead to unjust compensation^''^,
results that could be avoided by adopting such a defense. However, this argument
overlooks the fact that increases in tort liability awards find their origin in several other,
more important sources, such as an increased number of injured persons and injuries,
676m
677/^.
678 However, the question remains whether a reduction of claims pursuing a decrease in litigation costs is
desirable. On the one hand, one could argue that this would relieve courts from being overwhelmed by a
large amount of actions. Efficiency and care for the single case would increase. On the other hand,
potential plaintiffs would, as a practical matter, be deprived in their right to file suit against
manufacturers. Furthermore, plaintiff attorneys would not make as much profit as they would were the
compliance defense not recognized. However, whether the number of claims should be reduced should
primarily be a matter of procedural or "formal" law (e.g. introduction of statutes of limitation or
minimum amounts to file an action) rather than of substantial law.
679 Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System -
And Why Not ?, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 147,1241 (1992).
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more expensive losses, and higher medical costs. ^^^ Moreover, it must be stressed that a
decrease ofjury awards to plaintiffs could be achieved more efficiently by other means,
such as inventing maximum caps on damages for pain and suffering^^' and on punitive
damages,^^^ rather than introducing statutory compliance as a defense. Because of this,
the second argument is not compelling.
With regard to the statement that an extra judicial check is superfluous when a
manufacturer has already complied with regulatory safety standards, the following
aspects have to be taken into consideration. Safety standards in the motor vehicle area
are issued by a governmental agency, the NHTSA. This kind of agency, however, may
be influenced by interest groups, such as an automobile lobby group, or be subject to
political pressure.^83 Therefore, a judicial system, whose characteristic is its
independence from any political or industrial pressure, is needed to ensure justice,
fairness, and public safety and to avoid that the law is made by interest groups. ^^'^
The fourth argument goes in the same direction as the third one by contending
that lay jurors do not have the capability of assessing complex technical information in a
short period of time, while the regulatory agency's experts do have the necessary
^80 Warren, supra note 669, at 801
.
^^^ The appropriateness and legality of introducing this kind of caps is controversial, see, e.g., Best v.
Taylor Machine Works, 179 111. 2d 367 (111. 1997) (holding that legislatively imposed caps on
noneconomic damages (compensation for pain and suffering) are unconstitutional under Illinois's
constitution because they confer exclusive privilege on a specific group of people (business, doctors).
^^2 Also the introduction of caps on punitive damages is subject to controversy, see, e.g., Henderson v.
Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 1993) (holding that a statute imposing a flat cap of $ 250,000
on punitive damages was unconstitutional because it violated plaintiffs right to a jury trial); Robert L.
Rabin, Federalism and the Tort System, 50 Rutgers L. Rev. 1,30 (1997) ("[c]aps are debatable").
^*3 The following example demonstrates the seriousness of this statement:
In 1971, representatives of the automobile industry secretly met with President Richard M. Nixon
wanting him to stop the efforts made by the NHTSA to oblige manufacturers to install airbags in their
vehicles; see, James S. Kunen, Reckless Disregard: Corporate Greed, Government Indifference, and the
Kentucky School Bus Crash 150-154 (1994) for a reprint of the National Archives official transcript, Part
of a Conversation Among President Nixon, Lido Anthony lacocca, Henry Ford II, and John D.
Ehrlichmann in the Oval Office, Arp. 27, 1971, The Nixon Project, National Archives, Washington D.C.;
see also, Nader &. Page, supra note 395, at 435.
^^'^ Warren, supra note 669, at 804.
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scientific education. Therefore, the assessment of whether a safety standard is
appropriate should be left to them.^^^ In objection to this argument, it must be said that
in cases involving technical questions, evidence is presented by expert witnesses who
provide scientific explanations so that the ordinary person can understand the facts of
the case. Accordingly, the jurors as well as the judges, who are generally regarded as
laymen in the scientific field, will get the necessary information. However, it is
questionable whether jurors will be able to understand evidence presented by expert
witnesses. In comparison to experts working for administrative agencies {e.g. NHTSA)
most jurors will not have the educational background to grasp in every detail scientific
issues that require ftindamental technological knowledge, skills, or experience (e.g.
aviation or automobile product liability cases). Consequently, a jury will not be able to
assess complex scientific fact patterns as well as agency experts. On the other hand,
experts of governmental agencies may be influenced by political or industrial groups^*^,
whereas a jury is politically neutral^^^. Accordingly, governmental safety regulations
may not reflect the optimal level of safety. Therefore, the assessment of whether such a
regulation is appropriate should ultimately be left to the jury and the judge.
With the fifth argument it is alleged that a regulatory compliance defense would
contribute to more uniformity and clarity of the law.^^s Admittedly, liability under
common law does sometimes lead to inconsistent outcomes, which could be avoided by
introducing the compliance defense on a federal or at least a state level. However, the
price for this increase in consistency would have to be paid for by society, as public
685 jd at 804-805.
686 5gg gg David A. Kessler, Remarks by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, 50 Food & Drug L.J.
327,327 (1995) (stating that "Over the past two years six FDA field staff have been offered bribes for
special treatment. The products involved ranged from spices and seafood to surgical instruments and
foodstuffs. There were six attempted bribes,... one attempt on the West Coast, and five an the East
Cost.").
687 Warren, supra note 669, at 805.
688 jj_
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health and safety would be jeopardized^^^ because plaintiffs would no longer be able to
successfully challenge the appropriateness of regulatory safety standards, a price which
is much too high. Consequently, this leads to a rejection of the fifth argument.
The final argument centers on the allegation that a statutory compliance defense
will help developing and marketing new products, because manufacturers will be more
confident in creating them if they know that when meeting safety standards they will be
immunized from liability. ^^^ However, until this day, the regulatory compliance defense
has not been recognized by the majority of jurisdictions and, nevertheless,
manufacturers still continue to develop and market new products, because the goal of
achieving higher profits is incentive enough for them.^^i Thus, this argument also is not
compelling.
D) Compliance: Comment
The presentation of the foregoing arguments leads this author to the conclusion
that the current common law majority opinion, which is also reflected in the Traffic
safety Act (§ 30103 (e)), the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and the Restatement
(Third) of Torts, is the better view. That is, that compliance with federal regulatory
motor vehicle standards issued by the NHTSA should be admissible but not conclusive
evidence. The main argument which provides the basis for this conclusion is that those
safety standards are only minimum requirements. Thus, it is up to the state courts to
establish higher standards by taking into consideration the particular facts of each case
under a reasonable person standard.
689m





After having discussed the effects of compliance with federal regulatory
standards, we now turn to the consequences resulting out of noncompliance with those
requirements. In the leading case dealing with noncompliance with such standards,
Martin v. Herzog,^^^ Judge Cardozo concluded that the unexcused violation of statutory
safety standards is more than mere evidence of negligence, it is negligence in itself, or
"negligence per se".^^^ Today, the majority of courts^^"* still holds that such a violation
constitutes negligence per se or causes products to be defective as a matter of law in
cases involving design or failure to warn defects. Other courts consider noncompliance
as evidence of negligence or product defectiveness^^^ or give it presumptive effect^^^.
However, like in Martin v. Herzog, most courts recognize that noncompliance does not
constitute proof of negligence when the violation of the safety standard is excused or
justified.^9'' The same position has been taken in §§ 288 A^^^ and 288 B^^^ of the
692 126N.E. 814(N.Y. 1920).
693 M at 814-815.
694 Keman v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426,431 (1958); Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. Eutsler,
276 F.2d 455,461 (4*^ Cir. 1960); Wells v. City of Vancouver, 467 P.2d 292,295 (Wash. 1970); Hamed v.
Dura Corp., 665 P.2d 5, 12-13 (Alaska 1983).
695 Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 325 F.2d 605,612 (8* Cir. 1963); Michel v.
Valdastri, Ltd., 575 P.2d 1299,1301 (Haw. 1978); Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774,784 (lO"" Cir.
1978).
696 Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 578 F.2d 151 (4* Cir. 1978) (applying South Carolina law);
Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167,172 (Cal. 1993).
697 See, e.g., Bamum v. Williams, 504 P.2d 122,126 (Or. 1972); Klauseck v. Anderson Sales & Serv.,
Inc., 393 N.W. 2d 356,360 (Mich. 1986); Witham v. Norfolk & W.Ry., 561 N.E. 2d 484,485 (Ind. 1990).
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§ 288 A reads:
Excused Violations
(2)... violation is excused when
(a) the violation is reasonable because of the actor's incapacity;
(b) he neither knows or should know of the occasion for compliance;
(c) he is unable after reasonable diligence or care to comply;
(d) he is confronted with an emergency not due to his own misconduct;
(e) compliance would involve a greater risk of harm to the actor or to others.
699
§ 288 B reads:
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Restatement (Second) of Torts. In contrast, § 4 (a) of the Third Restatement appHes a
standard that is sHghtly different from the common law rule and the Second
Restatement. Under this section, noncompliance with safety standards is considered to
render the product defective, but an excuse for this wrongful behavior is not recognized.
Because of this, § 4 (a) has been subject to criticism. "^0° It is argued that in eliminating
the "excused violation," the new Restatement ignores the limits set to negligence per se
by common law.'^^i However, this argument has to be rejected, and the rule set forth in §
4 (a) should be considered appropriate in the area of product liability. The peculiarity in
this field is that the manufacturer usually knows, or at least should know, about
mandatory safety requirements prior to the marketing of his products. Therefore, if he
sees that a product does not meet the statutory or regulatory standards, he still has the
ability to postpone the sale until compliance is achieved.'^^ Consequently, an excuse for
noncompliance of the sort that exists in negligence actions generally is not appropriate
in product liability actions. Therefore, § 4 (a) of the new Restatement has to be entirely
approved and should be adopted by the courts in cases involving safety standards
governing product designs or instructions or warnings.
Effect of Violation
(1) The unexcused violation of the legislative enactment or an administrative regulation which is adopted
by the court as defining the standrad of conduct of a reasonable man, is neglignece in itself
^00 D'Angelo, supra note 669, at 471-474.
701 Id. at 472.
"^02 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, P.F.D., § 4, cmt. d, at 140. Example: In the
test phase prior to marketing the new "Model T' manufactured by X does not meet mandatory crash test
standards for side impact collisions. Nevertheless is the sale of the cars authorized by X because the
divergence between the mandatory crash test standards and the actual achieved results is "marginal". X
knew that he did not comply with mandatory safety standards prior to sale. He could have postponed the
delivery of the cars until full compliance was achieved. His failure to do so constitutes negligence and
renders the vehicle defective. He is not excused because the divergence was only "marginal".
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E. Warning and instruction defects
1. Definition
Besides the possibility of being held liable for manufacturing or design defects,
the motor vehicle manufacturer may also be subject to liability because it failed to
provide adequate instructions or warnings to its vehicles at the time ofsale J^'^ Although
closely related, instructions and warnings are not the same. Whereas instructions inform
the consumer about the safe use of the product,'''^ warnings call attention to the
existence and nature of risks involved in the use of a product so that consumers are able
to avoid harm either by behaving appropriately or by choosing not to use the product.^^^
Accordingly, even if the motor vehicle functions perfectly and is completely free of
defects in manufacture or design, it may still be considered to be defective.''^^ In these
cases, the defect is the manufacturer's failure to provide the necessary information^^^
^^^ Today, the automobile manufacturer's duty to instruct and warn is widely recognized, see, e.g.,
Leichtamer v. Am. Motors Co., 424 N.E. 2d 568 (1981) (Two people were killed and two others were
injured in the rollover of a Jeep CJ-7 while they were driving an off-road recreational area. The court
held that the manufacturer could be liable for failing to warn that the Jeep does not provide occupant
safety in the event of a forward pitch-over accident.); LaCoste v. Ford Motor Co., 322 N.W. 2d 898
(Iowa Ct. App. 1982) (Plaintiffs decedent sustained fatal injuries when he was stuck between a 1975
Ford pickup truck and a building. The plaintiff contended that the truck's transmission had shifted from
park to reverse after the decedent got off the truck with the engine running. The plaintiff prevailed
because the transmission design was defective and the manufacturer had a duty to warn of the truck's
known tendency to behave in this way.).
"^^ Hiigel V. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975) (stating that instructions refer to the
proper use of the vehicle); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, P.F.D., § 2, cmt i, at
31.
^^5 Hiigel V. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975) (holding that the manufacturer must not
only provide instructions regarding the proper use of the vehicle but must also alert the user to the
dangers involved in its use); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, P.F.D., § 2, cmt i,
at31.
706 MILLER, supra note 412, § 7.05 [5], at 148-149.
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The manufacturer's duty to warn of dangers at the time the vehicle is sold has to
be distinguished from his post-sale duty to wam'^o^. Whereas the first duty arises only at
the time of manufacture and sale, the latter duty arises when the manufacturer becomes
aware of a dangerous condition of its vehicles subsequent to the time at which they were
placed on the market.''09 Furthermore, a difference must be made between the post-sale
duty to warn and the manufacturer's duty to recall ^'^its vehicles.
2. Extent of duty to instruct and / or warn at time of sale
The automobile manufacturer's duty to instruct or warn extends to the
purchasers of its vehicles as well as to other foreseeable users7" However, the scope of
its duty to warn is not unlimited since the majority of jurisdictions takes the position
that a manufacturer's duty to warn encompasses only risks that were known or should
have been known to a reasonable person.'''^ Nevertheless, the manufacturer's duty to
warn not only extends to dangers associated with the intended use of the product but
also to misuses if the manufacturer is aware of a tendency towards this type of
misuse'^i^. In order to determine which type and extent of warning must be provided in
particular circumstances depends on several factors such as the likelihood that an
accident will occur, the type and severity of harm arising out of the accident, the
'^^^ See infra, at 163.
^09 Miller, supra note 412, § 7.05[5], at 155.
"^^^ See infra, at 165.
711 Miller, 5w/?ra note 412, § 7.05[5], at 148-149.
712 Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 581 P.2d 271,279 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Anderson v. Owens-Coming
Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991); Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284,289 (Iowa 1994)
(The court refuses to impose a duty upon manufacturers to warn of unknowable dangers).
713 LaCoste v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 703; Mazikoske v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 500 N.E.2d
622 (111. 1986) (Plaintiff was injured when he attempted to mount a 16-inch tire on a 16.5-inch wheel.
The tire exploded and the plaintiff contended that the defendants were negligent in failing to warn of the
dangers involved in such a mismatch. The court held that the defendants had the alleged duty to warn
when the existence of a mismatch would not be obvious to users.).
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manufacturer's burden to provide a warning, and the nature of the product itself."''
When applying these factors to motor vehicles, we reach the following result: motor
vehicles, by their very nature, provide a high potential of danger. It is not possible to
make them completely safe for their occupants nor for other road-users that might be
involved in traffic accidents (e.g., pedestrians). Moreover, there is always a certain
likelihood that an accident might occur due to several circumstances (driver's failure,
other road-user's failure; defect in vehicle, bad road conditions, etc.). In case of an
accident, property damage, bodily injury or even death are likely to occur. On the other
hand, the manufacturer can, at the time of sale of its vehicles, easily provide information
necessary for the consumer in order to avoid some of the risks (e.g., provision of a
sticker that a passenger-side airbag should be disengaged when transporting little
children). Indeed, automobile manufacturers regularly equip their cars with driver
manuals in which they provide this kind of information. Although a whole product
series of hundreds of thousands of vehicles has to be equipped with such precautionary
features, they are available at relatively low costs and bring a high benefit. Therefore,
the burden of motor vehicle manufacturers to provide adequate instructions or warnings
is relatively low.
3. Burden of proof and causation
In order to successfully sue a manufacturer, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant provided an inadequate warning which rendered the vehicle defective. Like in
design defect cases, the plaintiff has to provide evidence that a reasonable alternative
warning was available which would have reduced the risk of harm.'^^ Furthermore, he
'i'* Hiigel V. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975); Cover v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y.
1984).
^15 Jugle V. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 975 F.Supp. 576,582 (D. Vermont 1997); RESTATEMENT (Third)
OF Torts: Products Liability, P.F.D., § 2 (c); in contrast to a claim based on design defectiveness, the
provision of evidence for a reasonable alternative warning (or instruction) is generally easy since no
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must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the manufacturer's failure to provide
such a warning was the proximate cause of the injury.^'^ Accordingly, the manufacturer
cannot be held liable when the danger involved in the use of the vehicle is obvious or
generally known to the user7'^ Furthermore, the plaintiff must prove that if the
manufacturer had given an adequate warning, it would have been followed.^ '^ However,
like in German law,^!^ plaintiffs burden of proof is eased with regard to this
requirement since the courts have established a presumption that if adequate warnings
had been given they would have been foilowed.^^o Consequently, the burden of proof
shifts to the defendant who now has to prove that the plaintiff would not have followed
an appropriate warning had it been given.
technical issues are involved {e.g., the plaintiff can simply allege that a sticker warning of the danger of
transporting children on the airbag-equipped passenger seat should have contained a "read warning sign"
instead of words); accordingly, plaintiffs will be able to financially afford bringing a failure to warn
claim; thus, the argument made in context with design defects that financially small actions will be
eliminated does not apply here.
716 See, e.g., Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 743 F.2d 195 (3d Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985),
applying Permsylvania law (Plaintiffs husband who had been driving standard transmission automobiles
for more than 25 years started turned the ignition key of a 1980 Ford Mustang while the car was in gear.
The car lurched backwards and plaintiff, who wanted to enter the car, lost her balance and fell. The
plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer was liable for failing to provide an adequate warning of the danger
of starting a standard transmission car while in gear. The court held that there was no evidence that the
driver would have paid greater attention when starting the car even if supplementary warnings were
contained in the operator's manual or on a sticker located in the interior of the car.); Jugle v. Volkswagen
of Am., Inc., 975 F.Supp. 576,582 (D. Vermont 1997).
^'^ Claytor v. General Motors Corp., 286 S.E.2d 129 (1982) (stating that it is common knowledge among
mechanics that the application of excessive force can cause serious injuries); Baughmann v. General
Motors Corp., 627 F. Supp. 871 (D. S.C. 1985), affd 780 F.2d 1131 (4'" Cir. 1985), applying South
Carolina law (holding that a truck manufacturer has no duty to warn of the danger of explosive separation
of multi-piece truck rims when the plaintiff was an experienced tire repairman who was familiar with
relevant safety procedures for mounting wheel and rim assemblies); Morris v. Adolph Coors Co., 735
S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that there is not duty to warn of the risk of driving intoxicated
because there is a general awareness of this risk); Crow v. Manitex, Inc., 550 N.W.2d 175 (Iowa Ct. App.
1996); Payne v. Quality Nozzle Co., 643 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Brand v. Mazda Motor
Corp., 978 F.Supp. 1382,1389 (D. Kansas 1997) ("Kansas law does not recognize a duty to warn...when
the user akeady knows of the danger.").
^'8 Miller, supra note 412, § 7.05[5], at 154.
^^^ See, Chapter I, supra, at 62.
720 Menard v. Newhall, 373 A.2d 505,507 (1977); Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 1008 (Mass.
1982); Jugle v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 975 F.Supp. 576,582 (D. Vermont 1997).
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4. Post-sale duty to warn
The foregoing explanations dealt with the manufacturer's duty to provide
adequate instructions and warnings at the time of sale of his products. However, once
vehicles have been put on the market, they might develop dangers which were not
discoverable at the time of their manufacture {e.g. anti-lock braking systems might fail
or airbags might explode without impact etc.). In this situation the question arises
whether the manufacturer also has a duty to warn of dangers in the vehicle subsequent
to its putting in the stream of commerce, for a violation of which he could be held liable
(post-sale duty to warn). The courts provide different answers to this question. The
majority of jurisdictions'^^! holds that the manufacturer has a continuing post-sale duty
to warn under particular circumstances. Other courts,^^^ however, reject the imposition
of such a duty when the product was not defective at the time of sale. Still other
courts''23 argue in favor of the existence of a post-sale duty to warn but outline that there
is no duty to inform about safety advancements in the product which would reduce the
risk of danger. The jurisdictions recognizing a post-sale duty to warn make clear that a
decision on this issue has to be taken on a case-by-case basis.'^24 xhey limit the
^^' See, e.g. Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 99 N.W.2d 627 (Mich. 1959) (The plaintiff was struck
by a 1953 Buick Roadmaster equipped with power brakes. He introduced evidence that demonstrated that
shortly after the introduction of the 1953 Buick model difficuhies occurred with the power brake system,
resulting in sudden brake failures. The defendant manufacturer furnished all Buick dealers with repair
kits. However, it never issued a warning to the Buick owners. The court held that the facts of the case
imposed a duty on the manufacturer to take all reasonable means to issue warnings directly to the
purchasers of 1953 Buicks as soon as the defect was discovered.); Hamilton v. Smith, 773 F.2d 461 (2d
Cir. 1985), applying Connecticut law (the court held that the manufacturer of a press brake has a duty to
employ a degree of care, both during and after the sale, that a reasonably prudent manufacturer would
have taken under similar circumstances); Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826,832
(Minn. 1988); Crowston v. Goodyear Tire &. Rubber Co., 521 N.W.2d 401,406-410 (N.D. 1994).
^22 Arkwright Boston- Mfrs. Mut. ins. Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 844 F.2d 11 74, 11 85 (5* Cir.
1988) (applying Texas law); Black v. Henry Pratt Co., 778 F.2d 1278 (7"^ Cir. 1987); Romero v.
International Harvester Co., 979 F.2d 1444 (10"^ Cir. 1992) (applying Colorado law).
^23
See, e.g., Williams v. Monarch Machine Tool Co., Inc., 26 F.3d 228,232 (1" Cir. 1994) (applying
Massachusetts law).
'24 Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 521 N.W.2d 401,406-410 (N.D. 1994).
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imposition of such a duty to situations in where the likelihood of occurrence of injuries
outweighs the difficulties a manufacturer has to face in issuing post-sale warnings. "^-^ In
particular, they consider different factors such as the extent of the risk of harm and the
possibility of effectively communicating a warning to the actual user and ask whether a
reasonable manufacturer in a similar situation would have issued a warning. "^^^ Thus,
they apply a negligence standard which finds its basis in a risk-utility analysis applied to
a reasonable-person standard.
On the other hand, the jurisdictions rejecting such a duty focus on three different
arguments: first, since the product was not defective at the time of sale, a rationale to
impose liability on the manufacturer does not exist.^^? Second, after the sale of the
vehicle the manufacturer does not any longer exercise control over its product so that he
can no longer be held liable. ^^8 Finally, it is argued that imposing such a duty would
place an unreasonable burden upon the manufacturers, since they would be required to
trace the ownership of each product which may already have been sold years ago.''29
- Comment
As mentioned above, accidents involving motor vehicles are likely to occur and
frequently cause serious injuries. Accordingly, courts following the majority view will
hold that a motor vehicle manufacturer has a duty to warn consumers of dangers
discovered after the time of sale. This result is achieved by fairly balancing the interests
"725 Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826,832 (Minn. 1988); Crowston v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 521 N.W.2d 401,406-410 (N.D. 1994).
726 Cover V. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864,872 (N.Y. 1984); Patton v. Hutchinson WilRich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d
1299,1314-1315 (Kan. 1993); Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 521 N.W.2d 401,409 (N.D.
1994); see also. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF Torts: PRODUCTS Liability, P.F.D., § 10.
727 Carrozales v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 589 N.E.2d 569,579 (111. App. Ct. 1991).
728 Arkwright Boston- Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 844 F.2d 1 174,1 185 (5* Cir.
1988) (applying Texas law).
729 Black V. Henry Pratt Co., 778 F.2d 1278,1284 (7* Cir. 1987);
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of the consumers not to be exposed to a high risk of harm against the interests of the
manufacturer not to be subject to an unreasonable burden. Therefore, the majority view
has to be supported.
In contrast, the arguments of the minority opinion are not convincing. This view
overlooks that a vehicle does not need to be defective at the time of sale in order to
establish a post-sale duty to warn, but the imposition of such a duty is based on a
negligence standard taking into consideration what a reasonably prudent manufacturer
would have done. Therefore, the argument that the manufacturer does no longer have
control over the product is not compelling. Finally, the manufacturer's difficulty in
tracing the owners of vehicles in a dangerous condition is over-exaggerated. Knowing
of this difficulty the manufacturer and its dealerships should document data when and to
whom which automobile model was sold. True, they will not be able to find every
single owner, and therefore a risk of being held potentially liable remains. However, this
is the price a manufacturer has to pay when doing business.
5. Post-sale duty to recall
A product recall is defined as "[njotification of a defect combined with an offer
of repair, replacement, or refund.'''^^^ Thus, it differs from a post-sale warning in that the
manufacturer not only informs the consumer of the defect but also takes additional
measures to repair or replace it. Whether a manufacturer has the duty to recall vehicles
which are in a dangerous condition after they have been sold is controversial.
^^^ Jeffrey A. Lamken, Note, Efficient Accident Prevention As A Continuing Obligation: The Duty To
Recall Defective Products, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 103,104 (1989).
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a) Duty to recall under common law
While some courts'^^i jo not recognize a duty to recall unless a statute or
governmental regulation specifically establishes this duty, other jurisdictions''32 take the
opposite point of view in holding a manufacturer liable under a negligence standard for
breaching his duty to recall.
Some of the arguments provided by those courts refusing to recognize a duty to
recall are similar to the ones we have heard in context with the rejection of a post-sale
duty to warn. First, it is argued that a duty to recall would place an unreasonable burden
upon manufacturers of tracking down each purchaser in order to give notice of a
recall. ^33 Second, it is being held that the manufacturer's responsibility to eliminate
dangers arising out of the product ends when it left its control and shifts towards the
owner of the product.''^'* Furthermore, if liability was established, even if the
manufacturer failed to retrofit its products with technological features that have been
newly developed after the time of sale, this would discourage the development of new
^31 Smith V. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 755 F.2d 129,134-135 (8* Cir. 1985) (holding that a duty to
recall is no logical extension of a duty to warn); Baker v. Firestone Tire &. Rubber Co., 793 F.2d
1196,1200 (11"^ Cir. 1986); Lynch v. McStome & Lincoln Plaza Associates, 548 A.2d 1276,1281 (Pa.
Super Ct. 1988); Romero v. International Harvester Co., 979 F.2d 1444,1449-1450 (10* Cir. 1992)
(declining to impose a duty to recall or retrofit a product that was not negligently designed at time of
manufacture); Eschenburg v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 829 F.Supp. 210 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (declining
to extend a duty to warn to a duty to recall); Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299
(Kan. 1993) (holding that there is no duty to recall or retrofit absent legislation); Gregory v. Cincinnatti,
Inc., 538 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. 1995).
^^^ Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 41 1 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1969) (Manufacturer of airplane
engine was aware that that its engines were subject to failure due to defective design eight months prior t
a crash leading to the lawsuit. The court held that, although the defect was not discovered by the
manufacturer until after sale, the manufacturer had a duty to remedy the engines once their dangerous
condition came to the attention of the manufacturer); Bell Helicopter Co. v. Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d 519
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (the court held that a duty to recall was appropriate where the manufacturer
Lunghi V. Clark Equip. Co., 200 Cal. Rptr. 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a finding of negligence
based on a failure to conduct an appropriate retrofit campaign was independent of a finding that the
product was defective); Hernandez v. Badger Constr. Equip. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994) (stating that liability for failure to perform an adequate retrofit campaign was independent of
liability for defective design).
733 Lynch v. McStome & Lincohi Plaza Associates, 548 A.2d 1276,1281 (Pa. Super Ct. 1988).
734M
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technology 7^5 jn addition, courts argue that the resources of the judicial system are
limited and that administrative agencies, such as the NHTSA, are in a much better
position to weigh costs and benefits associated with recall and retrofitting programs.''^^
On the other hand, some of the jurisdictions holding a manufacturer liable for a
failure to appropriately recall dangerous products focus on the severity of the harm
resulting from such a failure (e.g. deaths and severe injuries when manufacturer failed to
recall defective airplane engine). "^^^ Others, however, reason that where the
manufacturer voluntarily conducts a recall campaign he is subject to liability if he fails
to perform it appropriately, because he deters other would-be rescuers from
intervening.^38 However, this kind of liability is only imposed where the manufacturer
was aware or could have been aware of the post-sale product danger. "^^^
B) Duty to recall under the Restatement (Third) of Torts, § 11
Section 1 1 of the Third Restatement reflects the position taken by courts
generally rejecting a manufacturer's duty to recall. It states that such liability for failure
to recall exists only in two cases: either when this duty is required by statute or
governmental regulation, or if the manufacturer voluntarily conducts a recall campaign
^'^ Id. (holding that there is no duty to retrofit or inform users of ne safety improvements); see also,
Victor E. Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable
Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 892,900-901 (1983).
736 Patton V. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 12991316 (Kan. 1993).
737 Braniff Airways, Inc., v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 41 1 F.2d 451,453 (2d Cir. 1969).
738 Bell Helicopter Co., v. Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d 519,532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (The court stated that
"Once the duty [to recall and repair] was assumed. Bell had an obligation to complete the remedy by
using reasonable means available to it...".); Blossman Gas Co. v. Williams, 375 S.E.2d 117 (Ga. App.
1988) (The court held that because the defendant volunteered he was obliged to use reasonable care in
the performance of the recall).
739 Lanclos v. Rockwell Int'I Corp., 470 So.2d 924,930 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (Experts testified that the
manufacturer had knowledge that incorporation of available safety devices for wood shapers was
necessary); Braniff Airways, Inc., v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451,453 (2d Cir. 1969) (Airplane
engine manufacturer was aware of engine defect eight months prior to plane crash but did not take any
action. This fact was essential for the court to find negligence).
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and in both cases fails to act as a reasonable person in conducting the recall. It thereby
rejects the position taken by a significant number of courts that establishs liability for
failure to recall, also in the absence of a statutory requirement, since this would place an
unjustifiable burden {e.g. incalculable costs) on the manufacturer. '''*o
c) Comment
A product recall due to a defective design of a particular automobile model
affects the whole product series, thus, hundred thousands of cars. In addition to the costs
of contacting the consumer the manufacturer will suffer financial loss in recovering and
repairing or replacing defective vehicle parts. '^'*' Consequently, compared to a post-sale
warning campaign, the financial burden placed upon a manufacturer is even much
higher when conducting a recall campaign. The costs in recalling a vehicle series may
even be higher than the estimated costs for being held legally liable for a failure to
recall. In Ghmshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,"^^^ for example, it has been stated that the costs
of fixing defective fuel systems in Ford Pinto automobiles would have been $ 137
million. Ford estimated that its liability for 180 bum deaths, 180 serious bum injuries
and 2,100 destroyed vehicles resulting from the failure to recall the Pintos would have
cost the entity only $ 49.5 million. Ford chose not to perform a recall campaign.
In order to determine whether liability against a manufacturer should be
established, his burden to perform a post-sale warning or recall campiagn must be
weighed against the risks and probable loss to which potential plaintiffs are exposed.
Where the manufacturer's burden is relatively low (e.g. $ 5,000) to save the life of a
'''*o Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, P.F.D., §11, cmt. a, at 244.
^^^ The manufacturer will generally execute repairs free of charge for the consumer, see, Balido v.
Improved Machinery, Inc,. 105 Cal. Rptr. 890,901 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
"^^^ 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981) (the court held that the decision to expose consumers to such a
serious risk of harm was an unethical "cost-benefit analysis" balancing human lives against corporate
profit. Id at 384.
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consumer, liability will be established if he fails to warn about the post-sale dangers or
to recall the product. However, where the manufacturer's burden is too high (e.g. $ 1
billion) compared to plaintiffs probable loss (e.g. life), liability should not be
established. Although the rescue of life as the highest object of legal protection is
favorable, it should be obvious that at some point the cost would be too high to justify
action on the manufacturer's part. The question which remains is where to draw the line
between liability and accpetance of manufacturer conduct. A strict mathematical
formula cannot be applied to answer this question, because it could not take into
consideration every single aspect of an individual case. Instead, the assessment of
whether a manfacturer is liable for a violation of his post-sale duties has to be decided
on a case-by-case basis. Given that a duty to recall imposes the highest burden on the
manufacturer, liability for failure to do so should only be established if the protection of
the consumer cannot be achieved by imposing other, less severe post-sale obligations
(e.g. post-sale duty to warn). Thus, the duty to recall should be imposed by courts only
as "ultima ratio".
However, as some courts correctly hold, motor vehicle manufacturers should not
be subject to liability for failing to recall their vehicles in situations where new safety
features have been developed after they have already been put in the stream of
commerce. This would place the risk of developing new technologies on the
manufacturers and would indeed deter them from improving the safety of their vehicles,
a development which would go to the detriment of the consumer. On the other hand,
product recalls should not solely be the task of administrative agencies. With regard to
motor vehicles, the NHTSA is empowered to order manufacturers to recall dangerous
vehicles. This serves the purpose of preventing the occurrence of harmftil events.
However, since the NHTSA is a governmental agency it might be subject to political
influence, or, due to its internal structure, slow to react. Therefore, it is necessary to
have courts that decide on the manufacturer's duty to recall and the consequences of a
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failure to exercise this duty. Although, the judicial system will not be able to prevent the
occurrence of harmful events, it is still able to provide compensation for the victims.
Thus, a combination of administrative prevention and judicial compensation is the best
solution to improve traffic safety.
This evaluation leads to the conclusion that the position taken by some
jurisdictions as reflected in § 1 1 of the third Restatement has to be rejected, and that a
common law duty to recall should be imposed with the limitations set forth above.
6. Comparison to German product liability law
Both U.S. law and German law distinguish between the manufacturer's pre-sale
duty to instruct and warn and its post-sale duty to warn or recall. With regard to the
liability for failing to provide adequate information at the time of sale, it is particularly
significant that the law in both countries applies the presumption that an adequate
warning would have been heeded by the consumer if it had been issued. ''•^^ Also, like the
majority of jurisdictions in the United States, German law has established the
manufacturer's post-sale duty to warn under a negligence standard.'''*^ Regarding the
issue of recalls, it can be noticed that administrative agencies in both countries (the
National Highway traffic Safety Administration in the United States and the Federal
Motor Traffic Agency (Karftfahrtbundesamt) in Germany) have the power to initiate
recall campaigns. However, in contrast to United States common law, a controversy
whether a duty to recall should be recognized in the absence of statutory regulation does
not exist among German courts. Nevertheless, the same factors that a number of United
States courts take into consideration in their evaluation of recall duties are also being
"^^^ With regard to German law, see, Chapter I, supra at 62.
"^^
See, Chapter I, supra at pp. 54.
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considered by German courts. '''^ Thus, it can be concluded that both laws are very
similar and only vary in details.
F. Defenses
Besides the preemption and compliance defenses,'''*^ manufacturers will try to
raise several other defenses in order to escape liability. Among those are statutes of
limitation, statutes of repose, contributory negligence and comparative fault, product
misuse, and product alteration.
1. Statutes of limitation
Most states have adopted statutes of limitation under which the plaintiff must
bring a products liability suit within a certain period of time, usually two or three years,
in order not to be barred from bringing the claim. "7"*^ For the running of this time period
the majority of states has, either by statute or common law, established a discovery rule
under which the time limitation begins to run from the time at which the plaintiff has or
should have discovered either the product defect'"*^ or the injury'''*^.
^^^ See Chapter I, supra at pp. 58.
'^^^ See supra, dX^^. 128.
''*'' See. e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 12-542 (1991 Cum. Pocket Part): An action for personal injury,
property damage, or wrongful death must be brought within twO years after the cause of action accrues;
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-106 (1) (1986): All actions for products liability for personal injury, death, or
property damage have to be brought within two years after the claim for relief arises; FLA. STAT. § 95.1
1
(3): A product liability action must be brought within four years or it is barred; Ga. CODE ANN. § 9-3-30,
9-3-31, 9-33-33: Negligence and strict liability actions must be brought within two years of the date of
accrual for bodily injury and within four years for property damage.
^'^^ See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 95.031(2) (the limitation period generally runs from the time the defect is
discovered or should have been discovered);
^'^^ Murphy v. Spelts-Schultz Lumber Co., 481 N.W.2d 422 (Neb. 1992) (the time limitation begins when
the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered the existence of the injury or damage);
Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2) (Supp. 1993) (the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has
discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury).
172
2. Statutes of repose
Based on the concept that after a certain period of time the defendant should no
longer be held responsible for harm resulting from the defective product, a number of
jurisdictions have enacted statutes of repose which act as an absolute defense. '^^o jf ^
product liability action has not been brought within the time limit set forth in such a
statute, the plaintiff is barred from recovery. The terms of the different statutes vary
from state to state, and the period of repose ranges from five to fifteen years. While in
some jurisdictions the injury must occur within the statutory time limit, other states
require the filing of the lawsuit within that time. Thus, in contrast to statutes of
limitation, the discovery of the defect or injury by plaintiff is irrelevant.
3. Contributory negligence and comparative fault
Contributory negligence is defined as conduct on the part of the plaintiff, which
is a contributing cause to his own injuries.'^^i Under traditional common law, a
plaintiffs contributory negligence was an absolute bar to recovery, since it was deemed
impermissible to permit recovery in cases where his misconduct partly caused the
injuries.'^^^ Even where the plaintiff only slightly failed to exercise reasonable care,
recovery was not allowed. As a reaction to the harsh consequences resulting from this
"all-or nothing approach,"''^^ almost every state has now adopted some form of
^^^ See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-551 (1956) (the cause of action must accrue within twelve years of
the date of fu-st sale); Ga. Code § 51-1-1 1 (b) (2) (1982) (the lawsuit must be filed) within ten years of
the date of first sale); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10, § 13-213 (b) (1984) (the products liability action must be
filde within ten years of the date of first sale to a consumer, or within twelve years of the first sale to a
non-consumer); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50 (1983) (the lawsuit must be filed within six years of the date of
first sale).
"751 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, § 463.
752 Butterfield V. Forrester, 103 Eng Rep 926 (KB 1809); PAUL SHERMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY FOR
THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER § 9.05, at 256 (1981, Supp. 1997).
75^ Prosser, supra note 415, at 568, note 1.
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comparative negligence. '5"* Under this concept, each person involved in a harmful event
is liable only in proportion to his or her share of fault. Consequently, the plaintiff in a
products liability action will now generally be able to recover despite the fact that that
his own negligence {e.g. driving intoxicated, failure to wear seat belt) contributed to his
injury. However, the concept of comparative fault is treated differently among the
states. Some states apply a pure comparative fault scheme, others chose to adopt a
modified approach. '^^ Under a pure comparative fault concept, which exists in about a
dozen jurisdictions,''^^ the plaintiff can recover no matter how great his degree of fault
is, provided it is less than 100 %. The amount of damages the plaintiff can recover is
then reduced by the percentage of fault attributable to him; for example, if the
plaintiffs fault is 30 %, then he can recover 70 % of the damages. Under modified
comparative fault a plaintiff is only able to recover if his share of fault is below a certain
threshold percentage. In some jurisdictions'^^? i\^q plaintiff will be barred from recovery
if his fault is equal or greater than the fault of the defendant. In others,''58 xhe plaintiffs
claim will only be barred if his fault is greater than that of the defendant. These two
forms of modified comparative fault reach different results in cases where both the
plaintiffs and the defendant's fault is 50 %. Under the former concept, "not as great as-
approach," the plaintiff will be barred from recovery, whereas under the latter, "not
greater than approach," he will recover 50 % of the damages.
^^'' Today, 46 states have adopted the concept of comparative fault, see, e.g., Hoffmann v. Jones, 280
S.2d 431,436 (Fla. 1973); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (1975). The only exceptions are
Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and the District of Columbia, see, e.g., Williams v. Delta
International Mach. Corp., 619 So.2d 1330 (Ala. 1993); see also. O. Stephen Montagnet, Assumption of
Risk in Mississippi: Eliminating the Confusion While Retaining the Defense - Independent of
Comparative Negligence Principles, 64 Miss. L.J. 753,755 and note 14 (1995).
"^55 Prosser, supra note 415, at 579, note 5; MILLER, supra note 412, § 32.01, at 3.
756 Prosser, supra note 415, at 579, note 5.
''^''
See, e.g., Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Nebraska, and Tennessee, see, PROSSER, supra note 415, at
579 note 5. B.
"^5* Most jurisdictions apply this kind of modified comparative fault concept, see, e.g., Connecticut,
Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, see, PROSSER, supra note 415, at 579 note 5. C.
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Whether the comparative fauh system not only applies to actions based on
negligence but also to strict liability is controversial. Most jurisdictions chose to apply
comparative fault to strict liability. "^^^ They argue that the semantic difference between
"fault" on the one hand, and "strict liability or no-fault" on the other hand, is irrelevant.
The main argument of these courts, however, focuses on the fact that if comparative
fault principles were not applied to strict liability, the plaintiff would be placed in a
worse position than if he had sued in negligence, although strict liability was imposed to
protect the consumer. In negligence, plaintiffs fault only diminishes, but does not
completely bar his claim, whereas when he sues in strict liability, his assumption of risk
completely forecloses recovery. Since in some jurisdictions assumption of risk is
merged into comparative fault, this would lead to the result that assumption of risk in a
negligence action would not defeat the plaintiffs recovery, while the same conduct in a
strict liability case would bar his claim. To void this "bizarre anomaly," comparative
fault should also apply to strict liability.'^^o On the other hand, it is also argued that it
would be unfair towards manufacturers to disregard the consumer's misconduct,
because this would relieve consumers from all responsibility for safe product use.''^'
4. Assumption of the risk
In some jurisdictions the defendant is allowed to bring assumption of risk on the
part of the plaintiff as a separate defense. This term is defined as "[pjlaintiff s voluntary
exposure to a known risk."''^^ ^g can be concluded from this definition, the defendant
must establish three elements in order to successfully plead this defense: the plaintiffs
759 See. e.g.. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1 162 (Cal. 1978); Armstrong v. Clone, 738 P.2d 79
(Haw. 1987).
''^O Daly V. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1 162, 11 67-1 169.
"761 Daly V. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 11 62, 11 72 (Cal. 1978); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665
S.W.2d 414,425 (Tex. 1984); Smith v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 600 F.Supp. 1561,1568 (D. Vt.
1985).
"^^2 Montagnet, supra note 754, at 754.
175
knowledge of the danger, its appreciation by the plaintiff, and his deliberate and
voluntary exposure to that danger^^^ For example, these prerequisites would be fulfilled
where the driver of a car knows about steering problems but continues to use it for a trip
during his vacation. ''^'^ Some states take the position that assumption of risk completely
bars plaintiffs claim^^^ Since assumption of risk as a complete defense would lead to
inconsistent results in connection with the application of comparative fault principles,
most jurisdictions have abolished assumption of risk as a separate defense and recognize
it only as a factor in determining comparative fault.^^^
5. Product misuse, alteration and modification
When the plaintiff uses a vehicle in an abnormal maimer or in a fashion not
intended by the manufacturer,''^^ or when he negligently repairs it or adds accessories to
it, one must consider how this conduct is relevant for his recovery. In some states
misues and alteration are statutory defenses.^^^ As for conmion law, most courts take the
position that the plaintiffs damages should be diminished according to the principles of
763 Elias V. New Laurel Radio Station, Inc., 146 So.2d 558,561-562 (Miss. 1962).
^64 Palmer v. Ford Motor Co., 498 F.2d 952 (10*^ Cir. 1974), applying Kansas law (the driver of a 1968
Ford truck was killed in an accident allegedly due to a steering defect. The court held that the driver's
knowledge of steering problems and the continued use of the truck could constitute assumption of risk).
^65 Tafoya v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 884 F.2d 1330 (10* Cir. 1989) (applying Colorado law); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572 (1991).
766 Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1 162,1 172 (Cal. 1978); South v. A.B. Chance Co., 635 P.2d
728 (Wash. 1981); Sanford v. Chevrolet Div. Of General Motors, 642 P.2d 624,628 (Or. 1982).
^67
See, e.g., Daniell v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.Supp. 728 (D.N.M. 1984): In an attempt to commit
suicide, plaintiff became locked into a trunk of a 1973 Ford for nine days. Plaintiff claimed that the car's
trunk lock design was defective for lack of an internal release mechanism. The plaintiff could not recover
for breach of implied warranty when the use of the trunk in this fashion was not intended.
''^^
See, e.g.. IND. CODE § 33-1-1.5-4(3); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-04.
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comparative fault.'^^ However, if this kind of conduct was unforeseeable for the
defendant manufacturer, the plaintiffs claim is completely barred.''''^
6. Comparison to German product liability law
As we saw earlier, German law explicitly recognizes most of the discussed
defenses. This is true for the statute of limitation defense (§ 852 BGB:'^''' three years
nmning from the time at which the plaintiff knew of the tortuous act and the tortfeasor;
§ 12 ProdHaftG: three years from the time in which the plaintiff knew or could have
known of the tortuous act), the statute-of-repose defense (§ 13 sec. I ProdHaftG: '^''^ ten
years running from the time at which the product has been put on the market), and the
contributory negligence defense (§ 254 BGB). Under the latter, every aspect of the
plaintiffs conduct, for example assumption of the risk or negligent conduct such as
driving while intoxicated, is taken into consideration in the decision on whether and to
what extent he should recover. Furthermore, German law applies in its § 254 BGB and
§ 287 ZPO an approach similar to the pure comparative fault concept, which is used by
some jurisdictions in the United States. However, a concept similar to the modified
comparative fault system is unknown in German law.
G. Damages
If the plaintiff has successfully brought a product liability action against the
automobile manufacturer, he is entitled to recover damages for the harm he suffered.
Damages can be classified in two groups, compensatory damages and punitive damages.
769 West V. Caterpillar Tractor, 336 So.2d 80,90 (Fla. 1976); Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 454 N.E.2d
197,204 (111. 1983); States v. R.D. Werner Co., 799 P.2d 427,430 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
'^''O Schuh V. Fox-River Tractor Co., 218 N.W.2d 279 (Wis. 1974) (unforeseeable misuse or alteration is a
complete bar).
''• See, Chapter I, supra at 65.
^^2 See, Chapter I, supra at 89.
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Compensatory damages can further be divided in economic damages and non-economic
damages.''''^
1. Compensatory damages
Compensatory damages are awarded to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries
and to restore him to the position he would have been in if the injury never had
happened.^'"* The plaintiff can recover for compensatory economic damages if he
suffered monetary loss. Monetary loss includes financial expenditures for medical
treatment, burial and memorial expenses, loss of income, past and future impairment of
earning capacity, expenses occurred for substitute domestic services, loss of use of
property (e.g. vehicle), and expenses for repair of damaged property ^'^^ Compensatory
non-economic damages, on the other hand, can be defined as subjective, non-monetary
losses. '^''6 They include, for example, recovery for pain and mental suffering, loss of
care, comfort, companionship and society, and consortium.'^''''
7" See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 18.560 (2) (a), (b), (3) (1997).
^^^ Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales ofJustice through National Punitive Damage Reform, 46
Am. U. L. Rev. 1573,1578, note 20 (1997).
''''5 Or. Rev. Stat. § 18.560 (2) (a) (1997). However, it has to be emphasized that recovery for the
defective product itself is - like in German law - considered as pure economic loss for which recovery in
most jurisdictions is not allowed because the provision of this kind of remedy is regulated under the
Uniform Commercial Code, see, e.g., East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476
U.S. 858 (1986); Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145,147-148 (Cal. 1965); National Union Fire Ins.
Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Pratt and Whimey, Can., 815 P.2d 601,604 (Nev. 1991): The court held that
damages resulting from a defective airplane engine leading to the destruction of the whole plane was
mere economic loss not recoverable under tort law. One important rationale for this rule is that otherwise
contractual statutes of limitation could be undermined, see, e.g.. Spring Motors Distribution v. Ford
Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660,663 (N.J. 1985). On the other hand, recovery is - again like in German law -
allowed where a defective component part {e.g. a gas pedal) led to the damage of the entire product (e.g.
vehicle) if component part and the rest of the product are not deemed to be an integrated whole, see. e.g.,
East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858,867 (1986) (holding that the
turbines of a ship and the ship itself are an integrated whole. The damage of the ship by defective
turbines is no damage to other property so that recovery was precluded).
'76 OR. Rev. Stat. § 18.560 (2) (b) (1997).
777 Or. Rev. Stat. § 18.560 (2) (b) (1997).
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2. Punitive damages
Punitive damages, on the other hand, are monetary damages that are not
intended to compensate the plaintiff.'^''^ Rather, they are awarded to punish a
manufacturer for its intentional, malicious, reckless or willful conduct showing its
indifference to human safety. The objective of punitive damages is to provide
retribution and to deter the actual defendant, as well as other potential defendants, from
similar conduct in the future (individual and general deterrent).''''^ Unlike compensatory
damages, punitive damages are a "[pjublic remedy for a public wrong. ""^^^ A significant
automobile case in which punitive damages were awarded, and that we have discussed
in cormection with the introduction of punitive damages in Germany and the
manufacturer's recall duties, is Grimshaw v. Ford Motor CoJ^^.
3. Comparison to German product liability law
Also in this field of comparison, German and U.S. product liability laws have a
great deal in common. Like U.S. law, German law recognizes the classification of
compensatory damages in economic and non-economic damages. ^^^ of particular
interest is the fact that the rules regarding recovery for the defective product itself are
identical. In both countries, compensation under tort law for the defective product itself
is generally precluded by the law governing contracts, which would otherwise be
undermined. A common rationale for this rule is based on the fact that the statutes of
limitation in contract law vary from the ones in tort law. Nevertheless, an exception to
'''8
See. e.g.. Enstan Group, Inc. v. Grassgreen, 812 F.Supp. 1562,1583 note 14 (M.D. Ala. 1993).
779 See. e.g.. Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 1377,1383-1384 (5* Cir. 1991) (upholding
the size of a punitive damage award because of its deterrent effect on the manufacturer); RESTATEMENT
(Second) Of Torts, § 908, cmt. a.;
7*0 Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales ofJustice through National Punitive Damage Reform, 46
Am. U. L. Rev. 1573,1579 (1997).
781 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981).
782 See, Chapter I, supra at pp. 66.
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this general rule is made under both laws in cases where the defective component part of
a product and the product itself are not deemed to be an integrated whole. "^^^
However, in an important matter German law differs from its American
counterpart. Unlike American law, German tort law does not recognize punitive
damages. As for the rationales and the proposal of introducing punitive damages in
German law it can be referred to the discussion on punitive damages in the first
Chapter.784
Another point of divergence between the law in both countries is that, as a
matter of fact, damage awards in the United States are generally much higher than in
Germany. Damages for pain and suffering awarded by German courts, for example,
rarely exceed DM 100,000 while U.S. awards for the same kind of damage often exceed
this amount by far. An explanation for this difference may be that in Germany the court
(judge(s)) decides on the amount of damages to be awarded, whereas under U.S. law
this generally is the task of the fact finder (jury)- Moreover, U.S. attorneys might be
able to exert more influence on juries (e.g. exposure to emotions suffered by plaintiff)
than German attorneys can on judges. Other aspects explaining this divergence may be
that social security (unemployment insurance, health insurance, pension insurance fund)
in the United States is not as good as in Germany, that medical expenses are higher, and
that attorneys work on contingent fees.
^^^ See, Chapter I, supra at 65, note 292.
"^^^
See, Chapter I, supra, at pp. 66.
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H. Conclusion
1. Analysis of products liability law in the United States
Regarding the theories of liability (strict liability and negligence), we have seen
that the plaintiff can base his claim on strict liability only in the area of manufacturing
defects. Although some courts may use the label of strict liability for design and
warning defect claims, the majority of jurisdictions apply, in reality, a kind of
negligence standard to these two kinds of defects. Within this standard a risk-utility test
focusing on the availability on a reasonable alternative design or warning is performed
in which consumer expectations are appropriately considered as one of several factors.
However, in order to ease the plaintiffs burden of proof, the introduction of a
presumption that an alternative design was available should be adopted by state
common law.
With regard to the manufacturer's post-sale duties, the courts should
unanimously recognize a post sale duty to warn and recall defective vehicles. This
recommendation is based on the ground that the responsibility of the manufacturer does
not end with the placing of its vehicles on the market, because he created a potential
source of danger which constantly has to be monitored, controlled, and eventually
eliminated. In this area the National Highway Safety Administration and state common
law should function as a double control mechanism in order to increase traffic safety by
preventing the occurrence of harmful events through post-sale warnings or recalls.
In addition to the already mentioned controversial aspects of Unites States
product liability law, the most difficult and practically relevant issue is the one of
preemption of state common law by the Traffic Safety Act and / or Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards. This issue is rooted in the federal system of the United States
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(see Supremacy Clause)'^^ and requires a balance of power between the federal
government and the individual states. The answer to the question of whether state
common law is preempted or not is decisive for every aspect of the plaintiffs action and
has to be determined by focusing on Congress' intent. Currently, neither Congress nor
the Supreme Court provided adequate guidelines on how to determine the issue. In its
recent analysis in Cipollone, Freightliner, and Medtronic, the Supreme Court did not
take a clear position and left wide room for various interpretations of its holdings. In the
ftiture, however, the Supreme Court should determine precisely if and to what extent
preemption takes place in the motor vehicle area. More blameworthy than the Supreme
Court, however, is Congress. It could avoid the discussion surrounding the preemption
doctrine by cleary stating its intent in its legislation. Until today, Congress has failed to
do so because it was probably easier to pass legislation v^dthout directly resolving the
issue. Potential defendants have to be advised in two ways. First, in every design or
warning defect case involving Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, they should
raise the preemption defense. Since the majority of United States Courts of Appeals and
numerous state courts argue in favor of preemption, it is very likely that they will win
the case on summary judgment. Second, since some courts take the opposite opinion,
manufacturers should not only comply with applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards, but rather they should comply in the way that they choose to adopt the safest
of several safety options provided by those standards. Although this will increase costs
on the part of the manufacturer, which will at the end be reflected in the product price
and, thus, be borne by the consumer, this contributes to increase traffic safety and
minimizes the manufacturer's risk of facing economic loss through damage awards.
785 U.S. Const., art VI, cl. 2.
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2. Final aspects in the comparison between United States and
German product liability law
a) Similarities
The most important finding in the comparison between product Habiiity law in
the motor vehicle area in both countries is that both laws are very similar, and in some
aspects even identical. This is particularly true for the recognition of two theories of
liability (strict liability and negligence), the existence of three kinds of product defects
(manufacturing, design, and instruction or warning defect) , the standards applied to
determine product defectiveness,''^^ the distribution of burden of proof, the defenses,
and most of the damages.
Significantly, the extent to which both laws are similar has increased since
Germany enacted the Product Safety Act in 1997, empowering, among other agencies,
the Federal Office for Motor Traffic to take preventive measures (warning, recall) in
order to increase traffic safety. Since the American counterpart, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, empowered with similar authority, was established in the
late 1 960s,^^^ today both countries use a combination of administrative preventive check
and judicial compensatory check to pursue the common goal of traffic safety.
In addition, even the conceptual difference between German Civil Law and
United States Common Law is minimized in the area of product liability, because not
only in the United States but also in Germany the rule making and development of this
786 The starting point in German product liability law is a consumer expectations test supplemented with
elements of a risk-utility balancing. Under United States law, the starting point is a risk-utility analysis
supplemented by taking into consideration consumer expectations.
7^7 It seems to be the trend that United States product liability law is - at least in some areas - the
forerunner of German product liability law. This is not only reflected in the fact that Germany
empowered its Motor Vehicle Administration with authority only about 30 years later but also in the fact
that the privity requirement in the United States has already been abolished in 1916 (in MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., Ill N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916)) whereas in Germany this only happened in 1968 (in
BGHZ 51,91 ff.).
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field of law is the task of the courts. The most important explanation for this finding is
that in Germany the existing statutes on product liability (the Civil Code from 1900
with its general provisions in §§ 823 ff BGB and the Product Liability Act from 1990)
either do not address product liability issues explicitly (Civil Code) or do address them
in an incomplete or inefficient way (Product Liability Act).
Eventually, an explanation for the remarkably significant similarities in product
liability law in both countries is a similar economic, social, and political development.
Both countries are highly industrialized, technologically developed, and economically
strong. In particular, industries in both countries are characterized by a large number of
manufacturing companies (e.g. Chrysler, General Motors, Ford; BMW, Mercedes Benz,
Audi, Porsche, Volkswagen) involved in worldwide trade. Although a few cultural
differences exist, people in both coimtries join similar education under a democratic
system and have basically the same world view. These people constitute society. Law,
on the other hand, does not find an end in itself but pursues, among other things, to set
standards which are economically, socially, and politically acceptable. Most often, law
seeks to find the right balance of interests. As a result, one might say both that law is the
mirror of society and that the nature of society is to a certain extent reflected in the
governing law.
B) Differences
On the other hand, three aspects in which both laws differ fi-om each other
should be outlined. The first significant difference is that although the law in both
countries is very similar in terms of substantive legal doctrine, it is different in terms of
practical matters. As for procedural aspects, pre trial dicovery exists in U.S. law but is
unknown to German law. The fact finding process under U.S. law is left to a jury
composed of six or twelve jurors, while in Germany the judge(s) decide(s) exclusively
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on this issue. ''88 Another important aspect concerns the remuneration of attorneys. In the
United States most attorneys work on a contingent fee basis, some on an hourly basis. In
Germany, however, contingent fees do not exist. The fees German attorneys receive are
regulated in the Federal Attorney Fees Act (Bundesgebuehrenordnung flier
Rechtsanwaelte, BRAGO).^^^
The second significant difference is that although both countries have a
federalist structure, tort law in Germany is exclusively regulated by the federal
government, while in the United States this area of law is traditionally a matter of state
law. Thus, in the United States there is not a single applicable tort law, but there are 50
tort laws addressing and solving issues sometimes similarly, sometimes differently. On
the one hand, this has the advantage that a variety of solutions can be provided by the
states, which can experiment in this area of law. On the other hand, this has the
disadvantage that United States law is not as clear as German law. The latter fact has
raised the question whether United States tort law should be more federalized. The
position taken to this complex and difficult question is that the federal government
should only slightly interfere, for example by providing optional proposals concerning
product liability issues. The rationale for this position is that tort law traditionally
belongs to the police powers of the states and is an important part of sovereignty.
Moreover, if one pleads for the nationalization of tort law, one must also plead for a
nationalization of other matters left to state competence (e.g. criminal law, family law)
in order to be consistent. This, however, would violate fiindamental principles of the
United States federal system.
^88 jn commercial affairs, however, one professional judge and two honorary jugdes (persons without
professional legal background, usually businessmen or merchants) decide the case, see, § 105
Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (GVG), in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 9. Mai 1975, BGBl. I S.
1077) (Landgericht, Kammer flier Handelssachen).
^89 BGBl. I S. 907.
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Third, the most important point of divergence concerns the recognition of
punitive damages. While this kind of damage is recognized in U.S. product liability law
as means of retribution and deterrence, it is unknown to German tort law. However,
because of these two objectives and in order to create incentives for motor vehicle
manufacturers to produce safer products, it is recommended that capped punitive
damages should be adopted by the German legislature.
Appendix
Examples of recall campaigns carried out by NHTSA'^^o
Company Model Number Year Reason
Chrysler Corp. Dodge Ram 960,000 1997 Transmission
Ford Motor Co. Crown Vict. 125,000 1997 Structure, hood
General Motors Cad. Delville 156,910 1997 Brakes, antiskid
BMW 3 181, IS, IC 410,000 1997 Throttle linkage
Mercedes Benz, N.A., S-Class 27,000 1997 Brakes, hydraulic
VW ofN.A. Audi 90 39,300 1997 Airbag
Volvo ofN.A. Model 855 12,530 1996 Fuel, throttle linkage
Toyota Motor Co. Camry 18,746 1997 Brakes, power assist.
Nissan Motors Corp. Altima 36,000 1996 Active Restraint Syst
Hyundai Motor Am. Tiburon 74,965 1997 Visual systems
Ferrari N.A. F355, F456 346 1997 Brakes, hydraulic
Rolls-Royce Motors Silver Dawn 1,621 1997 Brakes, hydraulic
Suzuki Motor Co. TLIOOOSV 2,935 1997 Steering (motorcy.)
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